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Chapter 1 
 
Introduction 
 
 
 
In 2002, they talked about a hundred-year flood. Then in 2006, it came again. Then in 2013. 
Again! Now, nobody talks about hundred-year floods. That is a problem. 
- Günter Koch, Gohlis, Dresden. 
 
 
 
In June 2014, the Technical University of Dresden held a conference on disas-
ters and cultural heritage protection. I participated. As the final event of the 
conference, the organisers had arranged a tour of Dresden’s floodwall defence 
systems in the city centre (Altstadt). It was a warm and humid day, almost like 
an omen of the scorching temperatures that the local valley climate can produce 
in July and August. Since rain had been scarce in the region, the Elbe was at 
an extremely low level. It was difficult to imagine what the river had looked 
like almost a year ago to the day in 2013, when the most recent flood inundated 
parts of Dresden. 
 The organisers had asked representatives from the Dresden municipality 
to show us the flood protection systems that the city had installed and upgraded 
over the course of the last decade. The protection walls run along the banks of 
the Elbe in the Altstadt, whose buildings make up the famous city skyline that 
earned Dresden the nickname “Florence on the Elbe” (Elbflorenz). Although 
many of these structures were rebuilt after the bombing of Dresden in 1945, the 
city centre is still cherished as a heritage site. The 2002 floods, which no one 
had expected, flooded parts of the baroque city centre and resulted in large-
scale restructuring of technical solutions to keep water out; this was one of the 
reasons heritage experts had come to Dresden for the conference.  
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 The elaborate system of walls and gates prevents the city centre and the 
rest of Dresden from being inundated, leaving only the riverbanks, where tour-
ist steamer ships lie at anchor, to be flooded. Since 2002, the city has invested 
in a massive system of mobile barriers that can be inserted, unfolded, or in-
stalled onto the sandstone walls when the risk of flooding is imminent. One of 
the bigger installations is a massive steel gate on hinges located by a track and 
field stadium to the west of the city centre. As our guides open it, they make 
sure that no one is trapped behind it. Once it begins to open, it cannot be 
stopped. Next to the gate, a wall hides another gate that slides out and closes 
off the street that leads into the city, preventing water from flowing into the city 
centre and the surrounding neighbourhoods. Each year, the authorities run 
drills to make sure the walls operate as they should and that they can seal off 
the city from threatening water masses. 
 Across the Altstadt, various solutions of these sorts, big and small, have 
been installed with almost surgical precision. In some cases, huge steel or sand-
stone gates are rolled out. In other cases, small mobile steel plates are connected 
to the permanent sandstone walls that once fortified the city against attacking 
enemies. “It’s like a game of Tetris,” a conference participant exclaimed as one 
of the guides showed us how the steel extensions are fitted onto the sandstone 
walls. The municipal representative explained in a proud voice the details of 
how long it takes to unpack all of these elements and install them. “Dresden,” 
he said, “can be made flood proof in a matter of hours.” The point is to have 
these systems ready to activate as quickly as possible, but without them being 
noticed in the day-to-day life of this busy tourist part of the city, the guide from 
the municipality explains to us. They have been fitted and adjusted into the 
architectural design of the city’s riverfront, enabling the aesthetics of the city 
centre to reflect the picturesque image of Dresden as the riverine capital of Sax-
ony. It is as if there exist two versions of the city at the same time: one for 
normal times, and one for the floods.  
 As the tour moves along, I strike up a conversation with an American 
professor who gave a presentation on the first day of the conference on Asian 
heritage sites and disaster risks. After discussing his talk, he asks me what I am 
doing here in Dresden. I tell him that I have come to do fieldwork to study the 
effects of the floods on local politics. He nods and says, “Oh, that sounds inter-
esting. This is a much-debated topic after Hurricane Katrina in the United 
States. That was a huge event. This here in Dresden, this is more like your usual 
disaster.” 
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Dresden under Water 
 
Dresden, a medium-sized German city with a population of approximately 
500,000 people and the capital of the Free State of Saxony, is no stranger to 
floods. As a riverine city situated along the banks of the Elbe, inundation has 
historically been an unpleasant fact of life for the population (Fügner 2002). As 
the city grew to become the cultural and economic centre of Saxony in the 18th 
and 19th centuries, population numbers increased and physical settlements ex-
panded along the river, making it one of Germany’s largest cities in terms of 
land area (Landeshauptstadt Dresden 2015). This made more inhabitants vul-
nerable to floods, and they devastated the city on several occasions in the period 
between 1784 and 1941 (Dresden Umweltamt 2012; Poliwoda 2007); there 
were also less damaging and smaller events that reached the seven-meter mark 
at the central measuring station by the Elbe in the Altstadt. During the 19th and 
early 20th century, massive flood canals, wide retention fields, and elaborate 
dike systems were built to make sure that flood waters could be controlled and 
diverted away from the city centre (Adam 2001; Korndörfer 2001). 
 Then something strange happened. Although water levels in the Elbe still 
reached considerable heights every year, the sixty years after 1941 did not pro-
duce any flood event that overran the city's flood defences. Dresden experi-
enced what historian Christian Pfister (2011) calls a disaster memory gap, during 
which the collective memory of what floods entail in terms of inundation and 
material damage faded out of public awareness and memory (see Figure 1). 
 Then, in August 2002, heavy rain for weeks on end caused the Elbe to 
reach the highest water levels on record, and large parts of the city, including 
parts of the baroque city centre, were inundated. Few people in Dresden had 
conceived of the possibility of an event on this scale, which revealed significant 
vulnerabilities in many areas of the city (Korndörfer et al. 2010:291). In hind-
sight, it was called a hundred-year event, and one not likely to occur again an-
ytime soon. In 2005 and 2006, two minor floods once again threatened the city, 
although they left most parts dry (Dresden Umweltamt 2012). Then, in June 
2013, the third-largest flood event on record broke the dikes in parts of  the city. 
Dresden had again experienced an event that was only supposed to occur once 
every hundred years. Now, those tasked with dealing with floods in the city face 
a conundrum: if  events once thought to be rare are now occurring several times 
in a decade, how should Dresden prepare for a “new normal” one-hundred-
year event? How far does one go in protecting the city against a future that does 
not fit past statistical projections? 
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Figure 1. Flood events in Dresden 1800 – 2013. Water level in cm. at Augustusbrücke in Alt-
stadt Dresden on the Y-axis. Only events over seven meters included. Flood events over eight 
meters in bold. Data provided by the Landeshochwasserzentrum Sachsen. 
 
  
  
1845
877 cm.
1862
824 cm.
1890
837 cm.
2002
940 cm.
2013
876 cm.
600
650
700
750
800
850
900
950
18
00
18
06
18
12
18
18
18
24
18
30
18
36
18
42
18
48
18
54
18
60
18
66
18
72
18
78
18
84
18
90
18
96
19
02
19
08
19
14
19
20
19
26
19
32
19
38
19
44
19
50
19
56
19
62
19
68
19
74
19
80
19
86
19
92
19
98
20
04
20
10
 
 
5 
 As many people have pointed out to me – often as the very first thing they 
said when I asked about their flood experiences – this particular area of  Ger-
many had not experienced severe floods for over half  a century when the major 
flooding came in 2002. Many speak of  a loss of  generational knowledge. Only 
old people knew what a flood in the Elbe river basin could amount to; 2002 
took almost everyone by surprise. No one had expected or even imagined that 
the Elbe and its tributaries could overflow with such magnitude and force. And 
then, most thought this kind of  event would not come again for at least a cen-
tury.  As one resident in a flood-prone area close to the Elbe remarked to me, 
“I thought I had already had my flood in 2002. But then the 2013 floods came. 
That was not supposed to happen.” 
 The Central European floods of  2002 and 2013 are the specific disaster 
events in focus in this work. Both events caused massive damage, and affected 
hundreds of  thousands of  people across the region. The economic costs of  the 
2013 floods numbered 11,7 billion euros in total (Munich Re 2014). The even 
more damaging 2002 floods were one of  the costliest disasters in European his-
tory, testifying to the fact that in the industrialised west (or global north), disas-
ter vulnerability is predominantly a matter of  economic risk, whereas in many 
other parts of  the world, vulnerability is a matter of  life and death (Blaikie et 
al. 1994). Hundreds of towns and settlements across Central Europe were 
flooded, and twenty-one people died in Germany alone. In Dresden, the costs 
of  the 2002 floods have been estimated at 1.36 billion euros (Dresden Brand- 
uund Katastrophenschutzamt 2013). Tens of  thousands were evacuated. Hun-
dreds of  homes were destroyed, ruined, or made uninhabitable for months – in 
some cases, years. Stories of  people losing their homes or livelihoods and seeing 
their insurance premiums rise were widespread in the media and in official re-
ports (Dresden Umweltamt 2012). The 2006 flood was a minor event that only 
flooded a few parts of  the city. The 2013 flood, although almost as high, caused 
comparatively less damage than the 2002 event, with costs amounting to “only” 
137,1 million euros (Freistaat Sachsen 2013:12). Recently, this was also docu-
mented across other sites in Germany that suffered from the same flood events 
(Thieken et al. 2016). An official evaluation report argued that the reduced im-
pact of  the 2013 flood was directly due to the massive investments in structural 
flood protection that followed the 2002 event (Kirchbach et al. 2013). In Dres-
den, the local administration calculated that its investment of  26 million euros 
in flood management plans between 2003 and 2013 had been directly responsi-
ble for the damages being almost a tenth of  what they were in 2002 (Dresden 
Brand- und Katastrophenschutzamt 2013). Still, hundreds of  houses were 
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flooded, thousands were evacuated, and just as many were made homeless for 
a considerable period. For many people in Dresden, the 2013 floods were just 
as bad, or much worse, than the 2002 event, since insurance plans had become 
less comprehensive, relief  aid from state and civil society sources was less gen-
erous, and reconstruction firms sought higher profits with poorer-quality work. 
But most importantly, few residents of  Dresden had expected that a flood on 
par with 2002 would occur within such a short time frame. Suddenly, people 
had a different conception of  what a hundred-year flood might mean.  
 Dresden is but one out of  hundreds if  not thousands of  cities, towns, vil-
lages and settlements all across Europe that have been impacted by recurring 
floods in recent years. As a continent, Europe is prone to several major disaster 
events each year (UNISDR 2014). In some regions, such as central Italy, earth-
quakes are a major natural hazard, as we have witnessed most violently in the 
recent past. In other areas, such as the North Sea region, storms and storm 
surges are a persistent source of  destruction for coastal settlements (Mauel-
shagen 2009). In almost all parts of  Europe, however, river flooding1 is the most 
frequent type of  natural hazard, and it has shaped and impacted European so-
cieties for as long as there have been human settlements (Wanner et al. 2004).  
 It is clear from European historical flood data (see Figure 2) that the num-
ber of  events has increased in the last one hundred years. Demographic devel-
opments and increasing urbanisation are among the factors contributing to the 
rising number of  events, which result in increased economic damage.2 The Eu-
ropean Environment Agency pointed out in 2013 that it cannot yet be assumed, 
however, that climate change is driving the increasing number of  flood events 
and damage costs. The conclusion in terms of  impact, however, is clear: across 
many parts of  Europe, it seems, floods have become more frequent, and, one 
could argue, a more regular aspect of  life for millions across the continent. One 
could also argue that, in some places, although they were once thought to be 
highly exceptional, they are now increasingly perceived to be the rule rather 
than the exception. This, I argue in this thesis, is the case in Dresden. 
   
 
 
                                                 
1 The type of floods that occur in Dresden are called fluvial flooding, which is caused by a 
river bursting its banks and flooding the surrounding areas. Other types of floods include 
coastal flooding (as a result of tidal shifts and/or storm surges), pluvial flooding (as a result of 
precipitation amounts exceeding the capacity of drainage and sewer systems), and reservoir 
flooding (dam breaches). 
2 What is striking, however, is that the number of deaths per event seems to have decreased. 
Meanwhile, the tendency in terms of number of affected people is less clear. 
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Figure 2. Floods in Europe 1900-2016. From above: number of  events, total damages (‘000 $). 
Years in bold, indicate years of  recent flooding in Dresden. Only riverine floods were chosen 
for this statistic. Source: EM-DAT Database. 
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 Although climate science cannot provide clear-cut and precise answers as 
to whether the Central European region will be more or less exposed to extreme 
amounts of  water due to climate change (Kovats et al. 2014; EEA 2013), the 
prospect of  a future with wilder, less predictable weather and river flooding is 
nonetheless the scenario that the city government and citizens of  Dresden are 
increasingly adjusting to.3  
 
 
Politics of the Usual 
 
After the conference event, the phrase “your usual disaster” stuck in my head. 
At first, I was puzzled by the American professor’s characterisation of  the 
floods as “usual”. Was he implying that they were unimportant?  
 I had heard this line of  thinking before. “Why,” colleagues and friends 
often asked me, “are you going to study a disaster that is not really that much 
of  a disaster? Who cares that some Germans got their basements flooded?” In-
deed, compared with events such Hurricane Katrina in 2005, the 2010 Haiti 
Earthquake, or the 2011 Tsunami-Earthquake-Nuclear Disaster in Japan (to 
name but a few recent examples), floods in places like Dresden are modest in 
scale, impact, and severity. Nevertheless, they are defined as disasters both offi-
cially (Dresden Brand- und Katastrophenschutzamt 2013), and in an emic sense 
by those that have endured them locally. How, then, can they be usual if  they 
are real disasters? 
 There was something perplexing about it. To speak of  usual disasters seems 
an oxymoron. To suggest that disasters can be normal, typical, or usual goes 
against the very idea of  what they are. In their essence, disasters are events that 
disrupt the normal state of  affairs. Hidden within the etymology of  disasters 
and catastrophes (“bad star” from Latin, and “critical turning point” from an-
cient Greek, respectively)4 lies the fact that they are events or periods where 
normalcy is momentarily suspended. How then can one speak of  disasters as  
                                                 
3 I should note that climate change does not frame the theoretical or empirical inquiry in this 
thesis, as this was quite simply not something that people in Dresden were concerned about, 
nor did it make a difference to their perspectives on the future of  floods in their city. However, 
it does figure as a backdrop for many of  the discussions being held in Dresden, as the city 
tries to adopt policies that address climate change adaptation measures (Korndörfer et al. 
2009). I will return to the question of  climate change towards the end of  the thesis. 
4 The etymological roots, origins, and meanings of the words disaster and catastrophe have 
been debated for years (see Quarantelli (1995) and Mauelshagen (2015)). Here, I refer to the 
meanings to which they are most commonly attached in references like the Oxford English 
Dictionary. 
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Figure 3. The 2002 floods in Dresden, Gohlis. Photo used with permission. 
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being usual when they are, by definition, unusual? How can flood events that 
people experience as destructive and disruptive be perceived at the same time 
as usual, typical, or even normal?  
 What we today call disasters covers a range of  very different types of  
events. Some are almost cataclysmic in nature, while others are frequent, fore-
seeable, manageable, and non-disruptive – and yet the disaster label is applied 
to them. Disaster scholars have argued over how to define disasters for more 
than half  a century (Quarantelli 1995), yet because what is called a disaster in 
most common languages covers such a wide array of  phenomena, there is still 
a lack of  clarity, precision, and simplicity in how we define disasters today (Ol-
iver-Smith 1999a:19). In terms of  severity, events such as the floods in Dresden 
occur each and every day somewhere on the planet. In this sense, such disasters 
are indeed usual, since such a large number of  them occur with such regularity 
that they escape global media attention (Pfister 2011). However, at the local 
level – for the people who experience the hardships of  these events – they can 
be usual in another sense, that is, as regular exceptions. They are experienced 
as such when, as Mauch (2009:3) describes, they are perceived and treated as 
“more of  the same,” even though they still appear to be discrete events. In this 
sense, the American professor was more right than he knew. Floods in Dresden 
are indeed perceived at this particular moment in time to be usual disasters. 
 In this thesis, I will explore how, after having experienced three major 
flood events since 2002, the citizens of  Dresden are adjusting to a new perceived 
reality in which recurring floods are the rule rather than the exception. My ar-
gument is that the people of  Dresden and the local government are in the pro-
cess of  usualising major flood events as disruptions that occur on a regular basis, 
but none-the-less also as events that are inherently uncertain. In Dresden, today, 
a collective feeling is emerging that what were once rare events are becoming 
ever more usual. This, as I will argue, has implications for how people under-
stand themselves as members of  society, and how floods in Dresden have a po-
litical and public afterlife. 
 Through these chapters, I attempt to understand the political ripple effects 
of  the multiple flood events that have occurred in the same place, with almost 
the same degree of  impact, over the course of  less than fifteen years by exam-
ining different cases, themes, and issues that have emerged around the flood 
events. As events that recur at the intersection of  nature and culture (Oliver-
Smith 1999a), I will explore how floods in Dresden become intertwined with 
other political issues. In other words, I aim to understand ethnographically 
what it means for people in Dresden to live with events that are articulated and 
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spoken of  as disasters (Katastrophen), and yet are treated as “more of  the same”. 
It is an attempt to ask how disasters come to be perceived as usual by those 
affected by them, and what political and social issues they leave in their wake. 
 I approach the Dresden case through a perspective of how flood events 
give rise to technical, moral, economic, and cultural issues. These include what 
kinds of  structural flood protection schemes should be built; to what extent the 
public can and should participate in flood emergency management tasks; how 
the riverscape, or floodscape, of  Dresden ought to be properly managed to bal-
ance flood protection and natural resources; the building of  urban infrastruc-
ture and greening of  the city; the question of  disaster solidarity and mutual help 
in times of  crisis; and how people are taking individual steps to mitigate the 
effects of  flood damage to their homes in the absence of  large-scale flood man-
agement solutions and new insurance schemes. All of  these issues, I argue, have 
emerged in the wake of  the floods, are constantly changing, and in turn shape 
how Dresden will face the next flood. They speak to many, but not all, of  the 
concerns that preoccupy the people of  Dresden as they learn to live with the 
floods, but importantly, they are also issues of  a more general nature. 
 Sociologist Michael Guggenheim has argued that there are two funda-
mental ways of  seeing the relationship between disasters and politics: as disas-
ters producing politics, or as politics producing disasters (Guggenheim 2014:7). 
In both versions, disasters and politics have a clear causal relationship with one 
another, in which disasters are taken to be events that either provoke some kind 
of  political, social, or cultural change, or as events that expose the political con-
figuration of  a society. My approach in this thesis attempts to steer clear of  
providing any clear-cut causal links. Instead, I take the Dresden floods and var-
ious political issues to be co-constitutive. In this way, I use the metaphorical 
concept of  intertwinement to signal how floods can at the same time both cata-
lyse changes in society and reveal aspects of  society (Gotham and Greenberg 
2014).  
 My argument in this thesis aligns itself  with a general insight drawn from 
anthropological and historical studies of  disasters (Oliver-Smith and Hoffman 
1999; Bankoff  2002), namely, that disasters are never located outside of  society. 
Moreover, I would argue that in cases such as Dresden, they are both the prod-
uct of  society and producing society in a recursive way, constantly oscillating 
between revealing the workings of  society and producing new configurations 
as actual events and as imaginaries: that is, as concrete events located in space 
and time (Sørensen and Albris 2016), and as events that continue to exist in 
public discourse and public memory both retrospectively and prospectively. 
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 Anthropological studies of  disasters often blur clear-cut causal relation-
ships between disasters and society that see disasters as either producing society, 
or being the product of  society. For instance, Anthony Oliver-Smith, perhaps 
the most widely cited disaster anthropologist, writes, “disasters occur at the in-
tersection of  nature and culture and illustrate, often dramatically, the mutuality 
of  each in the constitution of  the other” (Oliver-Smith 2002: 24).  Later in this 
introduction, I will expand on this argument, presenting different strands of  
research that can be categorised as either seeing disasters as the product of  so-
ciety (the vulnerability approach), and studies from various disciplines that look 
specifically at the effects disasters have on society. 
 I am not suggesting that such studies of  disasters are erroneous or that 
they have a wrongly construed approach to the subject, as I will make clear later 
on. Rather, the attempt is to produce an analysis of  a different kind of  disaster 
politics, one that does not take the disaster event itself  as the sole and primary 
focus of  political issues, but rather looks at how flood events in Dresden become 
intertwined with political and social questions that concern the people of  Dres-
den. 
 We could say, then, that this perspective sees floods in Dresden as political 
events only in relation to other issues or sets of  issues. Events that recur in the 
same place within a few years involve a different kind of  politics than the major 
disasters such as Hurricane Katrina or the 2010 Haiti earthquake, which bring 
with them exceptional circumstances and political problems. This thesis is, in 
other words, an attempt to approach the study of  disasters not as a politics of  the 
exceptional, but as a politics of  the usual by examining their public life as a partic-
ular aspect of  what Bankoff  (2002) has called a culture of  disaster.  
 
  
Structure of the Thesis 
 
This thesis consists of  seven chapters, which include this introduction and a 
conclusion. The rest of  the introduction situates the main arguments of  the 
thesis in relation to the research literature in the anthropology of  disasters, 
while drawing upon geographical, sociological, and historical research on dis-
asters. Here I will elaborate on what I take to be disaster politics and what I 
mean by “the public life of  floods”. I continue by describing the fieldwork, the 
empirical material, and reflections on positioning, informants and Dresden as 
the chosen field site for the ethnographic study. Apart from presenting the 
reader with a more detailed account of  what I did in Dresden, whom I talked 
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to, and what kind of  data I collected, the methodological section also touches 
upon the question of  retrospection as a methodical and theoretical component 
of  both the fieldwork and the analysis. I also discuss the fieldwork's approach 
of  following issues around as a methodological heuristic, rather than following 
a particular group of  people or focusing on one particular part of  the city. 
 Chapter Two sets the context for the rest of  the thesis, first by providing a 
brief  introduction to the history of  Dresden, and second, by providing a history 
of  flooding in the city. We begin with its establishment as the capital of  the 
independent Kingdom of  Saxony, and move to its incorporation into the Ger-
man Empire. After having experienced the rupture of  the First World War, 
Dresden, like the rest of  Germany, experienced economic crisis and the rise of  
National Socialism, which led ultimately to the Second World War. This cul-
minated with the cataclysmic bombing of  the city in February 1945, the defin-
ing event in the modern history of  the city. The war was followed by a half-
century of  communism, until die Wende (“the turn” or “the change”) and the 
reunification of  Germany brought liberal democracy and the influx of  market-
based capitalism, resulting in many places in the disintegration of  local com-
munities. Today, however, Dresden is a thriving city, with economic and demo-
graphic numbers on the rise. It is also a city in which an ongoing and vibrant 
discussion of  what it has been, what it is, and what it ought to be is taking place 
(Dyke 2001), apparent in the city’s growing political polarisation and the rise 
of  right-wing populism. 
 In the second part of  Chapter Two, I consider the great shock of  the 2002 
floods (Kuhlicke 2010), and how flood-affected people retrospectively reflect on 
what happened during the event. I then relate this collective shock to the history 
of  how Dresden and Saxony fought floods in the 18th and 19th centuries, and 
how this created a gradual learning process by which the state and its popula-
tion developed technical and social systems to deal with these events (Poliwoda 
2007).  In investigating how people in Dresden are becoming accustomed to a 
reality and future with more frequent major floods, I argue that one of  the ways 
that a usualisation of  floods occurs is through practices that make these events 
public through the creation of  visible memories in the natural and built envi-
ronment in and around Dresden. This has created what I call a floodscape, with 
signs, watermarks, monuments, and other material inscriptions that tell a story 
of  the city and its history of  inundation with the distinct characteristics of  what 
Ullberg (2013) has termed a memoryscape.  
 While Chapter Two situates the thesis in relation to Dresden’s history, 
including its history of  floods, Chapters Three to Six analyse different social 
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and political issues related to the afterlife of  floods. The themes and questions 
I explore in these four chapters overlap in important ways. Despite their inter-
relation, however, each chapter makes its own independent arguments on dif-
ferent issues. They are concerned with distinctively different issues that I have 
singled out from my empirical data as important to people in Dresden. 
 Chapter Three explores how people responded to the flood emergency in 
June 2013. I describe how the flood event unfolded, and how citizens partici-
pated in the effort to stop the flood risk from becoming a full-blown disaster. In 
the response efforts, a sense of  unity and common purpose among citizen vol-
unteers emerged and was enacted through different activities, from building 
sandbag dikes to debating whether the local government and professional agen-
cies had performed adequately in the face of  the flood risk. Civil networks and 
associations emerged out of  the emergency and are slowly beginning to resem-
ble or mimic professional agencies, but not in a one-to-one manner. What was 
significant about the 2013 flood response, moreover, was how social media pro-
vided citizens with a set of  platforms and tools that enabled new forms of  col-
laboration and coordination between citizens during emergencies. This devel-
opment was met with criticism from the local government, especially the fire 
department, even as the authorities praised civil participation in the flood crisis 
as acts of  civic virtue and awarded a large number of  flood response medals. 
This praise was summed up by the Prime Minister of  Saxony, Stanislaw Tillich, 
when he declared in a parliamentary discussion shortly after the emergency, 
“Our society works!” (Sächsischer Landtag 2013:8032).  
 In Chapter Four, I focus on the phenomenon of  disaster solidarity, exam-
ining how informants reflect on their own actions and the actions of  others 
during the different flood events. I describe various kinds of  social gatherings 
and community associations that have emerged in the wake of  the floods and 
how the question of  solidarity with flood victims became entangled with the 
issue of  solidarity towards asylum seekers during the European refugee “crisis” 
in the summer of  2015. I am thus not examining what kind of  phenomenon 
post-disaster solidarity is, but rather what happens to it after it evaporates, and 
how its afterlife is institutionalised, idealised, and politicised. In the chapter, I will 
discuss the notions of  anti-structure and communitas, as originally formulated 
by Victor Turner (1969), in an attempt to understand how such liminal forms 
of  solidarity are related through people’s experiences and in public discourse to 
a more structural form of  solidarity in the Durkhemian sense (1984).  
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 Chapter Five explores the controversy over plans to build a floodwall in 
Laubegast, a town located east of  the Dresden city centre. The issue of  perma-
nent flood protection is especially controversial in several places in Saxony 
(Otto el al. 2016). I analyse how plans to build a floodwall in the wake of  the 
2002 floods became an issue of  fierce debate, dredging up symbolic compari-
sons to the Berlin Wall, pitting locals against each other, and revealing the lo-
cals’ deep mistrust of  the Dresden city government. The debacle resulted in the 
city council authorising a participatory process in which citizens, state repre-
sentatives, and scientific experts discussed the best way to protect Laubegast 
against floods. The process took one year and produced a document recom-
mending that the wall should not be built: it suggested instead that the river, 
and thus also floods, need to be adjusted to and lived with, hence the docu-
ment’s title, “Living with the River” (“Leben mit dem Fluss”). At its core, the 
controversy is about the will and the possibilities to adapt to natural hazards 
rather than to prevent them entirely. Laubegast today is still without any struc-
tural protection schemes, meaning that those at risk of  future floods are taking 
individual measures to mitigate risks and reduce vulnerability to their property 
and assets by remodelling their homes to reduce damages.  
 The question of  how citizens adjust their homes and living conditions to 
floods is the theme of  Chapter Six. Many who live in the peripheral flood-prone 
areas of  Dresden, where structural protection is impossible for one reason or 
another, are faced with a dilemma: either adjust to the flood risk, or move away. 
Unfortunately for many, houses in flood-prone areas are hard to sell, and 
homeowners in these areas are thus tied to their mortgages and houses, in what 
seems for some like a deadlock. Meanwhile, politicians in Germany from the 
federal to the municipal levels are calling for more private insurance schemes 
to bear the burden of  paying for flood damages. However, many flood-affected 
people in Dresden find it impossible to buy insurance, and those that can have 
policies that are highly unfavourable and hugely expensive. As the community 
comes to the realisation that one hundred percent protection from floods is im-
possible to achieve, the logic and rationale of  flood management in Dresden is 
slowly turning toward risk management-based approaches, in which the respon-
sibilities and costs of  floods are distributed between homeowners and local 
communities. 
 In the conclusion, Chapter Seven, I attempt to bring together the various 
issues raised in the previous chapters. Here I will also address the question of  
how we can understand floods as being intertwined with other issues in terms 
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of  change and time, with respect to the ethnographic material in Dresden, 
which will also be covered in the following sections of  this introduction. 
 
 
Disasters Produced by Society 
 
As scholars of disasters and international development have argued for several 
decades, no disaster event is solely the result of the hazard itself (O’Keefe et al. 
1976). Rather, disasters come about through a complex interaction between the 
hazard and the vulnerabilities found within society itself. This is the main in-
sight of the so-called “vulnerability turn”5 that many believe has profoundly 
changed the way we think about and deal with natural disasters: we are begin-
ning to understand that there is nothing “natural” about them (Bankoff, Frerks 
and Hilhorst 2004; Blaikie et al. 1994).  
 During the latter part of  the 20th century, geographers, historians, sociol-
ogists and anthropologists began to challenge the use of  the adjective “natural” 
in the description of  disasters. Disasters, they argued, ought not to be seen as 
the mere outcome of  a hurricane of  an earthquake, but instead as the result of  
a complex and dynamic interplay between a hazard and the conditions and 
structures of  vulnerability in society itself  that put peop 
le in jeopardy and expose them to risk. In anthropology, the approach to the 
human condition in disasters as a result of vulnerability is most precisely for-
mulated by Oliver-Smith: 
 
A disaster is made inevitable by the historically produced pattern of vulnerability, evi-
denced in the location, infrastructure, socio-political structure, production patterns, and 
ideology, that characterizes a society. The pattern of vulnerability will condition the be-
haviour of individuals and organizations throughout the life history of a disaster far more 
profoundly than will the physical force of the destructive agent. (Oliver-Smith 1999:29) 
  
 As Oliver-Smith himself  noted in the case of  the 1970 Peru earthquake, 
in order to understand why that disaster impacted the region the way it did, one 
has to see it in the context of  500 years of  history (Oliver-Smith 1999b). This 
echoes the central point of  Kenneth Hewitt’s (1997) work on the geography of  
hazards, which was a foundational starting point for the turn to vulnerability in 
                                                 
5 There is no agreed-upon term to describe this turn, or whether or not it was, or is, a turn at 
all. However, with the rising interest in vulnerability as the primary cause of disasters, it is 
safe to say that a paradigm shift was underway in the 1980’s and 1990’s that today has be-
come dominant, not just in academia, but in the industry of disaster management more 
broadly.  
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its critique of  environmental determinism (Mauelshagen 2015:177). Yet it was 
the book entitled At Risk: Natural Hazards, People's Vulnerability, and Disasters, by 
Blaikie, Cannon, Davis and Wisner (1994, second edition as Wisner et al. 2004) 
that has since become the ‘bible’ of  the vulnerability approach. The book be-
gins, quite surprisingly, by stating that disasters “are not the greatest threat to 
humanity” (Blaikie et al. 1994:3). The message of  the book is that structural 
inequalities, such as lack of  access to housing, food, livelihood, political rights, 
and security, are the main drivers of  disaster risk. As such, the authors argue 
that preparedness, prevention, and relief  will not fundamentally reduce the risks 
that large parts of  the human population face. Rather, risk reduction should be 
aimed at development, and especially poverty relief, as the main way to address 
the structural inequalities that operate on local, regional, national and global 
scales, and that render the poorest population groups most at risk. In order to 
present a simple instrument to implement this view of  disasters, Blaikie et al.  
developed the PAR model (Pressure and Release Model) that has since become 
widely popular in international disaster risk reduction work.  
 From this perspective, disasters should be seen not only as sequential 
events (Bankoff  2004), but as processes that render people unsafe and vulnera-
ble as a result of  political, economic and social forces in society evolving over 
time. Vulnerability and exposure to disasters come about as a consequence of  
struggles over resources and political power, whereby some social groups find 
themselves in unsafe conditions. Such unsafe conditions can in turn be traced 
back to certain root causes in society, which have brought about economic ine-
quality, lack of  access to resources, social oppression and lack of  knowledge 
and education.  
 From the perspective of  vulnerability then, disasters and disaster risks are 
inherently socially produced and constructed. Or as Kathleen Tierney (2014) 
phrases it, in order to understand disasters, one has to understand the social 
roots of  risk. In other words, this particular approach to disasters emphasises 
that, notwithstanding the fact that hurricanes or earthquakes trigger disasters, 
such events are ultimately produced by society. 
 Recently, the concept of  resilience has gained considerable attention as a 
possible substitute for the role of  vulnerability in disaster management and risk 
reduction discourse (Comfort et al. 2010). Originally used far more often in 
other disciplines (material science, psychology, ecology, etc.) to denote robust-
ness and the ability to “bounce back” from an external shock, resilience began 
to take hold as a concept applied to social systems in the 1990’s and 2000’s 
(Adger 2000). 
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 Vulnerability as a paradigm, an approach, and a concept was crucial in 
focusing attention on the factors and conditions that produce disasters, showing 
how these events are always socially produced, through and through. The prob-
lem, however, was that an overwhelming focus on vulnerability and the argu-
ment that what is needed is to address the underlying developmental and socio-
economic problems in society that expose people to risk tended to reduce the 
role of  people themselves to bystanders – victims of  larger structural forces that 
had placed them in situations of  vulnerability, poverty, and marginality.  
 But resilience conveyed a more positive message than vulnerability, sug-
gesting that risk reduction could be handled by people themselves, since at the 
end of  the day, humans are resilient agents endowed with agency. The large 
United Nations project Resilient Cities, which was one of  the first projects on 
resilience and disasters, aimed to harness the slumbering forces of  communities 
and individuals to improve physical and social infrastructures so they are better 
able to withstand external shocks. This is echoed, for instance, in Kathleen Tier-
ney’s more nuanced concept of adaptive resilience. Tierney sees the strong bonds 
of solidarity that arise in the wake of disasters (see Chapter Five) as “a funda-
mental source of adaptive resilience” (Tierney 2014:203); I would argue that 
this description of resilience, one that focuses on the adaptive aspect of the con-
cept, has more interesting dimensions to it, as it departs from the original mean-
ing of resilience as a mechanical “bounce-back effect”. 
 Yet, few terms deserve the label ‘buzzword’ more than resilience as it is 
used today, and criticisms of  the term are cropping up (Barrios 2014; Cox and 
Cox 2016), even by some of  the early proponents of  the term (Evans and Reid 
2015). For instance, Hastrup (2009) has argued that resilience is a problematic 
concept in so far as it originates in systems thinking, and it thus in order to be 
effective relies on a systemic way of  thinking about social phenomena that was 
discarded by anthropology and sociology decades ago. Another criticism is that 
resilience discourse models tend to fit a certain kind of  travelling rationality, 
made to fit any context (Craig and Porter 1997), that often pays no attention to 
the specific circumstances and histories of  the communities and societies in 
which they intervene (Barrios 2016), although disaster risk reduction profes-
sionals have been shown to attach very different meanings to the concept (Ol-
wig 2009). 
 Roberto Barrios has shown this to be in the case in post-Hurricane Mitch 
Honduras (Barrios 2014). Barrios researched two communities that experi-
enced remarkably different post-disaster reconstruction processes. One commu-
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nity saw crime go up, and urban development poorly managed. The other com-
munity was thriving, social cohesion was strong, and NGOs and donors poured 
resources and money into their rebuilding and reconstruction efforts. In other 
words, one community was described as resilient, the other as vulnerable. Yet, 
as Barrios observes, “these two communities did not exist as geographically or 
socially delimited entities prior to the disaster” (Barrios 2014: 338). Instead, 
political relationships between locals, NGOs, donors, and the local authorities 
changed those communities. As Barrios points out, “the qualities and capacities 
of these communities took shape in the midst of these relationships” (Barrios 
2014: 339). Resilience, in this way, works as an anti-politics machine (Barrios 
2016:30; Ferguson 1994) that sets up its own goals, after which experts, donors, 
and authorities can claim success if  those goals have been achieved. Similarly, 
Benadusi’s (2013) work on post-tsunami Sri Lanka shows that community re-
silience sometimes amounts to little more than giving off  an image of  being 
resilient with the aim of  attracting donor and aid support.  
 Vulnerability and resilience have become central terms in the study of  dis-
asters and many other fields, generating enormous amounts of  research litera-
ture over the past years. However, the path taken by this thesis diverges from 
any direct conceptual discussions of  these terms. It will address issues pertain-
ing to vulnerability and resilience as needed, but it will not engage in conceptual 
discussions of  these, nor see the politics of  usual disasters in post-flooding Dres-
den through the conceptual apparatuses of  resilience and vulnerability.  
 The above discussion of  these terms instead serves to highlight how a spe-
cific strand of  research on disasters focuses on different ideas that can explain 
how societies produce disasters (vulnerability), and how societies can be 
changed so that they can withstand disasters in the future (resilience). In other 
words, this approach starts from the premise that disasters are the outcome of  
processes that originate from configurations in society that predate the disaster. 
Another strand of  research turns this relationship on its head, and instead fo-
cuses on the kinds of  changes and impacts that disasters have on society, not 
only in relation to future disasters, but also as events that impact all aspects of  
society, especially politics, which I will focus on next. 
 
 
Society Produced by Disasters 
 
Several fields of  research spanning different disciplines examine how disasters 
instigate effects that change society in one way or another. In the following, I 
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will outline some of  these, with specific focus on the political aftermath of  dis-
asters.  
  The type of  research that most directly studies this issue explores the ef-
fects that disasters have on political systems and the election of  political leaders 
(Rubin 2016). This literature is driven mainly by political scientists and reflects 
their disciplinary perspective. This research field focuses on the politics of  dis-
asters in relation to the existing institutional political system and the election 
of  political representatives. Studies have also looked at how particular tipping 
points in the intensity of  a disaster can lead either to change or to an accelerated 
status quo, as Pelling and Dill (2010) observe, suggesting that a disaster can 
either mean the downfall of  a political regime or the strengthening of  its posi-
tion. The 2002 and 2013 floods in Germany, incidentally, provide a rare oppor-
tunity for comparative analysis of  political voting behaviour, as both events hap-
pened not long before a federal election, prompting both Gerhard Schröder in 
2002 and Angela Merkel in 2013 to rush to the flood-affected areas in order to 
show their support for victims and gain voter support (Bechtel and Hainmueller 
2011). 
 Other studies of  how disasters produce political issues focus on the after-
math of  disasters, and their attendant political controversies and struggles; 
fights over compensation, reconstruction and relief; political change and state-
citizen relations. As has been widely documented, disasters often have a direct 
impact on the relationship between civil society and the state, government le-
gitimacy, and in some cases, regime change, as after the major 1985 Mexico 
City earthquake (Pelling and Dill 2010:22).  Many such studies have looked at 
how civil society has organised itself  into political and social movements, de-
manding government accountability for absent or inadequate disaster response 
efforts (Aldrich 2012; Fortun 2001; Petryna 2002; Johnson 2011).  
 Disaster events reveal not just images of  how a society copes with horrific 
and terrible events, bringing to light the conditions of  vulnerability that pro-
duced the disaster. They also provide clues to the relationships between order 
and disorder, stability and instability, prior to and following the events. As Ste-
phen Hilgartner notes, “Disasters evoke horror not only because they make 
chaos and suffering visible but also because they reveal shocking disorder in 
socio-technical systems” (2007:154). As such, relations between the public, gov-
ernment actors, corporations, and responsible emergency response units are 
likely to be reconfigured both structurally and mentally in the aftermath of  dis-
asters. 
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 Technological disasters are perhaps the most complicated in their after-
math. Adriana Petryna’s (2002) work on the Chernobyl nuclear meltdown of  
1986 is a milestone, not just in disaster studies, but in medical and political 
anthropology as well. By drawing on the notion of  biopolitics from Michel Fou-
cault (1990), she understands the socio-political effects of  the disaster in Cher-
nobyl through the lens of  biological citizenship: that is, citizenship premised on 
a specific governance of  the body. In a similar vein, Kim Fortun’s (2001) work 
on the long-term political effects of  the Bhopal chemical spill in 1984 seeks to 
strike a balance between a historical and contemporary account, focusing on 
legal struggles for compensation by the impacted population. Fortun’s and Pet-
ryna’s works both demonstrate how technological or industrial disasters are ripe 
with legal and political controversies that live on for decades after the disaster 
event itself, forcing us to ask when and where a disaster starts and ends, and 
whom it includes and excludes. Gregory Button’s (2010) work on the Exxon 
Valdez oil spill and other environmental disasters looks at the interactions be-
tween local communities and outside experts in the aftermath of  environmental 
disasters. More recently, David Bond’s (2013) work on the knowledge contro-
versies and governance issues surrounding the 2010 BP oil spill in the Gulf  of  
Mexico continues this line of  inquiry. Technological and industrial disasters of-
ten fuel heated blame-games, in which different actors seek to strategically po-
sition themselves in order to avoid paying compensation or taking legal respon-
sibility. 
 The afterlife of  disasters is also the topic of  Edward Simpson’s recent book 
The Political Biography of  an Earthquake: Aftermath and Amnesia in Gujarat, India, 
a thorough and detailed account of  the 2001 earthquake in the Indian state of  
Gujarat and its political ripple effects. As Simpson notes sarcastically, “disasters 
are not (only, one could add) the big, bad state of  exception to which all and 
everything can be attributed” (Simpson 2013:12). In the aftermath of  the earth-
quake, transformations occurred that sought to prepare the ground for a mas-
sive influx of  capitalist ventures, foreign investments, community reconstruc-
tion programmes, and donor restructuring programmes. It turns out that the 
Gujarat earthquake is yet another example of  the ability of  the global economic 
system to capitalise on disasters.  
 This phenomenon, labelled disaster capitalism, has become the focus of  
much work on the aftermath of  disasters in recent years, especially after the 
publication of  Naomi Klein’s (2007) influential book, The Shock Doctrine. Klein 
observed that in both wars and disasters, the shock of  disruption enables private 
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companies and profit-seeking ventures to obtain contracts for projects like re-
lief, reconstruction, rehousing and security. Disaster capitalism can be seen as 
a specific way that governments and private companies seek mutual benefit 
from a particular kind of  disaster governance, one that is driven by neoliberal 
market ideology, privatisation of  public services, and deregulation that permits 
profit-seeking actors to gain advantage from a crisis or emergency.  
 Anthropological takes on disaster capitalism have contributed to the un-
derstanding of  the relationship between the movement of  capital, free markets, 
and post-disaster reconstruction and relief  (Gunewardena and Schuller 2008). 
The medical anthropologist Vicanne Adams’ (2013) book Markets of  Sorrow, La-
bors of  Faith follows in the footsteps of  Klein by providing a rich ethnographic 
portrayal of  the privatisation of  social services in post-Katrina New Orleans. 
Importantly, Adams notes that not only did private companies obtain govern-
ment contracts to provide relief, recovery and reconstruction services (such as 
the infamous FEMA trailers provided by Haliburton that failed the governmen-
tal responsibility to care for the citizenry), but their capitalisation on post-dis-
aster management also restructured the role of  NGOs and private charities, in-
cluding church charities, by forcing these civil society actors to mimic profit-
seeking ventures by requiring them to produce things such as risk assessments 
and investment portfolios. Governance through neoliberal policies, ideologies, 
and rationalities, in other words, restructures and reframes a much wider set of  
relations in the post-disaster period. 
 Studies of  Hurricane Katrina have unearthed other aspects of  the afterlife 
of  disasters than the disruptive neoliberal capitalism. Katherine Browne’s 
(2015) monograph and ethnographic film, Standing in the Need is a detailed ac-
count of an extended African-American family of 300 members that had to flee 
New Orleans, showing how the social effects of a disaster event have long-term 
implications for how the most fundamental structures of kinship and related-
ness are configured. In a different vein, Shannon Lee Dawdy’s (2016) Patina: A 
Profane Archaeology, is an attempt to understand the historical and present iden-
tity of New Orleans by focusing on how people are connected through material 
objects in the city, post-Katrina. 
 The term disaster covers a typology of  events and situations that span a 
wide continuum of  impact, severity, and scale (Quarantelli 1998). However, a 
common denominator for what we call disasters is that they are situations that 
invoke a sense of  urgency among the impacted population and the institutions 
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tasked with responding to them. Disasters are then, almost by definition, emer-
gencies.6 A different strand of  research focuses not on the effects of  disasters 
through their aftermaths, but on the effects of  their anticipation, by studying 
how emergencies are prepared for and anticipated. 
 Anthropologists, sociologists, political scientists, and geographers have 
looked at themes such as anticipatory actions, preparedness logics, disaster sim-
ulations, the governance of  emergencies, the biopolitics of  emergencies, and 
other themes that all point to the political reordering of  society and public in-
stitutions before a disaster event has happened (Anderson 2010; Anderson and 
Adey 2012; Beckett 2013; Calhoun 2004; Fassin and Pandolfi 2010; Lakoff  
2007; Revet 2013). This literature illustrates the rise of  a specific problematisa-
tion of  emergencies in which the very idea of  what an emergency is, how gov-
ernments prepare for and anticipate them, as well as their political ramifications 
are brought into question.7 As I will explore in particular in Chapter Three, my 
intention in this thesis is to ask what kinds of  questions emergencies like the 
Dresden floods provoke with respect to how a state or a government deals with 
citizens’ desire to participate, and how citizens, in turn, relate to the state as the 
responsible actor for dealing with these emergencies. In short, how are state-
civil society relations reconfigured in an emergency and through the existence 
of  the flood events, both as they exist in the past as memories, and in the future, 
as projections of  the next event (Beckett 2013:86; Guggenheim 2014:9)?8 
  Anthropological studies of  disasters generally see them as being located 
within society, never outside of  it, and it is therefore hard to pinpoint political 
causes and effects in the relationship between disasters and society. The 2004 
Southeast Asian tsunami shows this clearly.  The disaster has been the object of  
ethnographies such as Monica Falk’s (2014) study of  the social and cultural 
impacts in Thailand; Michelle Gamburd’s (2013) The Golden Wave, an account 
of  the restructuring of  social identities and political structures in Sri Lanka; 
Mara Benadusi’s (2015) work on the politics of  community and humanitarian 
aid, also in Sri Lanka; and finally, Frida Hastrup’s (2011) work on how a fishing 
village in Tamil Nadu, India, dealt with the great wave through a cosmological 
                                                 
6 However, not all emergencies are disasters. This means that disasters are often lumped to-
gether with other forms of emergencies in the growing field of emergency studies Fassin and 
Pandolfini 2010. 
7 Craig Calhoun’s coining of the term “emergency imaginary” perhaps most precisely cap-
tures the stance of this critical approach to emergencies as a discursive power that legitimises 
global humanitarian interventions. 
8 I should note that when I talk about states of  emergency or exception, I am not necessarily 
referring to any legal categories as prescribed by law. Here I take the emergency to be a lived 
experience, a situation perceived to be endowed with great urgency by the affected people.  
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reordering of  their relationship to the sea, what she calls “weathering the 
world.” More recently, ethnographers have begun to make the ways collective 
memory and forgetting relate to the politics of  disaster a central focus in their 
work (Ullberg 2013; Simpson 2013), which portrays how disasters are being 
appropriated into society via cultures of  remembering and forgetting.  
 These different ways of  approaching how disasters impact and affect so-
cieties in both anthropology and related disciplines testify to a growing interest 
in understanding how disasters are just some among the many events that con-
tinuously shape societies, cultures and communities, and how disasters exert 
continuous impact upon culture and society, and vice versa. 
   
 
Intertwinement 
 
The distinction between studies that focus on how disasters are produced by the 
configurations of  society on the one hand, and how they change society on the 
other, as I have outlined above, is of  course a crude demarcation of  an area of  
research (disasters) that is made up of  many different lines of  inquiry. Most 
scholars would probably agree that disasters do both: they reveal the power 
structures of  society, including who are the most vulnerable and at risk, and 
they also have an effect on society after they have struck. Disasters are thus 
never located outside of  society. However, if  they are both catalysed and cata-
lysers, as Gotham and Greenberg (2014) have formulated it, then how are we 
to delineate where they start and end, or what role they play in the shaping of  
culture, with this dual ontology? 
 During my fieldwork in Dresden, I observed that the process of adapting 
or adjusting to past disasters that are expected to recur in the future is not an 
automatic, frictionless movement towards a predetermined ideal of optimal ad-
aptation. Here, I am inspired by Anna Tsing’s concept of friction. Although 
originally developed to understand the relationship between global and local 
processes, Tsing’s semantically flexible notion of friction also helps to under-
stand the relationship between floods and society in Dresden because, as she 
argues, “Cultures are continually co-produced in the interactions I call friction: 
the awkward, unequal, unstable, and creative qualities of interconnection 
across difference” (Tsing 2004:4). 
 During my research in Dresden, I have come to understand how both the 
deep and recent history of  floods has a distinct place in the way that citizens 
and the local government view their city. As one city official from the Dresden 
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Environmental Office (Umweltamt) told me, “You have to understand that 
Dresden’s relationship to floods is premised on a 400-year-long history.” There 
is no easy path to understanding how floods have been caused by society and 
in turn have affected the social, political and cultural make up of  Dresden. In-
deed, as a city with a deep and intimate history of  disasters, Dresden reflects 
the ways that other societies and cultures have evolved and developed, not in 
spite of, but because of, disasters. 
 In many parts of  the world, natural hazards are so common and cyclical 
that they become an integral part of  the social and cultural organization of  so-
ciety. This happens when a population’s expectations of  how disasters affect the 
social and natural world are attuned to past experiences and shape what will 
happen in the near and distant future.  
 Historian and ethnographer of  the Philippines, Greg Bankoff, has argued 
that Philippine society can be defined to a large extent as a culture of  disaster. Its 
continuous exposure to natural hazards of  various types, Bankoff  argues, cre-
ates a normalisation of  disaster risk whereby the threat that disasters pose 
looms not on an unlikely future horizon, but as a very real and ordinary condi-
tion around which people organise their lives, often in quite undramatic and 
practical ways. This, for Bankoff, presents a problem for the dominant vulner-
ability approach: 
 
Explanations that account for disasters in terms of a society’s vulnerability continue to 
assume that such a state of affairs is an abnormal one; though it may be a situation 
caused as much by socio-economic and political factors as by physical ones, it is none-
theless considered to be an aberrant condition. But for billions of people, in fact for the 
greater part of humanity, hazard and disaster are simply just accepted aspects of daily 
life. So normal, in fact, that their cultures are partly the product of adaptation to those 
phenomena. While a greater appreciation of the importance of hazard to the construc-
tion of culture still gains little acceptance among most western scientific communities, 
there are already signs of changes to come. As the developed world itself is increasingly 
beset by the consequences of global warming, climate change, and rising sea levels, ideas 
about hazard and disaster may have to be reconsidered. (Bankoff 2002:3) 
  
 Bankoff's argument is summed up by his statement that, “In some socie-
ties like the Philippines natural hazards occur with such historical frequency 
that the constant threat of them has been integrated into the scheme of daily life 
to form what can be called cultures of disaster” (Bankoff 2002:4). This leads 
Bankoff  to criticise current uses of  the vulnerability concept as hiding a hege-
monic Western discourse that renders some peoples as vulnerable according to 
a specific development logic of  what being vulnerable looks like. Although 
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Bankoff  is being provocative – and perhaps overstating the scale of  his point to 
include “the greater part of  humanity” – his main argument speaks directly to 
the kinds of  questions and issues I pursue here. 
 I do not claim that floods in Dresden are accepted aspects of  daily life. To 
suggest that the anticipation of  and the recovery after floods, not to mention 
the existential and psychological reworking they require, are part of  everyday 
life would go too far. Nor are floods in Dresden annual or cyclical, in the sense 
that weather phenomena like El Niño or tropical storms in the Philippines are, 
which recur much more frequently. Neither are they perceived at this moment 
to be out-of-the-ordinary “black swan events” (Taleb 2004), however, as they 
were before the 2002 floods. They sit somewhere in between, as both uncertain 
but possible future events that exert real influence over the present through both 
their manifestations in the riverscape of  Dresden and in the way that citizens 
organise their personal and social lives. 
 In a similar vein to Bankoff, historian Franz Mauelshagen has researched 
the long history of  storm and flood risks along the German North Sea coast. 
He has argued that the communities that have settled these regions for centuries 
can be characterised as a region of  risk, or a landscape of  coping (Mauelshagen 
2009). For Mauelshagen, a focus on multiple similar events occurring in the 
same area or city is a crucial aspect of  understanding how communities develop 
ways of  dealing with such events: 
  
Cultural practices, organizational achievements, or the building of  risk-management in-
stitutions that acknowledge the ongoing potential for disaster within a given community 
are unlikely to emerge from the experience of  single aberration. This explains why for-
mer approaches to the historical study of  disaster have failed to address the issue of  
sustained cultural change. Communities’ coping strategies must be seen as the result of  
a series of  occurrences that are perceived as similar and recurring even though their un-
predictable appearance still defines them as discrete events. (Mauelshagen 2009:44) 
 
 What both Mauelshagen and Bankoff  point out is that we need to pay 
attention to the way disasters are part and parcel of  the historical development 
of  societies, on par with other events that rupture and bring about change. By 
seeing the adaptation of  societies and communities to future events as an out-
come of  learning through trial and error in the face of  multiple recurring disas-
ters, we come to appreciate that “the unexpectedness of  catastrophes is not a 
historical constant. Rather, it depends on the character of  knowledge of  a soci-
ety at any given time” (Mauelshagen 2015:175). The point here is that when 
knowledge of  a hazard such as floods changes, attitudes and perceptions of  
risk, prevention, response and adaptation change as well.  
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 Disaster risk, as Sheila Jasanoff  argues, echoing Mary Douglas and Aa-
ron Wildavsky (1984) in their seminal work on risk and culture, is not a stable 
form of  objective knowledge against which we can easily measure the future. 
Rather, risk is essentially “memory bumped forward” (Jasanoff  2010). When 
and if  we speak of  disasters as provoking a kind of  disaster culture, then such a 
claim must be weighed against the current situation of  the community in ques-
tion, as well as against the temporal proximity of  the series of  events (i.e. when 
did they happen, how much time passed between them, were they substantially 
different, etc.) that have forced the members of  the community, including state 
actors, to engage in the building of  institutions and coping strategies in antici-
pation of  the next disaster. 
 In many ways, my objective in this research mirrors that of  Bankoff  in the 
Philippines and Mauelshagen in Northern Germany, not least because I agree 
with both of  these writers when they state in their different contexts that there 
is a need for social scientists to become more attentive to the historical perspec-
tive on disasters (Bankoff  2004; Mauelshagen 2015). In Dresden, floods have 
become entangled in other issues that hint at how flood events become much 
more than merely sequential, isolated events. Flood events become intertwined 
and entangled with issues surrounding technology, infrastructure, urban devel-
opment, post-unification identity, and notions of  solidarity between citizens. 
My approach to floods in Dresden, informed by the insights of  scholars such 
as Mauelshagen and Bankoff, examines these events and their relationship to 
society – not necessarily as a culture of  disaster, but, heuristically, as disaster-
as-culture. It is in this way that I aim to understand the public life of  floods in 
Dresden, not as a historian, but as an ethnographer. 
   
  
The Public Life of Disasters 
 
What do I mean when I claim that flooding is a public problem? How is a public 
problem different from a national problem, a community problem, or a societal 
problem? In order to approach these questions, I must address the question of 
what a public is. As Science and Technology Studies (STS) scholars have ar-
gued of late, echoing a point made by John Dewey (1954), publics are born out 
of an engagement with issues. Without issues, there is no public, as Nortje 
Marres (2007), succinctly puts it. Problems become issues and matters of con-
cern (Latour 2005) when a public is mobilised around them, laying a founda-
tion for institutional change to occur, as I will briefly discuss in Chapter Three.  
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 Michael Warner, moreover, reminds us that a public is essentially a self-
organised entity of relations among strangers, defined not by the involved ac-
tors’ ties to a social group through kinship or geographical boundaries, but by 
discourse. A public, therefore: 
 
…might almost be said to be stranger-relationality in a pure form, because other ways of 
organizing strangers—nations, religions, races, guilds, and so on—have manifest posi-
tive content. (…) A public, however, unites strangers through participation alone, at least 
in theory. Strangers come into relationship by its means, though the resulting social re-
lationship might be peculiarly indirect and unspecifiable. (Warner 2002:56). 
 
 Because a public exists only by virtue of address, it must predicate some 
degree of attention, however notional, from its members. We can therefore 
identify flooding in Dresden as a public problem when it engages members of  
society who are not directly affected by it themselves. The public life of  floods 
concerns more than merely sustained media attention, although this is part of  
the picture. It involves the ways in which many different actors in society engage 
with flood issues, thereby maintaining their status as matters of  concern. A slo-
gan by the local flood volunteer initiative Fluthilfezentrum says, “Flood protec-
tion concerns everybody” (“Hochwasserschutz geht jeden an”), and it is in this con-
text that I want to understand the specific circumstances and development of  
having to deal with flood disasters in Dresden.  One of  the central tenants in 
this research, then, is that in order to understand how disaster events shape a 
society or a culture, one needs to look beyond those individuals and groups that 
have been directly affected by the disaster. 
 The problem, however, is that it is relatively hard to make a clear-cut dis-
tinction between those that are affected by the problem and those that are not. 
Indeed, it is easy to determine which households are in the front line of  the 
flood risk, and have been flooded during each of  the last three flood events in 
the city. But the impact of  the floods extends far beyond those whose homes 
have been flooded and have suffered damages as a result. We can also say that 
different kinds of  publics arise around flood issues precisely because of  the dif-
ferences implicit in them: from public participation in flood response, to the 
planning of  flood protection and risk management policies locally, regionally, 
nationally, and internationally. 
 By approaching floods in this way, as a matter of public concern for the 
society of Dresden, I am also writing against the dominant notion of adaptation 
to floods and other natural hazards as being merely a matter of individuals and 
households making adjustments to reduce risk of damage and loss on the one 
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hand, and local government entities adopting appropriate and necessary plans 
to build the best structural protection solutions on the other. I am arguing that 
the recurring phenomenon of adapting or adjusting to floods should be seen 
through the lens of how relations between the state, ordinary citizens, and non-
state institutions change with respect to the many issues that floods leave in 
their wake. This can be seen as an alignment with Guido Poliwoda, historian 
of floods in Saxony, who, in his attempt to understand how the Saxon state 
became better adjusted to dealing with floods, asks, “How does political power 
react when society is repeatedly affected by natural disasters?” (Poliwoda 
2007:170).  
 To reiterate a point I have already made several times, I argue that flood 
disasters in Dresden are not political in and of themselves. Rather, they become 
politicised via the ways in which actors relate what occurs before, during and 
after floods to political issues such as property rights, insurance schemes, the 
political history of East Germany, the convergence of crowds of civilians in 
times of urgency, and the building of infrastructure and housing developments 
along the Elbe. As such, my perspective on floods in Dresden is that they be-
come politicised, and in turn, politicise other issues through the process of pub-
lic debate. What sets flood events in Dresden apart is that their urgency and 
intensity – indeed, their strong symbolic public presence as a collective threat – 
catalyses, amplifies, and brings into focus issues that have been latent or sim-
mering beneath the surface. 
 One further question needs to be clarified before I move on. If  disasters 
are generative moments that both shape and are shaped by other political issues, 
then what do I mean by the word political? In this thesis, I take disasters to be 
political in a broad sense, defined loosely as public power struggles between 
two or more actors over the allocation of material and symbolic resources in 
society.9 Candea (2011) has argued – in my view, correctly – that there has been 
such a proliferation of anthropological interest in “the political” and “politics” 
in recent years that it has become unclear what anthropologists mean by it, i.e. 
if everything is political, then nothing is political. Yet, for the political to be 
analytically interesting and conceptually useful, a balance needs to be struck 
between an open definition and one that has some kind of semantic boundary 
to it. Hence, I take public matters of concern in relation to floods as also being  
                                                 
9 This flexible definition, left intentionally broad, is a combination of several definitions of the 
political: in a Weberian sense as the struggle over and pursuit of power;  in a Schmittian sense 
as resting on the distinctions between friend and enemy (Schmitt 2005); and as David Easton 
noted, as a system that delegates authority over the allocation of values in society (Easton 
1953). 
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political problems, in so far as they involve power struggles and discussions 
around moral and ethical questions.  
 
 
Dresden as Field Site 
 
Most anthropological engagements with disasters and catastrophes follow the 
foundations of  ethnographic methodology, that focus on a single site or region. 
Moreover, given the typically fast onset of  disasters, many past disaster ethnog-
raphies have been written by scholars that had done fieldwork in the region 
prior to the event, who were present during the event, or even, in some cases, 
who were themselves disaster victims (Hoffman 1999a). This was true of  David 
Schneider’s (1958)  work on the island of  Yap in Micronesia, one of  the first 
articles that directly addressed disasters anthropologically, as well as for Bar-
bara Bode’s (1990) No Bells Toll: Destruction and Creation in the Andes, and An-
thony Oliver-Smith’s (1986) The Martyred City, both of  which dealt with the 
aftermath of  the 1970 earthquake in the Peruvian Andes.  
 Yet today, this is beginning to change to some extent. More fieldworks are 
being conducted on disasters and environmental crises in which anthropologists 
seek out the site of  a calamity to study its afterlife. This has been the case for 
many recent major disaster events I described earlier, and this present work 
aligns itself  with this trend.10  
 The 2013 Central European floods happened just as I was trying to decide 
where to conduct fieldwork for my doctoral research. I read a news article that 
stated that the floods had come “five years too soon” (Der Spiegel 2013b). Puz-
zled by this statement, I began researching more about floods in the region, and 
was intrigued by stories of the massive mobilisation of citizens in the efforts to 
fend off the water masses (Die Zeit 2013). I was also struck by how critiques of 
government response efforts were offset by complaints from authorities about 
so-called Wutbürgern (‘angry citizens’) who blocked plans to build structural 
flood defences (Der Spiegel 2013b). Recognising that these themes aligned with 
both my interests at the time and with my previous work in the South Pacific 
for my master’s thesis (Albris 2013), I decided to go to Germany and investigate 
these issues for my doctoral research. 
 I then went through a process of trying to decide which city, town or vil-
lage would be a good fieldwork site. There were many options. Hundreds of  
                                                 
10 In studying the immediate aftereffects of the 2013 tsunami in Japan, Slater (2013) calls the 
ethnographic study of sudden calamities and emergencies “urgent ethnography.” 
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Figure 4. Map of Germany. Source: Open Street Maps commons. 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Map of the Dresden Municipality. Highlighted areas are the main focus of this re-
search. Source: Open Street Maps commons.  
Gohlis and Cossebaude 
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places in the region had been flooded, some more severely than others. I could 
have chosen to go to a town such as Grimma, also in Saxony, that was among 
the most heavily damaged and has become the prime example of flooding in 
Saxony. Passau in Bavaria, where the Danube River meets two other riv-
ers,would also have been an interesting choice, as it wrestles with floods on a 
more regular basis than most. But in the end, I chose to go to Dresden. 
 Dresden was my choice because it seemed like the city had a variety of 
discussions around flooding going on at the same time. The city is both big 
enough for massive civil participation to emerge during flood events, and small 
enough to get a fairly adequate overview of the different actors that have a stake 
in, or seek to influence, flood issues. The value in choosing a city like Dresden 
to study a phenomenon like floods is precisely that it enables a focus on floods 
as a public problem. Dresden is not a metropolis. It is small enough to get a 
sense of how the city and its different neighbourhoods are responding to floods 
both in the long and short-term sense. However, it is also large enough to be 
able to compare how different parts of the city and different actors have re-
sponded in different ways. With well-developed public infrastructure systems, 
community organisations, radio stations, newspapers and a centralized bureau-
cratic system, it is large enough to study the emergence of publics and civil so-
ciety organisations that arise in relation to floods. I do not wish to argue that 
Dresden is a perfect fit for the questions I pursue in this thesis, but a city this 
size does offer the chance to study many different aspects of floods within a 
relatively well-defined geographic area. As I began fieldwork, however, I soon 
realised that Dresden does not constitute one field site in itself, although it has 
been studied as one entity before, notably in Elizabeth A. Ten Dyke's (2001) 
monograph on the politics and paradoxes of memory after German re-unifica-
tion. I came to realise that the flood issue is not the same for all parts of the city, 
and certainly less of an issue for the parts that have never been directly affected.  
 The various towns, districts and villages that make up the outer rim and 
peri-urban areas of Dresden are different, although they are located within an 
area that constitutes a political, social, and cultural entity. The city is a con-
glomeration of an old city centre, various older suburbs and neighbourhoods, 
and a plethora of formerly autonomous small villages and towns that have been 
incorporated into the wider Dresden municipal area over the years. This results 
in considerable variation even within the Dresden municipality, which gave the 
fieldwork an almost multi-sited character even though it took place within the 
confines of one city, with short side trips to other cities in Saxony, such as 
Grimma, Pirna, Döbeln and Meissen.  
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 Over the course of the thesis, a number of biographies are presented. We 
will visit many different parts of Dresden as well as many different kinds of 
individual actors and organisations. I have focused on a handful of places, 
where most of my interviews were conducted. These are Laubegast, 
Kleinzschachwitz, Sporbitz, Meusslitz and Zschieren in the eastern part of the 
city, and Gohlis and Cossebaude in the western part (see Figure 3), encompass-
ing three separate areas of the city. These include some of the areas in Dresden 
municipality that have been impacted hardest by the last three flood events. The 
areas of Pieschen and Übigau will be mentioned, but less than the other areas. 
What characterises the areas of Dresden I have focused on is that they are out-
lying, peri-urban areas, mostly residential, with self-contained houses and little 
industry.  
 The questions of the fieldwork site and of the spatial constructions of the 
field have of course been broadly debated in anthropology, especially since the 
1990s (Marcus 1995). The debate that George Marcus launched with his essay 
on multi-sited fieldwork was an attempt not just to rethink the methodological 
practice of single-sited fieldwork, what Marcus called the 'research imaginary' 
of the discipline (Marcus 1998:10; Candea 2007:168). It was also a re-examina-
tion of what delineates an ethnographic field, what constitutes its boundaries, 
and not least, how the ethnographer is a constructing actor both in the way field 
sites are carved out for the purpose of analysis and the way the fieldwork’s 
length is determined (Marcus and Okely 2007). This was indicative of a wider 
trend in the 1990's that questioned the discipline’s relationship to its cherished 
notion of the field as a bounded entity (Gupta and Ferguson 1997). 
 In a dialectical sense, it was inevitable that a counter-narrative would 
emerge that would respond to the opening up of fieldwork practice and how it 
has blurred, in a sense, the definition of what constitutes the core of ethno-
graphic fieldwork. In his essay Arbitrary Locations: In Defence of the Bounded Field-
Site, Matei Candea (2007) attempts to provide one such counter-narrative. In a 
polite critique of Marcus’ call for multi-sited fieldwork and a rethinking of re-
search practices within anthropology, Candea argues that there is still some-
thing to be said in favour of the singular, bounded field site. He proposes the 
notion of the field site as an “arbitrary location” that bears no necessary relation 
to the “wider object of study” (Candea 2007:180). The single field site can, in 
Candea’s words, function as generator of theory. It can do so because the field 
site of the anthropologist is an arbitrary location, a heuristic device, which Can-
dea defines as the opposite of Weber's ideal type: 
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While the ideal type allows one to connect and compare separate instances, the arbitrary 
location allows one to reflect on and rethink conceptual entities, to challenge their co-
herence and their totalizing aspirations. If the ideal type is meaning which cuts through 
space, the arbitrary location is space which cuts through meaning. (Candea 2007:180).  
 
 Candea argues that one of the strengths of choosing one isolated case or 
field site is that it places productive constraints around the research project and 
the questions that are being investigated. It limits and demarcates what can be 
studied and what kinds of questions can be asked, and in that way, through 
productive constraint, it can challenge the conventional wisdom around a given 
matter of concern. It should be noted that Candea explicitly argues that the 
notion of arbitrary locations, or the bounded field site, is to be understood as a 
“development of the same dissatisfactions with the previous practice which 
gave birth to multi-sitedness itself” (Candea 2007:169). One could question 
whether the utility of the concept of the arbitrary location goes much beyond 
what theorists of case study methodology have argued for years, namely that 
the value of case studies lies in their ability to produce theoretical arguments 
that can be expanded and tested in other cases (Mitchell 1983). 
 In this study, Dresden serves as a case for asking and discussing general 
questions related to disasters and politics. By taking on one field site and ex-
ploring it as a way to understand disaster management and flood management 
more broadly is not to suggest that Dresden is an arbitrary location in the sense 
that points and conclusions derived here can be easily transported to other 
towns and cities that deal with floods on a regular basis. There are indeed as-
pects of Dresden’s social, cultural, political, ecological and economic history 
with respect to floods that constitute a unique case. The point, rather, is that 
this is the case for any city that has experienced floods. In a sense, by studying 
the same phenomena and allowing an analysis to raise questions that are both 
specific and general at the same time, perspectives can arise that are both sen-
sitive to the unique case of Dresden and relevant to other cities in the world 
prone to floods. 
  
 
The Fieldwork 
 
I visited Dresden several times in the fieldwork period, including two major 
trips, from April to October 2014 and from April to August 2015. A third short 
trip was made in June 2016. There were several reasons behind the decision to 
make several trips to the field, both personal and professional. On the personal 
 
 
35 
side, not long after I had arrived in Dresden for the first time in the spring of 
2014, my girlfriend made the wonderful announcement that our first child 
would be born in the early months of 2015. At that time, I was still open to the 
possibility of doing one long fieldwork, but with the arrival of our firstborn, I 
decided to leave Dresden in the autumn of 2014 for Copenhagen. On the pro-
fessional side, I came to the conclusion in the course of the 2014 fieldwork that 
it would make sense to have two main trips to Dresden, using the break in be-
tween as an opportunity to reflect on what I had learned during the first trip, 
enabling a more focused second trip in the spring and summer of 2015. 
 I made many friends in Dresden. Some had a direct connection to my 
research on the floods in the city, while others did not. During the first and 
longest trip to Dresden, I stayed in a Wohngemeinschaft, or “WG” for short (liv-
ing community) with six students from the Technical University of Dresden, 
five Germans and one French national. Living with them, speaking German 
with them, learning from them, eating with them, and partying with them, was 
the main way I managed to get through the fieldwork. If it had not been for 
their insistence that we speak only German (they all speak relatively good Eng-
lish), I would never have reached the point at which I felt comfortable inter-
viewing informants in their native language. As the German university culture 
encourages young people to study at universities around the country, none of 
my housemates were native Dresdners. Yet some of them, having lived there 
for several years, were great mentors for me in learning about the city, its geog-
raphy, urban layout, cultural life, political issues, and history. The WG further-
more had a larger network of people who had formerly lived there – some still 
in Dresden, others now in Berlin or elsewhere – and an extensive network of 
university friends who would visit the apartment for events such as WG parties, 
football matches, and the celebration of Männer Tag (‘Men’s Day’) in May, 
when young men go to the Elbe River to barbeque and drink beer. 
 The second trip was different in a number of ways. When I returned to 
Dresden in 2015, I was accompanied by my girlfriend and our newborn baby 
daughter. We rented an apartment in the area known as Hechtviertel (literally 
“pike neighbourhood”) in the Neustadt. We tried our best to make a temporary 
life for ourselves. It was a challenging but also rewarding period for us as a 
family, having to adjust to parenthood while I roamed Dresden contacting, 
speaking with, and interviewing people as often as I could.  
 The field was dispersed in many ways, and was not confined to one spe-
cific group of people or place. As I will explain in more detail in a later section, 
I followed flood issues around Dresden more than I followed a particular group 
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of people or a particular part of the city. This meant that I encountered many 
different types of informants: city officials, members of the fire department, hy-
drologists, green activists, grassroots leaders, community associations, social 
media administrators, civil flood response organisers and volunteers, and ad-
ministrators of small garden associations (Kleingartenvereine), or allotments, as 
they are known in English. However, the largest and most important group of 
informants were the citizens who had experienced flood events in the areas of 
Dresden that are prone to flooding.  
 The flood-affected citizens can be divided into different categories. The 
first consists of those who have been directly and personally affected by floods, 
i.e. whose homes were engulfed in water masses. In another group are those 
who were not personally affected, but who live in the same neighbourhood as 
people who were flooded, and who helped out with the response, recovery and 
reconstruction efforts; or, who have been engaged in various debates about 
flood protection in their local area. In yet another group are people who own 
shops or restaurants, or who run a Kneipe (pub or tavern), located in flood risk 
areas. 
 I pursued many different ways of contacting informants. I was advised 
very early on by my friends and initial informants in Dresden that I should be 
careful about just walking up to a house, knocking on the door and asking to 
talk to flood victims. In some cases, I did just that. But in other cases, I wrote 
emails, made phone calls, and sent text messages after having acquired contact 
information either through snowballing via other informants or research online. 
In the case of government officials at the Environment Office (Umweltamt) and 
the fire department, such formal entry strategies are often the only way to es-
tablish contact. But when trying to contact citizens living in flood prone areas, 
I was often a bit challenged, first and foremost because it was hard to even know 
where to begin, since so many parts of the city had been flooded in 2002 and 
2013 that there were thousands of potential informants.   
 Secondly, I neither wanted to approach people with flood experiences too 
formally, nor did I want to seem too intrusive. In a couple of encounters when 
I had asked for an interview via email or via a phone call, the person declined, 
not because they were hostile to my proposition, but simply because they were 
tired of talking about how their houses had been flooded. In fact, both citizens 
and city officials I interviewed and spoke with would often would reflect on the 
fact that if  the 2002 floods had been a shock to everyone, since then, the issue 
has received far more attention than it might actually warrant, in some cases 
diverting attention from other matters, as one city official put it.  
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 Moreover, I found that many people, both ordinary citizens and govern-
ment employees, were somewhat tired of talking to journalists and other inquis-
itive people hunting for exceptional stories. I felt, however, that in some cases 
I could offer an alternative to that, and thus I tried to listen as openly as possi-
ble, letting the people I interviewed steer the conversation. 
 In my encounters with the people I interviewed and followed, I often 
sensed that they did not know what to make of me; I did not quite fit a concep-
tion of a ”professional stranger” (Agar 1996). They were not necessarily suspi-
cious of me. People who have experienced floods are generally used to journal-
ists and researchers asking them all sorts of questions. But since floods are first 
and foremost a local problem for people in Dresden, they were puzzled by my 
presence there. They were often startled when I told them that I was from Den-
mark (see Chapter Five on the Flutfeierparty), and would try to find some kind 
of connection, commenting that they had recently been to Copenhagen, or that 
they had watched Olsen Banden as a child (The Olsen Gang, a Danish film series 
about a comical gang of criminals, was extremely popular in the GDR). 
 In many cases, some informants explicitly told me that it was a good ex-
perience to finally speak to someone who would listen to their problems with-
out there being a formal reason for it; many people have had to endure long 
conversations with insurance agents, contractors hired for reconstruction, and 
government officials tasked with devising new flood risk management and pro-
tection plans. A few people became vital to my fieldwork, not just as informants 
who were willing to talk about their personal experiences with floods at length, 
but also as gatekeepers that invested time in putting me into contact with others 
in their local area. Stefan Schulz, a farmer, whom we will meet in Chapter Two, 
was one of these. Another was Erika Werner, a nurse living in the eastern part 
of Dresden, who had not suffered flood damage to her house, but who had been 
highly active in the relief and reconstruction efforts in her local area. We will 
meet her in Chapter Four.  
 I have chosen to anonymise informants as much as possible. This is not 
because there are any grave reasons for doing so, but simply because I would 
like to honour the fact that I urged people to speak as freely as they could about 
what concerned them. I always asked whether they wanted to remain anony-
mous before the interview started. In a few cases, however, anonymisation 
makes little sense, as some of my informants have appeared widely in the media 
and are well-known figures in Dresden.  
 The data itself consists of field notes taken during public events, local 
meetings, and everyday encounters with residents of Dresden. It is supported 
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by 35 formal, semi-structured interviews with flood-affected citizens, flood re-
sponse volunteers, and shop owners, as well as representatives from govern-
ment entities, NGOs, community associations, grassroots initiatives, and ad-
ministrators of social media platforms. The interviews lasted between one and 
three hours, and those I recorded were transcribed and translated from German 
into English. I coded and analysed all the field notes and interviews in qualita-
tive research software as the first step in the analytical process. 
 Some of the interviews had a wider perspective, going beyond flood issues 
to get a sense of people’s life histories. This was particularly the case for inform-
ants who had lived in flood-prone areas for most of their lives, and especially 
those who had lived in the same place since before die Wende. During some 
interviews, at my request, we took walks by the Elbe River, where they ex-
plained various things to me and showed me which places had been flooded. 
These walkabout-methods resemble the kinds of cultural and landscape map-
ping exercises that, as Veronica Strang has argued, aim at “collecting social, 
historical and ecological data in situ” (Strang 2010:132).  
 Photos and videos have a particularly central place in the way I did field-
work. Several of the longer interviews I conducted developed in a manner 
where I would arrive, we would talk for perhaps an hour’s time, and then we 
would sit by the computer and look at pictures from the floods that they had 
taken or gathered from friends and family members. Our conversation would 
then be centred around these photos and videos rather than my predefined ques-
tions, as we went chronologically through the different stages of the flood 
events. In some cases, people were kind enough to share pictures with me to 
take home. Many of the images and photos I use in the thesis were donated by 
informants.  
 Memos and voice recordings were a valuable way of saving my thoughts 
and field notes, as was the use of my smartphone. The digital age has opened 
up a wide range of possibilities for recording ethnographic data, and the 
smartphone is a true “Swiss Army knife” for fieldwork. It is useful not only in 
terms of writing notes on cloud-based apps, but also recording interviews, 
memos, and street sounds, and of course taking pictures and videos. It is also 
highly valuable for finding one’s way in the field using maps and GPS. Alt-
hough I also had a proper notebook to write longer notes during conversations, 
much of the audio, visual and written data that this thesis is based on came 
from the use of a smartphone. 
 The digital world made an impact on my fieldwork in other ways. I had 
no extensive experience with online research, let alone doing full-blown digital 
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or virtual ethnography before beginning fieldwork in Germany. I had never im-
agined that online research could be in any way comparable to normal field-
work – meeting people, chatting, interviewing, hanging out, attending meet-
ings, visiting locations, and so on. Digital ethnography was unknown territory 
to me, although it is rapidly growing into one of the most innovative subfields 
of anthropology given the hyper-digitalisation of the world, especially with re-
spect to social media (Miller et al. 2016). Yet, during fieldwork, I used the in-
ternet and especially social media to get into contact with people. The Face-
book groups that emerged out of the 2013 civil flood response efforts (see Chap-
ter Three) were immediately useful to me, not only as a means to contact people 
but also to dig into the variety of opinions on floods and flood protection that 
are expressed in vibrant and dynamic online communities. As such, the online 
platforms provided an important way to triangulate information about the flood 
events and to get a sense of the different opinions on the issues that have sur-
faced in the wake of the floods. Although I would not categorise this fieldwork 
as having been an instance of digital ethnography, I do align myself with Chris-
tine Hine’s suggestion that ethnography of the virtual or the digital can be de-
signed in such a way that one studies not on, but through the internet, as a 
medium for understanding interactions with informants in an otherwise “of-
fline” ethnographic piece of research (Hine 2015). 
 In the following two sections, I will deal with the two questions that have 
distinctly characterised my research process: using the issues as my points of 
orientation in the field, and retrospection as a condition of the research design.
  
  
Retrospection 
 
While the spatial aspect of fieldwork has been discussed intensely over the 
years, Dalsgaard and Nielsen (2013) argue that the temporal question has been 
surprisingly absent; though one should add that the theoretical and ethno-
graphic study of time has been flourishing in anthropology for decades (Gell 
1992; Munn 1992; Guyer 2007). Fieldwork, like any other kind of practice, is 
situated in a particular time, just as it is situated in a place or space. As such, 
the temporal question should not escape methodological scrutiny in ethno-
graphic practice, the authors argue (Nielsen and Dalsgaard 2013:1). Works 
such as Johannes Fabian’s (1983) critique of anthropology, Time and the Other, 
do address the problem of representation of other cultures in anthropology from 
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a temporal perspective. Yet the methodological implications of temporal con-
ditions are seldom theorised or discussed compared to the spatial question of 
where the field is located and how the ethnographer carves it out. 
 In this thesis, my methodological considerations are attentive to temporal 
questions for a number of reasons. It has not always been easy to describe my 
fieldwork in Dresden. Doing the kind of participant observation that is often 
seen as the methodological hallmark of the ethnographic approach was often a 
challenge. As my main focus was on studying what came in the wake of the 
floods, it always felt like I had missed out on the action, what I wanted to study. 
I often found myself in a kind of deadlock, especially during the first fieldwork 
in 2014, when it seemed as if the field was constantly slipping away from me, 
as people’s own experiences of the floods faded more and more into the past 
and were replaced by the worries of everyday life. Studying how people reacted 
and dealt with the flood problem was a bit like chasing a shadow, trying to shed 
light on something that was slowly fading into the darkness of the past.  
 But these challenges have not only been restrictive. They have produc-
tively framed my research, before, during and after fieldwork. They have forced 
me to examine not what a disaster is, but how disasters live on in the minds 
and lives of people, and how it fades away. Understanding the physical absence 
of disasters has forced me to grasp what they leave in their wake that is not 
tangible, not easily perceivable. Consequently, rather than seeing the absence 
of floods as a constraint upon the kind of analysis I am undertaking, I see the 
productive character of past events for present concerns and future projections 
as the main analytical gravitational point of the thesis.  
 As a guiding principle, I thus take both the production of empirical 
knowledge and the analytical work that underpins this thesis to be an exercise 
in retrospection. Specifically, both the interactions I had with people in the field 
as well as the analytical ethnographic work that I present here are attempts to 
understand past events in the present. I could only begin to draw a picture of 
what floods meant and still mean to people in Dresden by relying on people’s 
own retrospections: their memories, stories and recollections of the events that 
had transpired a year or more ago. In other words, I am studying people’s ret-
rospective practices, and at the same time my ethnography is itself an exercise 
in retrospection. This puts history and temporality as theoretical and methodo-
logical concerns at the forefront of this work. The focus on events in time “re-
quires a constant reference to the singular moment of the disaster invoked by 
informants as a constant ‘presence’ through its effects” (Dalsgård and Nielsen 
2013:7). 
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 I was not in Dresden – in the sense of being present – during the floods. 
But I have been there in the sense that I engaged with people who are still trying 
to interpret what the floods mean in the present and for the future. One of the 
main reasons that long semi-structured (and in some cases unstructured) inter-
views became the main method of data collection was that I soon came to real-
ise that I had to understand floods through people’s own retrospective accounts. 
Thus, long detailed narrations of people’s stories, memories, opinions and re-
flections on the flood events, I thought, best captured both the temporal retro-
spective (and prospective) dimension of floods, as well as the complex web of 
issues with which such events become intertwined. After having talked for 
some time about who they were, what they did for a living, how long they had 
lived in that place, and what they had done in their life, I would ask them to 
recollect in as detailed a way as possible how the flood events had unfolded 
from their point of view. The form of the ethnographic interviews was thus 
shaped by an attentiveness to retrospective narratives, in which informants at-
tempted to make sense of past flood events seen from the perspective of the 
ethnographic present.  
  In a harsh critique of the current (over)use of the terms ‘ethnography’ and 
‘ethnographic’, Tim Ingold laments that anthropologists and like-minded schol-
ars have deployed the terms so loosely that they have lost their original signifi-
cance, and hence have been fetishized into definitional obscurity. He further-
more argues that the nature of the ethnographic is all about transforming en-
counters with people retrospectively: 
 
For what we could call “ethnographicness” is not intrinsic to the encounters themselves; 
it is rather a judgment that is cast upon them through a retrospective conversion of the 
learning, remembering and note-taking which they call forth into pretexts for something 
else altogether. This ulterior purpose, concealed from the people whom you covertly 
register as informants, is documentary. It is this that turns your experience, your memory 
and your notes into material—sometimes spun quasi-scientifically as “data”—upon 
which you subsequently hope to draw in the project of offering an account. (Ingold 
2014:386) 
 
 Retrospection, if we are to follow Ingold, is then a process that is intrinsic 
to, indeed is the very heart of, ethnographic thought and analysis. As I men-
tioned, this thesis is retrospective not only by virtue of my informants’ retro-
spections, but indeed also my own ways of retrospectively trying to make sense 
of what I encountered during fieldwork. For Ingold, ethnographic practice – 
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whatever else such a practice might be – always involves a “retrospective con-
version” of what the ethnographer produced in the field, and what he or she 
produces in the analytical and writing-up phases.  
 
 
Issue Ethnography 
 
Fieldwork, George Marcus (1995) observed in his now classic essay on multi-
sited fieldwork, can take on a variety of different forms in the contemporary 
globalized and interconnected world. From following a group of people as they 
move around, to following a thing as it circulates in networks, to following a 
conflict or issue across actors and spaces, Marcus argued that we are witnessing 
a significant change in the way we conduct the business of anthropology.  
 My fieldwork research in Dresden was structured strategically around fol-
lowing issues. By this I mean that I aimed to study the political and social issues 
that people in Dresden themselves seemed to find most important, an approach 
based on pragmatism (i.e., ‘if it works, it is important’). As I have already men-
tioned in passing, one implication of this strategy was that I did not exclusively 
study one close-knit community or group of people for a prolonged period of 
time, as is the standard model in ethnographic fieldwork. My fieldwork was 
more dispersed and eclectically assembled. Informants came from different 
parts of Dresden, sometimes with no connections to one another.  
 The importance and urgency of issues related to floods are always most 
dominant during and in the immediate aftermath of the event, or when certain 
political decisions set in motion new objections and resistance by civil society 
against the state and government. This is not, then, an ethnography in the sense 
of offering a description of one group of people – one ethnos – but rather an 
attempt to provide an account of how people perceive and position themselves 
in relation to issues that have emerged in the wake of the floods. It is what I 
would call an “issue ethnography”.  
 As I mentioned earlier in this introduction, since concerns about floods 
are not the same in periods when they are not present, tracing exactly who is 
interested in and cares about the issues is no easy task. It has become a public 
issue, and not necessarily one confined to people living in a certain geograph-
ical space, but to people who engage with the issues in different ways. Floods 
have affected all parts of Dresden both physically and discursively, and are 
events about which people are keenly concerned. As such, studying floods in 
Dresden has required that I zoom in on different groups of people, such as 
 
 
43 
flood-affected citizens, and on other kinds of actors, such as government agen-
cies (e.g. the fire department) as well as non-state actors, such as the German 
Red Cross.  
 In the next stage, I focused in on a number of selected issues – self-organ-
ised flood response, social media use, controversies over structural flood pro-
tection, insurance policy issues, solidarity and help between victims and volun-
teers, and the gradual normalisation of floods as a part of living in the city. In 
other words, my field research as well as the subsequent analysis and writing 
up of notes and interview transcripts have been guided by the issues, or matters 
of concern, that people in Dresden who are faced with living with floods desig-
nate as the most important. Following the issues that floods in Dresden have 
left in their wake, in other words, is as much a methodological position as it is 
an analytical perspective. 
 There are obvious challenges and limitations related to this approach to 
doing fieldwork and analysis, the first being that I forfeit the unique kind of 
research depth that ethnographic fieldwork usually provides into the lives of a 
selected group. Moreover, there is a palpable lack of everyday interactions, as 
the forms of participant observation I conducted were not construed, quite in-
tentionally, with such research aims in mind.  
 However, the material that has emerged as important in this research, and 
what the analysis revolves around, is the result of an inductive process in which 
I let the people I met in Dresden define to a large degree which issues and prob-
lems I should examine. This implies that the guiding principle of the fieldwork 
was the set of issues that I, in an inductive manner, assembled from talking to 
people about floods in Dresden. This is important also in terms of the position 
I take on the political issues related to floods, as an outside observer that fol-
lowed these issues around.  
 Reiterating a point I have made already, one of the cornerstones of my 
approach is to reject the notion that the idea of a public is a given. Recent works 
by authors such as Nortje Marres (2007) have notably revived the century-old 
views of philosopher John Dewey and public intellectual Walter Lippmann, in 
which Dewey famously noted that publics arise when there is a problem that 
existing institutions are not equipped to handle (Dewey 1954). In the various 
issues related to floods in Dresden that I analyse, I deal with controversies in 
which actors oppose, antagonise, and reject each other in various ways, and in 
which publics are formed and have the potential to form into public institutions, 
as Dewey noted in The Public and Its Problems. As a way of dealing with this 
methodologically, I lean on sociologist Luc Boltanski’s (2011) notion, echoing 
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Bruno Latour (2004), of an empirical sociology of critique rather than a critical soci-
ology, to present an ethnography of the critiques that people formulate, rather 
than a formulation of those criticisms by me as an ethnographer. The issue of 
critique will be most relevant in relation to Chapter Three, on the controversy 
over public participation in flood response, and in Chapter Five, on the debacle 
around building a floodwall in Laubegast. 
 Although the critiques examined in this thesis are predominantly voiced 
by those that make up the main group of informants – flood-affected people and 
other categories of citizens – I have attempted also to include counter-narratives 
to these flood issues by interviewing representatives of various government 
agencies in Dresden. In this sense, a critique becomes more a mapping or a 
laying out of the critiques that actors themselves are making than the formula-
tion of a critique of power (e.g. Scheper-Hughes 1995). I should furthermore 
clarify that my intention in this thesis is not to argue in favour of one position 
regarding the different political issues related to floods in Dresden, since I am 
not directly affected by these events myself. I am, in this sense, merely one out 
of hundreds of observers and commentators on these issues that contribute to 
the ongoing discourse about the public life of floods in Dresden.  
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Chapter 2 
 
Dresden in War and Water 
 
 
 
Wars and disasters also belong to the history of the area. (Auch Kriege und Naturkatastrophen 
gehören zur Geschichte des Ortes.) 
- From the website of the Zschieren-Zschachwitz Community Association, Dresden. 
 
 I do not know Dresden without the river. The river is always there, no matter where I am. 
 - Andreas Krüger, Meusslitz, Dresden.  
 
 
 
This chapter is intended as a dual introduction: to the political, social and cul-
tural history of Dresden, and to its history of floods. As will be a recurring 
theme throughout the entire thesis, my intention is to interweave the various 
issues that have surfaced in the wake of the floods with other political and social 
issues that are the source of ongoing public debate and controversy in Dresden. 
It is against this backdrop that the chapter’s structure and progression should 
be seen, starting with the earliest history of Dresden, and ending with an exam-
ination of how floods have made their mark on the natural and built landscape 
of the city.  
 
 
“Florence on the Elbe” 
 
Dresden was first mentioned in historical records in the year 1206, and as a city 
in 1216. In 1547, Dresden became the capital and seat of the protestant King-
dom of Saxony. At this time, Dresden’s old city centre was on the northern side 
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of the Elbe, the area known today as Neustadt (New Town). In 1694, Friedrich 
August I came to power; he became the symbol of the glory of Saxony, which 
he remains to this day. 11 The central bridge in Dresden is named after him, and 
the name ‘August the Strong’, as he is remembered, is a mythical character 
symbolising all things Saxonian. During the reign of August the Strong, Dres-
den developed into an architectural gem of Europe, beginning with the con-
struction of the Zwinger Palace in 1732 in what is today known as the Altstadt 
(Old City), on the southern banks of the Elbe. The palace served as a venue for 
great parties at which August hosted the royals and nobles of Europe. In 1733, 
August’s son, Friedrich August II, was crowned king of Saxony, and continued 
his father’s vision of building a splendid European city with magnificent archi-
tecture and cultural treasures from around the world. The protestant Frauenkir-
che (Church of our Lady) was completed in 1743 and stood until its complete 
destruction in 1945 as the main exemplar of the city’s baroque architecture, 
testifying to its nickname as Elbflorenz (Florence on the Elbe). Meanwhile, Au-
gust had converted to Catholicism, and his son started work on the Roman 
Catholic Hofkirche (Courtly Church), which was completed in 1754.  
 Toward the end of the eighteenth century, Dresden became one of the 
cultural capitals of Europe. Artists, composers, and nobles flocked to the river-
side architecture and the court of the Saxon kings. In 1791, Goethe wrote of 
Dresden, “There is an incredible treasure of all sorts in this beautiful place,” 
(“Es ist ein unglaublicher Schatz aller Art an diesem schönen Orte”). But the small 
kingdom also became ensnared in the quarrels and wars that would come de-
fine the last three centuries of European history.12 
 In the course of the 19th century, the enlightenment ideals and the indus-
trial revolution that followed changed Dresden profoundly, as they did the rest 
of Europe. The institutional foundations of the Technical University of Dres-
den (TUD) opened in 1828, and the first German intercity railway between 
Dresden and Leipzig was completed in 1839. The famous Semperoper – the 
Dresden opera house named after its architect Gottfried Semper – opened in 
1878, and the world’s first cable car was built by the banks of the Elbe in 1901. 
                                                 
11 The following sections concerning the history of Dresden rely on the following sources: 
(Landeshaupstadt Dresden 2015; Dyke 2001), as well as other sources and documents that 
will have in-text references. 
12 In 1756, Prussia invaded Dresden, and in 1760 the city became the site of a standoff be-
tween the Prussian and Austrian armies that nearly destroyed the city. Next came Napoleon, 
who in 1806 occupied the city, and Saxony became a kingdom under Napoleonic rule, allying 
itself with the French emperor. When Napoleon was defeated, a year-long Russian occupa-
tion of Dresden was supplanted by Prussian rule. Saxony eventually regained independence 
by ceding half of its territory to Prussia. 
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After having fought in numerous European wars throughout the 17th, 18th and 
19th centuries, the sovereign independence of Saxony ended in 1871, when it 
was annexed into the newly-founded German Empire that was established after 
Prussia’s defeat of France.  
 Like so many other German cities, the history of Dresden in the 20th cen-
tury was a tumultuous one. As the First World War was coming to an end, the 
last Saxon monarch, King Friedrich Augustus III, abdicated. What had been 
the Kingdom of Saxony under the German Empire now became the Free State 
of Saxony under the German Weimar Republic. In 1933, the Weimar Republic 
effectively ended as Hitler’s National Socialist Party came to power. Wide-
spread support for Nazism also emerged in Saxony and in Dresden. The rest, 
as they say, is history. 
 As the Second World War began to shift in favour of the Allies, system-
atic bombings of German cities increased in force. Few cities escaped the Brit-
ish and American air bombing raids. Large parts of Hamburg and Berlin were 
incinerated as the Allies sought to avenge the bombings of British, French, and 
other allied cities.13 Dresden’s position as the geographical centre of the Third 
Reich, along with its relatively small size and lack of strategic importance, 
meant that it had escaped bombing raids late into the war. But on February 13 
and 14, 1945, as Allied forces were marching on German territory, British and 
American long distance bombers set out to bomb Dresden. The result was one 
of the most notorious and horrific stories of wartime destruction in modern his-
tory, producing a long list of scholarly works and popular written accounts. Of 
these, the most famous outside of Germany is perhaps Kurt Vonnegut’s novel 
Slaughterhouse Five (1969), in which Vonnegut recalls his own personal experi-
ences as a prisoner of war in Dresden during the bombing. The city was set on 
fire by bombs that contained phosphorus, which burns at extremely high tem-
peratures; this turned the asphalt into liquid, burning those who had not died 
from the shell blasts. Fighter planes armed with machine guns followed the 
bomber planes, targeting groups of people that attempted to flee the city 
(Gretzschel 2012:77). The number of deaths resulting from the bombings has 
been fiercely debated, and today, there is still no consensus around the exact 
                                                 
13 It has been speculated that Winston Churchill deliberately wanted Dresden to be severely 
bombed as revenge for the Luftwaffe’s bombing of Coventry. Since 1959, Dresden and Cov-
entry have been twin cities. Since 1978, Florence and Dresden have also been twin cities. This 
seems to testify to Dresden’s attention to its own history and self-identity not only as Florence 
on the Elbe, but also as a bombed city, sharing its historical fate with similarly bombed cities 
in Europe. For a fuller discussion, see Harmon (1991). 
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figure. Recently, a German commission of historians estimated the number to 
have been around 18,000 deaths, and no more than 25,000 (Der Spiegel 2008). 
 The events of February 1945 have since become an important symbol of 
the atrocities of war committed by the Allies, and part of an uncomfortable 
debate in the West about what responsibility the Allies had in the destruction 
of German societies, for strategic reasons that in hindsight do not seem to have 
justified the level of destruction (Jerzak 2015). The bombings of German cities 
were often cast in terms of strategic military necessity, when in fact, their pur-
pose was to demoralise the German people (Gretzschel 2012:18), just as Hit-
ler’s bombings of London aimed to break the spirit of the British people and 
weaken public support for the war.  
 For Dresden, the firebombing has since become a defining moment in its 
history. Several monuments spread out over the city commemorate the event, 
and the iconic pictures of the incinerated Altstadt – what Vonnegut memorably 
described as a ‘moon landscape’ – are among the most common images for sale 
on posters and postcards in tourist shops. The city has proactively used its tragic 
history to promote itself as symbol of peace. Indeed, much of Dresden’s inter-
national public image has been one of promoting pacifism. This should how-
ever be seen in the context of various public and intellectual post-war debates 
in Germany, sometimes called Aufarbeitung der Vergangenheit (working through 
the past) or Vergangenheitsbewältigung, which discussed blame and remorse in 
light of the rise of national socialism and the role of the German civilian popu-
lation (Herf 2002; Müller 2002). 
 I will not go further into the story of the Dresden bombings here. It has 
been thoroughly examined in an abundance of historical accounts (see 
Gretzschel for a visually excellent introduction in German). It is important to 
note, however, as Claudia Jerzak (2015) does, that the Allied bombings of the 
city in February 1945 created a myth that has persisted to the present day about 
Dresden as an innocent city of art and culture. In the dying months of the war, 
the Nazi regime used the bombings to portray the Allies as destroyers of West-
ern culture and civilization. After the war, the Soviet regime used the destruc-
tion first as a means of symbolising the Nazi regime's responsibility for the war, 
and later to affirm war crimes committed by the Western powers. The victimi-
sation of Dresden was sustained in part by the Peace Forum’s annual protest 
events against the socialist state in the Kreuzkirche starting in 1982. What be-
came known in the early 1990s as the “Quiet Commemoration” soon turned 
into a conflict over the proper way to commemorate and remember the bomb-
ings of 1945. The history of the Second World War was thus reinserted  
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Figure 6. Commemoration of  the burning of  6865 corpses after the 1945 bombing of  Dres-
den. Altmarkt square in Dresden Altstadt. Photo: Kristoffer Albris, May 2014. 
 
Figure 7. Frauenkirche on Neumarkt square in Dresden Altstadt. Statue of  Martin Luther in 
foreground. Photo: Kristoffer Albris, May 2014. 
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into the divisive political debate between socialism and capitalism at the time, 
and, as we shall see later, provides a historical backdrop to some of the political 
tensions in Dresden today.  
 The story of the Frauenkirche encompasses many of the elements of the 
troublesome work of memory in the case of the destruction of Dresden and the 
communist era that followed (Dyke 2001). Many of Dresden’s historic and fa-
mous buildings were rebuilt in the years following the war, beginning with the 
Zwinger Palace. But the communist regime decided not to rebuild the Frauen-
kirche, despite its fame as the most central and important landmark in the city. 
Much speculation has surrounded why rebuilding was never undertaken. Lack 
of funds and political will might have been the reason, but the official explana-
tion was that the Frauenkirche was to remain a symbol of the atrocities of war 
that Nazism and fascism had led to. After the wall came down and Germany 
was reunified, a new citizen-driven initiative sought to reconstruct the de-
stroyed Frauenkirche. In 2005, a rebuilt version was completed. The money 
raised for the rebuilding and restoration of the church came in part from civil 
society in Dresden, but also through donations from around the world, includ-
ing British and American donors. As a result, the Frauenkirche is today pro-
moted as a symbol of peace and reconciliation between the former enemies of 
Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States (Jerzak 2015). 
 A great deal of public discussion preceded the actual rebuilding process, 
concerning what kind of Frauenkirche the new version would be. The church 
that stands today is built upon the ruins of the old, with a section of one wall 
being the only part of the old church still standing, while old stones have been 
inserted at intervals between the new sandstones that predominate. This mix 
signals that the Frauenkirche is both newly-constructed and the same as before. 
As Vees-Gulani (2008:38) has noted, the reconstruction of the Frauenkirche was 
also an opportunity for the people of Dresden to reorient parts of the city’s his-
torical identity away from the Nazi past, by including the city in a UNESCO 
world heritage imaginary, in which the church building played an important 
role. 
 
 
Socialism and What Came after It 
 
The story of the division of Germany and the building of the Berlin Wall, which 
made Germany both the geographic and symbolic centre of the Cold War, need 
not be retold in great detail here. I will, however, touch upon a few aspects of 
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this historical period that were particular to Dresden, and which provide some 
clues to how its citizens understand themselves and their city today.  
 My trips to Dresden took place a quarter of a century after the fall of the 
Berlin Wall. Yet in most of the talks and interviews I conducted with people, 
the communist era was the starting point of our conversation, a point in time 
that seemed to suck all attention toward it in one way or another. Some would 
build up the narrative of how they had experienced the flood events by starting 
with the hardships that they had had to endure following the fall of the Berlin 
Wall. Others would simply start out by explaining how they had been brought 
up during the communist regime, and what this had meant for them personally 
in relation to the local government, the Elbe River, and life in general. In order 
to provide a brief but illustrative example, here is how Stefan Schulz, about 
whom we will hear more later in this chapter, explained himself when I asked 
him to tell me about his life: 
 
When I was 30 years old, die Wende (“the change”) came. (…) The demonstrations 
started first in Leipzig, then in Dresden. They were held once a week, and sometimes 
there were more than 100,000 people in the streets in Dresden. 100,000 people! And I 
was afraid. I was really afraid that somebody would shoot me. The GDR system was 
thoroughly organised and under surveillance, almost as bad as it is today (laughs) be-
cause of surveillance and the Internet, but back then, everything was infiltrated (Unter-
wandert). Using a telephone without someone listening to what you were saying was 
impossible. There were weapons everywhere. I was afraid. When die Wende came, eve-
rything broke down. Nothing was like yesterday (wie Gestern). No laws, no money, no 
work, no jobs. There was nothing. That was a challenge. The GDR political system was 
so completely anchored in our society, that such a sudden change – I would never have 
thought it possible. Nobody had thought it possible. My colleague, who is 85 years old 
now, always said to me that he would live to see German unification. And I said, come 
on, dream on! But he lived to see it. It was a wonderful time. Suddenly you could say 
what you thought. But it was also hard. Suddenly, millions of people were on the street 
with no jobs; maybe as much as fifty percent of the companies were suddenly gone. 
 
 During the Cold War and the division of Germany into the liberal demo-
cratic Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and the socialist German Demo-
cratic Republic (GDR), Dresden was one of the largest cities outside of East 
Berlin. Saxony itself was dissolved as a political entity and split up into three 
Bezirke (administrative zones), of which Dresden, Leipzig, and Karl Marx Stadt 
(now Chemnitz) became the respective administrative centres.  
 During the communist era, the reception of Western television from the 
FRG was the only way for many East Germans to get a sense of what was 
happening on the “other side” of the iron curtain. Yet the Dresden Elbe Valley 
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was one of the only places in the east where radio wave reception was so poor 
that Western television could not be seen. As a result, the area around Dresden 
was nicknamed “the valley of the clueless” (“Tal der Ahnungslosen”). When I 
arrived in Dresden, the first person I met – someone I had contacted through 
an anthropology colleague from Austria – greeted me by saying, “Welcome to 
the valley of the clueless. Hope you like it.” It is not uncommon to hear this 
phrase used by people who complain about the folly of local politics in present-
day Dresden, or from those outside of Dresden and Saxony who wonder what 
they are up to when they hear news of right-wing populism. Similarly ironic 
expressions borrowed from the communist past are used in other contexts as 
well, also with respect to flooding, as we shall see in Chapter Five. 
 The Berlin Wall finally fell on November 9, 1989, and the two Germanys 
were reunited after decades of separation on October 3, 1990. It is hard to un-
derestimate just how significant this event was for the German people, espe-
cially those who had lived in the GDR. After the fall of the wall and the end of 
the Cold War, many cities in the former East Germany struggled with the so-
cial, political, cultural and economic reforms that suddenly flooded the former 
communist country. Dresden was no exception, and in dealing with unification 
and transition, it found itself facing new political challenges such as the re-
emergence of a strong right-wing nationalist movement. The period following 
reunification with West Germany gave rise to a number of paradoxes in the 
local population’s attempts to come to terms with the past (Dyke 2001). 
 Elizabeth Ten Dyke’s ethnography of Dresden’s transition from being a 
major city in the GDR to becoming a part of the much larger unified Germany 
is a compelling account, and was representative of the growing anthropological 
interest in studying post-socialism in the former eastern bloc (Verdery 1996: 
Berdahl and Bunzl 2010). In addition to explaining the structural changes tak-
ing place at this particular time in history that impacted all aspects of Dresden 
society, Dyke takes the reader through a series of ethnographic excursions that 
exemplify the paradoxes and conundrums that this political, social and cultural 
upheaval caused. Her study focuses on the question of memory and remember-
ing in her encounters with the people of Dresden in the midst of economic and 
social transition, inviting them to reflect on life under communism, including 
those who had lived through the 1945 bombings. Two of Dyke’s main points 
are that memories of the past are fragile and flexible, able to adapt and change 
to the issues that define the present, and that memories are contested frames of 
the past, places of struggle between different actors in Dresden. Dyke’s focus, 
therefore, is on how the imaginary of the GDR past in Dresden becomes 
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twisted and bent in the narratives of her interlocutors, as the project of coming 
to terms with the past is inextricably linked to the problems that these people 
face in adapting to a unified Germany (Dyke 2001:15). 
 There have been other anthropological ethnographies of the transition 
faced by communities and towns in the former East Germany. Daphne Ber-
dahl’s (1999b) Where the World Ended is an intimate ethnography of the transi-
tion from socialism to liberalism. In her account of the village Kella, located in 
a betwixt-and-between borderland dividing the East and the West, Berdahl por-
trays how its roughly 600 inhabitants experienced the disruptive end of the com-
munist regime. For Berdahl, Kella constitutes a borderland both metaphorically 
and literally, “a site for the construction and articulation of identities and dis-
tinctions through boundary-maintaining practices, as well as an interstitial 
zone, a place betwixt and between cultures” (1999b:3). The transition from so-
cialism to liberal democracy in Berdahl’s account, then, was as much about 
existential questions of belonging and community as it was about political econ-
omy and social contracts between the state and civil society. 
 An important aspect of the histories of East Germany, Saxony and Dres-
den in the wake of socialism was the influx of capitalism and foreign invest-
ments, the loss of jobs, the closing down of former GDR state-run industries, 
and numerous architectural controversies around the restoration of old build-
ings and the building of new, as the case of the Frauenkirche exemplified. In 
other words, there was a complete reworking of the political economy and aes-
thetic politics. In Dresden, this debate took many forms. One hotly debated 
example, however, was the central street of Prager Strasse, which was turned 
into a Western-style shopping street shortly after die Wende, with glass facades, 
malls, and an abundance of shops selling things to a population that the market 
needed to convert from sceptical socialists to capitalist consumers. This resulted 
in a “consumption frenzy” (Konsumrausch), in which, as Berdahl has argued, 
the access to goods and to the choice of which goods to buy were “defined as 
fundamental rights and democratic expressions of individualism” (Berdahl 
1999a:87). Both Berdahl’s and Dyke's studies illustrate the dynamics at play in 
Dresden, Leipzig, and elsewhere during the transition from a socialist state-
driven planned economy to a liberal democracy and market economy in which 
the political and economic changes not only impacted the practice of life, but 
upset the very idea of what it meant to have lived under socialism and to have 
been part of a country and an ideology that no longer existed. The transition, 
in other words, demanded the re-shaping of the population into different sub-
jects. 
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 East Germany today, as Peperkamp et al. argue (2009:1), “has literally 
become a foreign country belonging to the past,” but, as they state, “it is by no 
means a forgotten country.” Partly as a response to widespread disappointment 
with Western capitalism and with a market that pulled the rug out from under-
neath everything that people in places like Dresden had believed in, cultural 
counter reactions surfaced. As many observers of the former East Germany and 
other former communist countries in Europe have pointed out, nostalgia for 
the communist past began to take shape during the 1990s and into the new 
millennium. That is to say, there arose a certain culture of nostalgia in the for-
mer East Germany, in which people collect material objects from the GDR era, 
or in which nostalgia is enacted in popular media and cultural artefacts such as 
art, photos, movies, songs, and so forth. The neologism that has been used to 
describe this phenomenon is Ostalgie, or, “a longing for the East”.  
 A number of scholars, including anthropologists, have tried to grasp the 
emergence of this particular culture of remembering – so much so that Ostalgie 
and collective memory have become overly dominant in the study of the former 
East bloc countries, and perhaps especially in the former GDR (Boyer 2006; 
Müller 2008). To borrow a term from Arjun Appadurai, Ostalgie, memory, and 
the past in the context of the former GDR, have become gatekeeping concepts, 
“that seem to limit anthropological theorizing about the place in question, and 
that define the quintessential and dominant questions of interest in the region” 
(Appadurai 1986:357). 
 Indeed, as Peperkamp et al. (2009) note, Ostalgie is but one aspect of the 
story of how the GDR is remembered in eastern Germany today, and that such 
ways of describing cultural practices of remembering tend to conjure up stereo-
types that miss the complexity of places like Dresden, Leipzig or Chemnitz in 
today's Saxony. In a thorough discussion of Ostalgie, Dominic Boyer (2006), 
himself having conducted long-term fieldwork in Berlin on post-unification me-
dia and intellectual life, argues that the phenomenon should be seen not as a 
longing for the east as such. Instead, Boyer argues, Ostalgie has been a way for 
West Germany to mirror itself in relation to its ‘Other’, that is, the East. Mir-
roring this perspective, German scholar Paul Cooke (2005) has analysed the 
representation of the GDR’s past after unification through the lens of post-co-
lonial theory, exploring whether the East could be seen as a colony of the West. 
Indeed, Neller (2006) reminds us that the word Ostalgie has been used more 
frequently in public discourse in the West than in the East. Moreover, nostalgia 
for the communist past, it should be remembered, has not been confined to the 
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former GDR, but has been documented, discussed and debated in intellectual 
and public discourse across Eastern Europe (Peperkamp et al. 2009:2).  
 In addition, Ostalgie is often framed in highly ironic ways, as are many 
references to the communist past (see also Rethmann 2009). An example that I 
will discuss at length in Chapter Five is how the Berlin Wall became an ironic 
symbol for local resistance to the building of a floodwall in Laubegast, a town 
in Dresden. Local protesters used the “Mauer im Kopf” (“wall in the head”) 
phrase, not to mean that city planners were still operating under the old GDR 
mind-set, as the saying suggests, but rather that they could see no other solu-
tions to flood problems besides building concrete or sandstone walls. The citi-
zens advanced this critique in a highly tongue-in-cheek manner. Indeed, this 
ironic use of the GDR past to advance the political resistance of a local com-
munity against the city government of Dresden testifies to the fact that the 
memory of the GDR past – including Ostalgie, as Daphne Berdahl suggested – 
was not so much about remembering the past, or re-invoking a discussion of 
the past, but about “the production of a present” (Berdahl 1999a:202). Memory 
of the GDR past, in this sense, can also be used as a means to pursue political 
ends in the post-socialist present, while not necessarily expressing nostalgic sen-
timents. 
 Interestingly, when I conducted fieldwork in Dresden, this kind of Ostalgie 
was less common. The ‘museumification’ of the GDR past, one might say, had 
settled down. One could explore the Dresden city museum, the military mu-
seum, the GDR museum in nearby Pirna, or the Stasi headquarters museum in 
Leipzig for clear indications of public engagement with the GDR past in a kind 
of institutionalised remembering. But the Ossie Parties, Ostivals, and Ossie Discos 
that Berdahl and others observed were not in evidence in Dresden in the period 
from 2014-2016, hard as I tried to find them, although my individual percep-
tions should not suggest that they do not exist at all. Anselma Gallinat noted 
this as early as 2001, when she conducted fieldwork in Saxony-Anhalt, noting 
that “practices that celebrate ‘East German’ identity seemed rare” (Gallinat 
2008:666).14 
                                                 
14 In popular culture, movies such as Good Bye, Lenin!, Sonnenallee and Das Leben der Anderen 
have been hugely successful examples of Ostalgie culture. Yet these kinds of movies seem not 
to be on the minds of German filmmakers anymore. The recent mini-series Tannbach, in con-
trast, was a depiction of a small village divided down the middle by the American and Rus-
sian occupying troops, one half of the village in the FGR, the other in the GDR. But that 
story is about the transition from National Socialism via wartime to a divided Germany. 
Ostalgie seems to have had its day – or at least its peak – in popular culture, and has in some 
ways been replaced by new attempts to bring to light other histories of the Second World 
War, especially the transition from Nazism to Socialism. 
 
 
56 
 Gallinat's work on identity in the East has revolved around questions such 
as what it means to be at home in eastern Germany, as opposed to the identity 
of being or feeling like an East German, instead of notions around nostalgia for 
the past. In essence, East Germans today, Gallinat argues, often reject the label 
of “East German”, even as they still identify as belonging to a place that has a 
unique history and keen sense of self-awareness (Gallinat 2008:666), of which 
the GDR past is but one component.  
 My own experiences in Dresden a decade and a half after Gallinat’s ob-
servations in Saxony-Anhalt reinforce the point that people indeed seek to iden-
tify with Dresden, or Saxony for that matter, as a place with a specific cultural 
and social history, while not being concerned specifically with an identity of 
being post-socialist Ossies (although this does come up in some contexts: see 
Chapter Four). The Saxon identity, in contrast to the socialist GDR identity, is 
more visible today, and is exemplified by the use of the Saxon flag in private 
gardens – used as often or even more so than the German national flag – as well 
as by the city’s symbolic use of the mythical figure of August the Strong. 
 Indeed, one could argue that the rapid altering states described by Ber-
dahl, Dyke, Boyer and others in the transitional decade following the fall of the 
Berlin Wall and the dissolution of the eastern bloc has calmed down. Other 
forms of rupture and transition are now unfolding, but these have clear ties to 
the transformations that occurred after 1989. I would argue that public atten-
tion has now shifted in part to other matters of concern, including floods, envi-
ronmental protection, urban development, the rise of right-wing extremism, 
populist politics, and declining population rates in the former East. However, 
a substantial part of the population of Dresden and of Saxony, especially Leip-
zig, are highly critical of global capitalism, and the anti-globalist left-wing 
movement still attracts a considerable amount of support in Dresden, especially 
in the Neustadt, north of the Elbe.  
 
 
Dresden Today 
 
Today, Dresden is the capital of the Free State of Saxony, one of the 16 Bun-
desländer compromising the German federal system.15 It is the twelfth most pop-
ulous city in Germany, with 541,986 inhabitants (Landeshauptstadt Dresden 
                                                 
15 Although Saxony is officially not a Land but an independent state under the federal Ger-
man system, it has de facto the same status as the other Länder and city states, such as Berlin 
and Hamburg. 
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2015), but the fourth-largest in terms of size, surpassed only by Berlin, Hamburg 
and Cologne. The population ratio is 1,632 inhabitants per square kilometre. 
The city’s large geographical footprint compared to its population is evidence 
of its large, green, uninhabited areas, but also of the fact that several formerly 
independent villages and towns on its borders have now been incorporated into 
the municipality, a point that is important to take note of in relation to flood 
issues. Some parts of Dresden, in effect, seem almost cut off from the city cen-
tre, giving the impression of a mosaic of different entities rather than one co-
herent city area. The city is divided into 19 different districts, or Ortsämter, and 
Ortschaften, which are the smallest administrative entities. These can in turn be 
divided up into smaller neighbourhoods and villages that often have unique 
community identities and self-awareness. 
 The population numbers in Dresden are beginning to slowly increase 
once again after having dropped to a record low after die Wende, when many 
decided to leave the city and the former East to pursue a life in other parts of 
Germany or elsewhere in Europe (Landeshauptstadt Dresden 2015). But major 
cities like Dresden and Leipzig that have seen increasing population rates are 
the exception rather than the rule in the former East. 
 According to some estimates, more than one million former East Ger-
mans fled to West Germany and other countries shortly after the fall of the wall 
and reunification (Borneman 2000). Young people especially moved, and the 
East suffered a serious case of “brain drain”. The most dramatic example of 
this trend is the case of Hoyerswerda, a city in Saxony north of Dresden, built 
according to socialist urban planning principles. The city has become the fast-
est-shrinking city in Germany, having lost over half its population since unifi-
cation. Anthropologist Felix Ringel has studied how people in Hoyerswerda 
have dealt with this demographic rupture. Echoing Gallinat, Ringel suggests 
that the shrinkage of Hoyerswerda should not be seen in relation to a backdrop 
of a homogenous post-socialist Ostalgie culture, but rather that the shrinkage of 
cities in the former East has prompted manifold ideas, interpretations, and im-
aginations drawn from different pasts and directed toward competing future 
visions that are proving to be essential tools for dealing with the current demo-
graphic and economic changes (Ringel 2013:26). 
 The socialist era also had profound implications for religion and faith 
across the East. In today’s Dresden, only around 20 percent of the population 
adhere to the Christian faith (15 percent Protestant and 4.5 percent Catholic), 
which needs to be seen in relation to the ambivalent position that the church 
occupied during the communist era. Religion in the former GDR and across 
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Eastern Europe today has been the subject of much debate and attention (Mül-
ler 2008). Eastern Germany has been labelled along with the Czech Republic 
as the most atheist region in the world, resulting from a massive “de-christian-
isation” during the communist era (Schmidt and Wohlrab-Sahr 2003). When 
the GDR state was established in 1949, roughly 81 percent of the population 
belonged to a Protestant church, and 11 percent to the Roman Catholic church. 
By the time the Berlin Wall fell, church membership had fallen to 25 percent 
and 4 percent, respectively (Peperkamp et al. 2009:7).  
 Although Germany has been unified legally and politically, economically 
and socially, it is as if two Germanys still exist today. Large parts of the East 
suffer from unemployment, a lack of public services, gender imbalance, emi-
gration, and abandoned houses (e.g. Economist 2015). Yet in some parts of the 
East, things have improved in recent years, especially in places such as Dres-
den. Economic indicators suggest that Dresden is a thriving city, with booming 
industries in micro-electronics, information technology, biotechnology and 
nanotechnology (Landeshauptstadt Dresden 2015). As city officials and citi-
zens have told me again and again, Dresden is affluent, which is why many are 
puzzled when it comes to the cost-benefit justifications used to obstruct flood 
risk reduction measures the city could easily pay for. We will return to this issue 
in Chapters Five and Six.  
 I have often been struck by the different ways Dresdners describe their 
city, and by the kind of self-image that the local government and administration 
seeks to convey to the public. One the one hand, it portrays itself as a city of 
nature, one that prides itself in preserving its precious green areas and its rivers, 
and whose population enjoys an active outdoor life by biking, jogging, and 
climbing in the nearby Sächsiches Schweiz Nationalpark.  
 At the same time, the Dresden government attempts to portray the city as 
on the forefront of economic and technological developments, as a city of the 
future. The Technical University of Dresden (TUD) is one of the prides of the 
city, and the term “Germany’s Silicon Valley” is often ascribed to the Dresden 
area for its production of microchips. Because of the technical profile of the 
university, many engineers who have been educated there still live in the city, 
thus reflecting both the industrial composition of the types of jobs and business 
innovation and the attempt to attract foreigners with specialised skills. In the 
living community (Wohngemeinschaft, or ‘WG’ for short) where I stayed during 
my first fieldwork in Dresden, several of the current and former residents were 
either studying or had recently obtained a degree in some kind of engineering 
field.  
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Figure 8. Baroque skyline of the Dresden Altstadt, taken from the northern side of the Elbe, 
while people wait for a music concert to begin. Photo: Kristoffer Albris, July 2014. 
 
Figure 9. “Trabbi” car at Laubegast Inselfest festival. One of  the few signs of  Ostalgie that I 
observed. Photo: Kristoffer Albris, August 2014. 
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 That the city of Dresden wants to be both industrial and green is not nec-
essarily a paradox, as one could argue that the same is true of many cities in 
Europe. But in Dresden, this tension between developing the city to cater to 
greater economic development on the one hand while preserving nature and 
cultural history on the other arises continuously in public controversies, espe-
cially in the areas of infrastructure and urban development. The discussion that 
has attracted the most attention in recent years is the debacle over the building 
of the Waldschlösseln Brücke.  
 For about a century, there have been various plans to build a bridge over 
the Elbe in the area between the four bridges in the Altstadt, and the next bridge 
to the east, the so-called Blaue Wunder (“the Blue Wonder”). After unification, 
plans to build a bridge that would link Blasewitz on the southern side of the 
Elbe with Waldschlösseln on the northern side became intensely debated, earn-
ing the nickname Dresdner Brückenstreit (Dresden Bridge Controversy) (Schoch 
2014). The controversy pitted politicians and citizens against each other, with 
one side arguing that Dresden’s traffic problems had to be resolved, and that 
the bridge would be a critical element to achieve this, and the other side arguing 
that the Elbe River valley should have less traffic, and should be developed ac-
cording to green and sustainable ideas and principles. In 2005, a public vote 
decided by a two-thirds majority in favour of building the bridge. However, the 
issue was further complicated when UNESCO expressed worries that the her-
itage status of the Elbe Valley would be jeopardised by the building of the 
bridge. The project was delayed, and the city government tried to propose sev-
eral solutions that would appease UNESCO. In 2006, however, the Elbe River 
valley was put on the “Red List” of UNESCO heritage sites. Construction of 
the bridge began in 2007, and in 2009, the UNESCO heritage committee voted 
to revoke the area’s heritage status, making the Elbe River valley one of only 
two such cases in history.  
 Another case that is more relevant in relation to floods concerns as-yet 
unrealised plans to build luxury apartments and office spaces along the Elbe in 
Pieschen, the so-called Hafencity (harbour city). From the start, the core of the 
controversy around this development project has been that the buildings would 
be erected in what is now a highly flood-prone area (Sächsische Zeitung 2016), 
prompting Sandra Winther, one of the organisers of a protest movement with 
whom I talked, to ask “who would come and help these rich people and corpo-
rate executives stack sandbags and clean out the debris when the next flood 
comes.” 
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 Moreover, Dresden is a city that likes to put its history on display, attract-
ing huge numbers of tourists each year. Scores of especially American tourists 
come to Dresden annually, mainly as war history tourists; many have likely 
read Kurt Vonnegut and want to delve into the historical destruction and re-
building of Dresden after the Second World War. The impressive and detailed 
Military History Museum, housed in a former military barracks on the northern 
end of the city, is the best of its kind in Germany. However, given some of the 
political developments in Dresden of late with the rise of PEGIDA, as we shall 
see below, the number of tourists coming to the city dropped three percent be-
tween 2014 and 2015, which is worrying the city government and tourist sector 
(Die Zeit 2016). 
 For reasons that will become apparent later in the thesis, I would like to 
end this short overview of the history of Dresden by noting a few of these recent 
political developments in the city and in the region of Saxony. I will start out 
by retelling one of the most famous incidents in Dresden after die Wende, exem-
plifying the surge of right-wing extremism and political polarisation that has 
characterised many parts of Europe in the post-Cold War period (Hervik 2004; 
Holmes 2000). 
 
 
Political Polarisation 
 
Jorge Gomondai was a Mozambique national. He had lived and worked in 
Dresden since fleeing the civil war in his home country in 1981 at the age of 18. 
On the night of Easter Sunday in 1991, he boarded a tram in the Dresden Neu-
stadt. Near the central square of Albertplatz, a group of around fourteen right-
wing radicals entered the tram and approached Gomondai with racist remarks. 
They subsequently attacked him. It was not long before the driver noticed that 
one of the doors to the last car had been opened while the tram was in motion. 
The driver stopped, and when he went back to check on the door, he found 
Gomondai lying on the tracks bleeding heavily, having been pushed out of the 
car. He died in the hospital a week later as a result of the injuries he incurred. 
 A memorial event in his name was held in the Kreuzkirche, and afterwards, 
the participants marched towards Albertplatz to the place where he had been 
beaten to death. There, they were met by a right-wing radical faction who 
showed up with chains and items that made as much noise as possible, to pro-
test the memorialisation of a foreigner. Annual memorial events have been 
staged on the anniversary of Gomondai's killing, and in 2007, the city changed 
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the name of a small square close to the site of the murder to Jorge-Gomondai-
Platz, erecting a memorial stone that describes the incident. An award has also 
been established in his honour. 
 The murder of Gomondai and the memorial event has since become the 
subject of articles, books and films. The event and its effects on Dresden politics 
and right-wing radicalism were also examined comprehensively by Dyke 
(2001:58). This event was only the starting point, a sign of simmering neo-na-
tionalist sentiments that had been bottled up during the socialist regime. In-
deed, one of the major political ruptures in Dresden since die Wende has been 
the rise of right-wing nationalism. Such racially-motivated violence against 
non-Germans, as well as the growth of populist and anti-Islam movements, 
were also in evidence when I conducted fieldwork in the city. Katherine 
Verdery (1996) asked what comes after socialism; a polarisation of politics and 
resurgence of nationalist sentiments seem to be among the answers to her ques-
tion.  
 Another famous example of the standoff between right-wing and left-wing 
factions is linked directly to the darkest day in the city's history. On the memo-
rial day of the bombing of Dresden, February 13, an annual event is staged at 
which people hold hands in a long chain along the Elbe. A large number of 
citizens participate, as do many politicians from the Dresden city council and 
the Saxony State Parliament. The event has also become known for clashes 
between right-wing and left-wing groups. Right-wing factions have attempted 
to use the event to boast of their pride in German history, and to remind the 
world about the atrocities committed by allied forces against the German peo-
ple during the war. Left-wing groups, whose stronghold is in the Neustadt, 
north of the Elbe, upset with what they see as opportunism on the part of the 
right-wing groups, have consistently met their opponents with demonstrations 
and blockades of their attempts to participate. 
 But most recently, this turn to neo-nationalism has taken the form of a 
new movement. In October 2014, a political organisation called Patriotische Eu-
ropäer gegen die Islamiserung des Abendslandes, more commonly known as 
PEGIDA, was formed and started organising marches every Monday in the 
streets of Dresden. It also arranges weekly demonstration events in the central 
squares of Dresden, which are followed by a walk around the city; these latter 
are clearly inspired by the peaceful protest walks that began in Leipzig and 
spread to the rest of the GDR, catalysing the civil resistance to the GDR regime 
and culminating in its downfall. The aim of PEGIDA is, as its name suggests, 
to push for more restrictive government policies against Muslims and Islam in  
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Figure 10. Memorial stone for Jorge Gomondai by Albertplatz in Dresden Neustadt. Candles, 
flowers and flyers are from recent annual commemoration event. Photo: Kristoffer Albris, 
April 2015. 
 
 
Figure 11. PEGIDA demonstration event in the Dresden Altmark (Old Market Square). 
Photo: Kristoffer Albris, April 2015. 
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general. PEGIDA started out as a local protest movement in Dresden, but it 
quickly spread to other parts of Germany and beyond, only to lose momentum 
shortly thereafter. It still maintains a foothold in Dresden, however, and fuels 
a highly polarised political climate of hate and anger.  
 PEGIDA began its evening walks in October 2014, just after I had re-
turned to Copenhagen after my first fieldwork. When I returned to Dresden in 
April 2015, I discussed the surging popularity of the movement with friends 
and informants as often as I could, trying to make sense of it. One of the people 
I had long talks about it with was Sebastian, one of the best friends I made in 
Dresden. He was a former resident of the living community where I stayed dur-
ing my first fieldwork in 2014, and we often talked about political developments 
in Dresden. At one point in the spring of 2015, we were talking about PEGIDA 
and how versions of the protest movement had begun appearing in many parts 
of the Western world, including in Denmark. By this time, however, they ap-
peared to be losing support in these other places, and their momentum was 
starting to dwindle. But not in Dresden. Sebastian said: 
 
It seems like they pop up everywhere, but then they just disappear again. How can it be 
that this does not happen in Dresden? Why won’t it just die out? What is so special about 
us here? 
 
 When PEGIDA first appeared on the political scene in Dresden, it was a 
shock to everyone I knew in the city, and they were, to put it bluntly, beginning 
to feel a bit embarrassed that they lived in Dresden. But it also provoked a re-
action, and as the refugee crisis in 2015 began to escalate, the left-wing political 
milieu responded with several counter-protests against PEGIDA. I participated 
as much as I could in both PEGIDA demonstrations and in the left-wing coun-
ter-demonstrations, to which I will return in Chapter Four.16 
 The political tensions in Dresden are ongoing, and the fate and develop-
ment of PEGIDA and other right-wing movements and parties are yet to be 
settled. But the consequences for the reputation of Saxony and Dresden are 
beginning to cause problems for local politicians, and not just in terms of tour-
ism, as mentioned earlier. Around the time of the British referendum vote on 
the EU (commonly referred to as Brexit), as the PEGIDA protests and the burn-
ing of asylum centres in Saxony escalated, German media began to talk about 
                                                 
16 I have struggled to decide the extent to which I should incorporate these recent political de-
velopments into this thesis. Clearly, much of what is going in politically in Dresden does not 
relate to issues of flooding. And yet, in some ways, there is a clear relationship, as will be par-
ticularly evident in Chapter Four, on solidarity after the floods. 
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a “Sächxit”, implying that the German federal state would perhaps sever ties 
with the Saxon state if right-wing extremism continued to produce such violent 
and racist acts. A recent survey of attacks on asylum centres and foreign indi-
viduals across Germany reveals that Saxony’s share of these attacks is the high-
est in both relative and total numbers (Der Spiegel 2016). 
 Seen from the outside, Dresden today appears to be deeply divided polit-
ically. Although a slight majority of voters in Dresden and Saxony support the 
conservative CDU party, there is a strong support for both left-wing and right-
wing political factions. In recent years, however, the city council has been con-
trolled by a red-red-green alliance of the SPD (the Social Democratic Party), 
Die Linke (the left socialists), and Die Grüne (the Green Party), which has 
prompted changes in the way environmental and urban infrastructure issues are 
decided and ushered in a political trajectory more inclined to green solutions 
and climate change adaptation. But, as the case is across Germany and at the 
federal level, the established parties are worried not only by the rise of 
PEGIDA, but also the rise of the Alternative für Deutschland (Alternative for Ger-
many), a right-wing populist and anti-European party that has gained momen-
tum in recent regional elections. 
 Right-wing extremism and political populism have been dominant 
themes in public discourse in Dresden in recent years. However, right-wing ex-
tremism should not be viewed as an essentialising aspect of Dresden and Sax-
ony today, no more than Ostalgie, shrinking cities, and antagonism toward the 
influx of western capitalism should stereotype the former East Germany (alt-
hough Saxony and Dresden in particular have gotten a bad reputation in the 
rest of Germany lately). Indeed, the current cultural, social, and political con-
figuration of Dresden society is much too nuanced to accommodate such labels, 
as the flooding issue, among others, would indicate. And with that, it is time to 
return to the flood issue: a topic which, as I also argued in the introduction to 
the thesis, needs to be seen in the light of the historical and contemporary social, 
cultural and political configurations that I have only been able to briefly outline 
above. In the following, I will first discuss the history of floods in Dresden and 
how the city has learned from such events in the past, before moving on to 
discuss the shock of the 2002 flood and how it has shaped the landscape of the 
city in the years since. 
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Floods of the Past 
 
Throughout history, Dresden has experienced numerous major flood events 
when abnormal weather causes the Elbe River and its tributaries to rise. Studies 
of  the history of  floods in Saxony include Mathias Deutsch (2000) and Dieter 
Fügner (2002). The latter produced a small book that is remarkably detailed in 
its reconstruction of  the actual flood events and its recording of  the high-water 
levels that have been reported during floods over the last nearly one thousand 
years. But much of  that history is today forgotten, apart from the watermarks 
that can be found on buildings. As I have already mentioned, a crucial aspect 
of  the study of  floods and their impact on contemporary Dresden is that no 
floods occurred between 1941 and 2002. However, if  we look more closely at 
the historical sources and records, it is clear that the period between 2002 and 
the present day, during which floods became a matter of  public concern in Dres-
den, is not a historically unique occurrence.  It mirrors what historian Guido 
Poliwoda describes regarding the period from 1790 to 1845, when the city ex-
perienced a similar period of  frequent major floods.  
 Learning to manage flood risks in 18th and 19th century Saxony, Poliwoda 
observed, was a process that took decades. The major flood of  1784 was partic-
ularly destructive to Dresden. An excerpt from Poliwoda’s historical account is 
worth including here: 
 
The ice flood of  1784 threw Saxony into chaos. Meter thick ice floes cut through the 
rivers, fragments destroyed houses; boats which had been cut loose and timbers stored 
on the riverbanks were swept away by the flood tides, cutting everything in their paths to 
tatters. Dams burst, mills, infrastructures and industries all along the river were de-
stroyed, some villages sunk to their church spires under the icy floodwaters. Nine people 
died whilst the government in Dresden simply watched the events unfolding in paralysis. 
How did such a disaster come about? The eye-witness and scientist Pötzsch reported in 
1784 that the temperatures dropped immediately before the ice break-up, and no one was 
able to anticipate such a destructive ice flow. The last flood of  this magnitude in Saxony 
took place in 1655, and the lack of  efficient defences and rescue mechanisms before and 
during the disaster were understandable. In the decades before 1784 Saxony, unlike Aus-
tria, had not been confronted with disastrous high waters. Prior to 1784 rescue forces 
were able to put preventive defence strategies into operation, the lack of  which would 
only become apparent in Saxony after the disaster had taken place (Poliwoda 2007:176). 
 
 What is striking about Poliwoda’s account is that the last event of  a simi-
lar character and magnitude had occurred almost 130 years earlier, in 1655, 
which means that neither the authorities, civil society, or the structural defences 
were prepared to meet the challenges that such an event posed. In other words, 
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disaster memory gaps have been part of  Dresden’s relationship with floods in 
the past. What seemed to be new problems arising in 2002 were in fact problems 
that the region has dealt with for centuries. 
 In examining the complex issue of  memory and disasters, every context 
under study is different. In Dresden, the history of  flooding is long, complex 
and interwoven across generations. As the high-water marks found in and 
around the city testify to, and as Poliwoda’s study reminds us, the problems 
faced and discussions raised in Dresden and Saxony today are far from unique 
in a historical perspective. They are perceived as new, however, by the people 
of  Dresden today, notwithstanding the fact that people do know that floods 
have been a part of  the history of  Dresden; this forms one aspect of  what I term 
a floodscape, as we shall see below. 
 Whether or not a rising Elbe will result in flood inundation is a matter of  
a few metres – in some places, even centimetres. Floods in Dresden are thus a 
result of  tipping points being crossed, tipping points which themselves vary over 
time relative to the degree to which structural flood protection has been built 
and the speed at which government institutions and civil society are able to 
react. Disaster memory gaps are therefore extremely prone to contingency and 
chance, even though they appear to have been ordered and predictable in hind-
sight. In fact, between 1941 and 2002, and also in-between the recent flood 
events, there have been numerous smaller events in which only very few places 
in the city were under water (Dresden Umweltamt 2012:9). 
 Is the period from 2002 to the present day a statistical outlier, or a version 
of  things as they ‘usually’ are? Do such periods of  regular flooding – of  usual 
disasters – occur with predictable frequency in the statistical record? A study by 
Merz et al. (2016) examined the clustering of  flood events in Germany in the 
period from 1932-2005. Although there are a range of  reservations that one 
needs to make in doing such retrospective statistics of  past flood events, the 
authors suggest overall that the recurrence of  floods in Germany, like the 2002 
and 2013 floods along the Elbe and Danube rivers, “are temporally organized 
in flood-rich and flood-poor periods” (Merz et al. 2016:824). This study seems 
to suggest, then, that the period that Dresden is experiencing right now (or has 
perhaps already experienced) follows a relatively predictable pattern in which 
multiple flood events will be clustered close to one another, while other periods 
are without floods. 
 As the following case demonstrates, although statistics show us one ver-
sion of  the world, another version becomes apparent when we hear the  
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Figure 12. Flooded Elbe in 1845. The text reads: ‘The Elbe Bridge in Dresden, 3.  March 
1845, early around 10.30 am.’ (Die Elbe Brücke zu Dresden am 31 März 1845, früh nach ½ 10 Uhr.)  
Source: Sammlung Deutsch. 
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stories of  people who lived through the floods, and importantly, what a shock 
the floods represented to them. This was especially the case with the 2002 
floods. In the following, I will retell the story of  Stefan Schulz, in order to con-
vey a better of  sense of  this shock. 
 
 
The Great Shock in 2002 
 
I have lived here since 1978, and there were no floods. I understood that the Czech Republic regu-
lates the waterflow with its dam system, and hence, we have no floods here. We are protected. I had 
so much faith in this river. I never thought it could hurt us. 
- Stefan Schulz, Gohlis, Dresden. 
 
It was a Tuesday evening on August 6, 2002. As a member of the volunteer fire 
department in Gohlis, a village on the outskirts of Dresden, Stefan Schulz had 
been filling sandbags by the Elbe all day. Tired, sweaty and hungry, he went 
back to his apartment located just behind the dikes to eat and have a bath. The 
Elbe's water level was rising sharply in those hours, but there was still half metre 
to go before the point at which the water would break the dikes and flow into 
the roads of Gohlis. Although he had never seen the Elbe as high as this, Stefan 
estimated that they had a whole day to work before they would be surrounded 
by floodwaters. And there was a good chance that it might not happen at all. 
 Immediately after returning to his home, the police showed up in front of 
his property. An officer shouted up to Stefan, who was looking out of the win-
dow from the second floor, that everyone in the house had to be evacuated 
immediately. Stefan was looking after two of his neighbours’ children while 
their parents worked down by the dikes. He shouted down to the police officer 
that they all would come down after he had eaten and taken a bath. A few 
minutes later, the police broke through the door to the apartment, smashing the 
doorframe. Stefan and the two screaming children were rushed into a police car 
and evacuated to higher ground. 
 It was not until several years later that Stefan understood why the police 
acted as they did. The last time Dresden had experienced a severe flood was in 
1941. Almost no one had experienced what a flooded Elbe looked like, and 
they therefore had no idea what to do in such a situation. The police had been 
given strict orders to evacuate everyone in the flood risk areas, and to use force 
if people resisted. “It was new for everyone, not least the police,” Stefan reflects 
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in 2015, thirteen years later. “Effective emergency response requires some in-
stitutional memory. In this case, no living person in this area, neither police 
officers nor civilians, had experienced a great flood before.” 
 The following day, Wednesday, the Elbe suddenly stopped rising. Alt-
hough the police still restricted locals from returning to their homes, nobody 
was guarding the entry zones to Gohlis. Gerhard Schröder, then Chancellor of 
Germany, was in Dresden wearing rubber boots and rain gear, presenting him-
self to the media as a responsible and caring government leader who was ready 
to support the flood victims of Dresden. At that time, there was only one month 
until the next German federal election. Dresden's police forces were busy se-
curing the Chancellor's visit in the central part of the city, and thus did not have 
sufficient resources to look after districts like Gohlis, with its few hundred in-
habitants, no significant industry, and no landmarks of symbolic value.  
 Stefan remembers how, on the day after the evacuation, he went back to 
his house. As he crept past the abandoned police barricades, he saw to his great 
surprise that strangers from other parts of Dresden were promenading along the 
dikes behind the swollen Elbe River. Everything was open. Stefan found it a 
paradoxical situation: while he had been evacuated by force, today, it was like 
nothing had happened. People were walking their dogs along the river as they 
always did. Only this time, there were even more people – what locals call 
‘flood tourists’ – often described in German as ‘Gaffers’: that is, people who are 
observing something urgent and devastating, but doing nothing about it. In the 
following days Gohlis, like many other parts of Dresden, would be severely 
flooded by the Elbe when the water again began to rise. The flooding in Gohlis, 
a settlement of roughly a hundred houses, was devastating; almost every single 
building suffered some degree of flooding. 
 Stefan’ story is one of the more dramatic of its kind of the 2002 floods. 
And yet it is not unique. Every single person I talked to during my fieldwork in 
Dresden reiterated the same point: the residents of Dresden, including the au-
thorities, had no idea that the river could rise to such a dangerous and threat-
ening level, nor that the Elbe and its tributaries (especially the flash flood prone 
Weisseritz River that caused most of the flooding of the Alstadt in 2002), could 
inundate and damage so many parts of the city. As a result, the city has not 
been the same since. Nor has Stefan.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
71 
Making Sense of Tipping Points 
 
Given the history of floods in Dresen as described by Poliwoda and others, the 
fact that the 2002 floods were a shock might seem odd. Was this event really 
such a great surprise?  
 The research literature does suggest that the 2002 flood was a gigantic 
shock all across Germany, as studies have indicated (Kuhlicke 2010). But was 
it more so in Dresden or Saxony than in other parts of  Germany? Thieken et 
al. (2007) surveyed population groups in three flood prone areas: the Elbe River 
area, the Elbe tributaries (the Mulde River, the Saale River, and others), and an 
area in Bavaria, in the Danube catchment. The differences in how people re-
ported experiencing floods before the 2002 event are telling. Only 9.5 percent 
of  people in the Elbe River area had experienced a flood before, while this num-
ber was 20.2 percent for people living by the Elbe tributaries. But in Bavaria, 
41.9 percent of  people had previously experienced a flood, which makes it clear 
that the shock of  the 2002 floods was by far the greatest in the Elbe River area, 
including Dresden (Thieken et al. 2007:1022). 
In another study, conducted after the minor floods in 2005 and 2006, 
Kreibich and Thieken (2009) report that: 
 
Before August 2002, the flood risk awareness and flood preparedness of authorities and 
house- holds in Dresden was low. The inundation channels and the Elbe riverbed had 
not been maintained well. Just 13% of the households had undertaken building precau-
tionary measures. The severe flood situation as well as the low flood preparedness led to 
tremendous damage, e.g., losses to residential buildings amounted to 304 million euros. 
After 2002, the municipal authorities in Dresden developed a new flood management 
concept and many households were motivated to undertake precautionary measures. 
Building precautionary measures had been actually undertaken by 67% of the house-
holds before the floods in 2005 and 2006. Flood damage was significantly lower, due to 
the less severe flood situations and the much better preparedness. It is an important chal-
lenge for the future to keep preparedness at a high level also without recurrent flood 
experiences.  
  
 That the 2002 floods were indeed a ‘radical surprise’, as Christian 
Kuhlicke (2010) shows in a survey of citizens in the town of Eichsfeld (also in 
Saxony) and which, it can be argued, is also the case for Dresden, should not 
be seen in a historical vacuum, however.  
 The general impression that I received from talking to flood-affected peo-
ple in Dresden who endured the 2002, 2006 and 2013 floods is that most did 
have an idea that floods could occur in the area where they live. At least, that 
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is what they reported to me in retrospect. One the one hand, then, people will 
recall the floods as an event that came as a radical surprise, and on the other, as 
one that could have been foreseen.  
 The water level of  the Elbe has risen to high levels in the period of  the 
“alleged” disaster memory gap in Dresden, and many floods happened else-
where in Germany in this period, including in the GDR times. In 1997, for 
example, there were massive floods along the Oder River, on the border be-
tween Germany and Poland. This event made flood risk a heightened concern 
for people across Germany, as had other events in both the Danube catchment 
and in other parts of  Europe during the period when Dresden was not experi-
encing floods. There is more nuance here, then,  than merely stating that this 
was a ‘radical surprise’ (Kuhlicke 2010). Memory works in strange ways, and 
often people who have directly experienced flood events in Dresden will at-
tempt to make sense of  why they knew what they knew – and what they did 
not know. As Tobias Renner from Laubegast explained to me, in a joking man-
ner, echoing what I heard from city officials: 
 
It had been fifty years without a flood. Here by the riverbank is a high water marker, so 
we knew that there could be floods. But such a long time had passed, and nobody had 
the floods “in their heads”, so it was not a theme at all. People didn’t think about it. And 
after 2002, people perhaps thought about it a bit too much (laughs).  
 
 For an outside observer, it is difficult to fully comprehend what people 
remembered, what they knew then, what they did not know, and what they 
know now that makes them more informed, because people tend to rationalise 
the past and make it more sensible. As in the above quote by Tobias Renner, the 
narrative is that of  course people knew that there could be floods. Signs in the 
built and natural landscape indicated this to them. And yet, flood-affected peo-
ple still frame their experiences as a fundamental shock, an event that nobody 
had expected could happen. I stress this because I do not want to suggest that 
flood-affected people in Dresden were ignorant of  the fact that floods along the 
Elbe could occur. Rather, as Sheila Jasanoff  (2010) reminds us, our perception 
of  any risk is always to a certain degree a matter of  our collective and individual 
memories being “bumped forward.” Or in other words, echoing Douglas and 
Wildavsky (1984) in their foundational book Risk and Culture, we choose which 
risks to live with and mitigate based on shared cultural assumptions and predis-
positions.  
 There is yet another aspect to the disaster memory gap in Dresden that 
needs to be mentioned, and which is important because of  the striking historical 
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record. The fact that Dresden did not experience any major flood event during 
the GDR period (from 1949-1990) is in hindsight incredible. Was this merely a 
statistical coincidence, as the records seem to suggest? When I got the chance, 
I would ask people I talked to or interviewed what they thought about this. Not 
many had an opinion on the matter, and most said they had never really thought 
about it. But a few people did have some ideas about why there were no flood 
events in communist days.17 
 I had a long conversations about this question with a gardener who, like 
Stefan, lives in Gohlis. He told me about his grandfather, who built the house 
in which he lives here in Gohlis. His grandfather always had an eye on the 
Elbe’s water level, measuring it with a wooden stick he kept for the purpose 
when the water was just a little higher than normal. His grandfather experi-
enced the 1940 and 1941 floods, and had spoken of  it often to his children and 
grandchildren. The gardener therefore always knew that the Elbe River could 
flood their house and their neighbours’. Still, it came as a surprise in 2002 to 
everyone, including himself. But we talked briefly about the fact that many peo-
ple had the same awareness of  flooding as he did through contact with the el-
ders in their families. The gardener said that many people in Gohlis had not 
imagined what a major flood would be like, which probably has something to 
do with the fact that what you hear about from your parents or grandparents is 
never the same as what you experience with your own eyes.  
 The gardener I talked to had an interesting theory about the causes of  the 
flooding. He stressed several times, however, that it was only a suspicion (eine 
Vermutung), and he could not factually substantiate the theory. Like others, in-
cluding myself, he wondered how it could be that there was no major flooding 
for the duration of  the GDR period. According to him, part of  the explanation 
could perhaps be found on Czech side of  the border, where a lot of  money has 
been invested to exploit the flow of  the river to generate power. This has created 
a higher risk of  the Elbe being bottlenecked upstream and in retention areas – 
and three major floods since die Wende. But again, he stressed that this was only 
a hunch, and he did not want to be seen as a crazy conspiracy theorist. I asked 
him what kind of  new infrastructure had been put in place that would cause the 
water to flow more intensely from the Czech Republic. He did not have an an-
swer. He repeated, that although there is no clear evidence, and that this is just 
a suspicion, it is still odd that there were no floods in the exact period when 
there was not capitalism in Eastern Europe. Indeed, the gardener’s theory – one 
he was not alone in voicing, it should be added – seems to contradict the point 
                                                 
17 It should be noted that there were several major flood events in different parts of the GDR. 
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that is often highlighted in news articles and government reports that the wid-
ening of  the river and the clearing of  run-off  retention areas on the Czech side 
of  the border has decreased flood risk considerably, although this was mostly 
initiated after the 2002 floods (Dresden Umweltamt 2012). 
 The point here is not to suggest that there are widespread conspiracy the-
ories regarding the introduction of  capitalism in the former GDR and the rise 
of  frequent flood events, nor that the gardener believed such theories to be true, 
as his own repeated disclaimers testify. It is, rather, to show that people who 
have experienced floods in Dresden are trying to reconcile the absence of  any 
other floods in their lifetime before the massive event in 2002 with the three 
major events in less than two decades. People seek answers, and in doing so, 
they rationalise the past and attempt to make it sensible in order to come up 
with some kind of  explanation. 
 
 
Governing Floods  
 
What the gardener’s theory also reminds us is that the Elbe catchment is in two 
countries: Germany and the Czech Republic. Flooding in the catchment basin 
area is thus an international question. A third of  the precipitation that runs into 
the Elbe River is gathered in the Czech Republic, and the Moldau River that 
runs through Prague is the biggest tributary of  the Elbe. Flooding in the middle 
part of  the Elbe does not pose a major risk of  damage without floods upstream 
in the Czech Republic, despite the major tributaries - Schwarze Elster, Mulde, 
and Saale - that flow into the Elbe (Dresden Umweltamt 2012:6). The dams 
and land use plans in the Czech Republic are therefore of  vital importance for 
how floods impact German cities like Dresden. 
 At this point, it is important to note the policy context in which floods 
have been managed since 2002. The fact that the Elbe runs through two coun-
tries, and the management of  its catchment is thus an international task, is but 
one aspect of  the multiple scales at which flood prevention measures and risk 
management schemes need to be addressed. As will be evident in Chapters Five 
and Six, many of  the problems and issues that arise around flood protection 
and prevention stem from the fact that the Elbe, like the other major German 
rivers, is managed at the state and federal levels, although the effects of  floods 
are felt at the local and municipal levels. Yet, as rivers connect upstream and 
downstream locations with one another, any kind of  flood protection scheme 
in one location will affect locations elsewhere along the river.  
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 Cities, however, are allowed to implement whatever schemes and 
measures are allowed by their state; in Dresden’s case, the Free State of  Saxony. 
After the 2002 floods, the city went through a long process of  evaluation and 
response to the fact that the event, as Korndörfer et al. argue, “brought clearly 
into view the deficiencies of  flood prevention and defence within the city, as 
well as shortcomings in the organisation of  the authorities within Dresden” 
(Korndörfer et al 2009:29). As a result, the city invested heavily in flood de-
fences such as dikes, walls, pump systems, and mobile steel elements that can 
be mounted onto permanent stone walls in case of  a flood emergency, as I de-
scribed at the very beginning of  the thesis.  
 At a more general level, the German Water Act of  2005 serves as the in-
stitutional framework for how German states and cities should deal with flood 
issues. However, after experiencing not only the 2002 floods that affected many 
parts of  Central Europe, but additional events in the years that followed, the 
European Union passed the Flood Directive (2007), which requires all member 
states to initiate and implement a set of  measures to address their flood risk 
vulnerabilities (Hartmann and Spit 2016).  
 I will not go further into the institutional framework of  the Flood Di-
rective at this point, as I will revisit it again, especially in Chapters Five and Six. 
What the different political regulatory frameworks – from the EU, the German 
federal government, the Free State of  Saxony, and the city of  Dresden itself  – 
mean, however, is that the landscape of  the Elbe in the city is increasingly be-
coming controlled by large-scale management plans; as Steve Rayner (2003) 
would say, nature is being thoroughly domestified. In order to delve further into 
how the landscape of  Dresden has been impacted by floods, I will first give a 
short introduction to the source of  the floods: the River Elbe itself. 
 
 
Floodscape 
 
When you talk about floods in Dresden, you think first and foremost of  the Elbe (Wenn man von 
Hochwasser in Dresden spricht, denkt man zuerst an die Elbe.) 
- Dresden Umweltamt (2012:6). 
  
The Elbe rises in the mountains of  the northern Czech Republic, where streams 
coalesce into the Labe, its regional name. From there, it turns south, and meets 
the Moldau River, which runs through Prague. It then turns west and crosses 
the border into Saxony. Before entering Dresden, it runs through the heritage 
landscape of  the Elbe River Valley, with the Sächsische Schweiz National Park 
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and picturesque cliff  villages on either side of  its banks. In Dresden, it begins 
to widen, leaving the more mountainous part of  its path and heading on the 
Meissen; from there, it flows on to Magdeburg, Wittenberg, and finally Ham-
burg, before it pours into the North Sea. 
 The earliest reference to Dresden spoke of  a fishing settlement (Dyke 
2001:72), indicating that from the city’s earliest days, the livelihood of  its people 
came from the Elbe. In the following centuries, the river connected Dresden to 
the other major cities in its catchment area, from Prague to Hamburg, and from 
the North Sea to the other rivers of  Europe. The Elbe has thus not only been a 
source of  livelihood for Dresden throughout its history, but also its connection 
to the surrounding world through commerce and transportation (Korndörfer 
2001). 
 Today, commerce along the Elbe is very spare compared to earlier times. 
Some boats travel up and down the river between cities that are connected via 
its waterways, but these are significantly outnumbered by tourist steamers and 
river cruise ships. For a century and a half, small steamer boats traveling from 
Dresden downstream to Meissen, or upstream towards Pirna and beyond into 
Saxonian Switzerland National Park, have been a tourist attraction in Dresden. 
This tradition is alive and well today. 
 Like any city built along the banks of  a river, Dresden has a special rela-
tionship to the Elbe. The river runs for 30 kilometres within the city limits, and 
ten bridges make sure that people and goods can travel between the northern 
and southern parts of  the city. The self-image of  the city is intrinsically tied to 
the river. The nickname of  Dresden, Elbflorenz, testifies both to the baroque and 
neo-classical structures in the Altstadt, and to the romanticism that is often as-
cribed to the Elbe. 
 I would often ask people I interviewed about their relationship to the Elbe 
before I asked them about the floods. The idea was to get a sense of  why they 
lived where they did and what the Elbe meant to them apart from the flood 
question. “Everyone knows that the Elbe is a source of  both good and bad,” 
remarks Daniel Neumann18, a salesman living in Radebeul on the outskirts of  
Dresden. In another case, Ernst Fischer, who owns a shop by the banks of  the 
Elbe in Laubegast, relates to my questions with memories of  his childhood: 
 
                                                 
18 Daniel is the only one of whom I consider to be informants or interlocutors, whom I have 
not anonymized by using a pseudonym. After the floods, he has become a public figure, and 
has appeared in numerous news articles, and has participated in conferences, debating the is-
sue of social media in flood emergencies. 
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Ernst: It has huge importance. I was born here, in this house. I have a good connection 
to this place. Many families have passed the land on to the next generation. We are a 
large family here. It is not like in the city [in the Dresden city centre] (…) it is not anon-
ymous. And, I find that to be a good thing. I feel good here. It is beautiful. 
 
Kristoffer: And in relation to living by the river? 
 
Ernst: It means a lot. We played here by the river as children, with simple things. We 
built dams, and found old ammunition from the Second World War in the river. Shortly 
before the Russians came, many people threw their firearms in the Elbe. Or documents 
linked to the Nazi party. We would find such things as we played by the riverside. 
 
Kristoffer: Are there still guns and pistols lying around? 
 
Ernst: I don’t know about today, we don’t find them anymore. A lot of  time has passed 
now, but in the 1960s we found many such objects. Of  course, then the river was not as 
clean as it is now.  
 
 The last point that Ernst makes is an important one. When I asked people 
about their relationship with the river, many would often stress that the Elbe 
was filled with sewage waste and chemicals during the socialist era. Although 
memories such as Ernst’s testify to an intimate relationship with the river, there 
is also the fact that the river has been transformed since die Wende, as several 
projects and plans by the local government, the Saxon state, and the federal 
government have sought to clean it up. 
 Dresdners often talk about having a relationship of  trust with the Elbe – 
a kind of  social contract – that, for some, was broken when the river flooded 
the city in 2002. It is perceived very much as an actor, a person, with a will and 
consciousness of  its own; sometimes for better, but indeed, also for worse. As 
Stefan Schulz explained to me, reiterating his sentiments regarding the shock 
of  the evacuation in 2002, "Kristoffer, I did not know that the Elbe could act 
like this. I felt like it betrayed me.”  
 The Elbe means a great deal, not just to the citizens of  Dresden, but to 
the city’s identity as a whole. The banks of  the Elbe are used as a primary rec-
reational space for Dresdners in everyday life. Compared to the riverbanks of  
other major European cities such as Paris, London, or Berlin, Dresden, alt-
hough smaller than these other cities, has insisted throughout its history on pre-
serving a more natural appearance of  the Elbe. As Korndörfer (2001:22) argues, 
no large city in Europe has as coherent a river landscape running through its 
centre as Dresden. This is in large part thanks to the Elbwiese, a strip of  parkland 
that acts as a buffer zone between the built environment of  the city and the river   
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Figure 13. Elbwiese, or Elbauen, to the east of  the Dresden Altstadt. In some places, hay is har-
vested by local farmers from the retention areas, giving the impression of  a rural landscape in 
the middle of  an urban area. Photo: Kristoffer Albris, September 2014. 
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itself. The Elbwiese has historically had a pragmatic function, not only as a pro-
tection zone for wildlife and wild plants, as well as a drinking water resource, 
but also as a barrier and a retention space during periods of  flooding. 
 When the Elbe is not on the verge of  flooding the city, the Elbwiese areas 
are a primary public space in the city. Flea markets are held here on a regular 
basis; people use it for picnics, sports, and games; and children play here during 
summer. In addition, the Elbradweg (Elbe cycling path) is a primary route for 
cycling enthusiasts, tourists, and joggers. Many of  the leisure activities of  the 
city are thus centred around the Elbe, and it acts as a gravitational point for 
social life in Dresden. But the Elbwiese would not exist as a space of  public en-
joyment were it not for its function as a retention space for flood water. The 
way that citizens use the city is thus tied to the way it has adapted to floods 
throughout history, forming what I would call a floodscape. 
 I define a floodscape as a landscape in which the relations between the 
built and natural environments are defined in large part by the area’s history of  
floods. The floodscape of  Dresden is thus as much a result of  the social, cultural 
and political history of  the city as the flood events themselves. The Elbwiese is 
not the only example of  the floodscape in the natural environment of  Dresden; 
there are also various retention areas; flood canals, such as the Kaditzer 
Flutrinne; and, as we will see in Chapters Five and Six, dikes and walls that have 
protected the city for centuries, but that have been overtopped on several occa-
sions in recent years.  
 Landscape should be understood in a broad sense here, comprising not 
only ‘natural’ spaces such as riverbanks, parks, forests, and the river itself, but 
also the built environment – including, most importantly, a range of  symbolic 
markers indicating that this is a place that has been shaped by floods in the long 
course of  history. Such symbolic markings amount to what I call the presence 
of  public memories of  floods. 
   
 
Public Memories 
 
The floods have made their mark on the landscape of Dresden, producing a 
series of cultural imprints, symbols, signs, and inscriptions upon the city, 
through statues, memorials, high water marks, art, literature, and other such 
manifestations, practices and objects, that contribute to sustaining the floods a 
public matter of concern.   
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 The public memories of floods in Dresden, I argue, extend beyond what 
could be called material manifestations in the landscape, such as the river flow 
and high water marks. It seeps into the offices and hallways of district bureau-
crat offices, into private living rooms, onto webpages and social media plat-
forms, as well as into museums and public spaces throughout the city. The 
floodscape thus compromises not just the urban river landscape, but also a set 
of discourses that sustain the floods as a public matter of concern. The massive 
surge in news articles that discuss flood issues, even long after the dissipation 
of the emergency, is an obvious, and not surprising, example of this. More sur-
prising, perhaps, is a new fixture on the front cover of the Sächsische Zeitung, the 
most widely read newspaper in Saxony: a small but very important graph at the 
bottom of the page that provides readers with a measurement of the Elbe’s daily 
water level over the past weeks and months, in order to indicate whether there 
is a trend toward flooding in the near future. This small but striking addition to 
the standard weather reports commonly found in regional and local newspapers 
is telling of the way that floods have become a matter of public attention on par 
with bad weather and sunny skies.   
 Arriving in Dresden, it is a challenge to notice whether there had been 
any floods if  one did not know where to look. The past flood events are indeed 
detectable, but they are not easily found when one does not know what to look 
for. Their presence is inscribed into the social memory of  people and, more 
tangibly, into the physical memory of  the built environment, through high wa-
ter markings on buildings and commemorative monuments (Denkmale).  
 As David Alexander argues (2005), symbols that relate to disaster events, 
like any other type of  symbolism, are not static. They are dynamic and change 
over time, forming markers in a long-term process of  rationalising or making 
meaning out of  disaster events. In addition, if  we are to understand how sym-
bols reflect a certain cultural perception of  disasters within a given society or 
cultural group, we also need to understand how they gradually lose their “grip 
on people’s imagination” (Alexander, 2005:32). Memories of  disaster, whether 
they are located at the individual, institutional, or societal level, can be switched 
on and off, reinterpreted, used and appropriated for various ends and purposes; 
they can also hibernate, if  considerable time has passed without a new event 
occurring. 
 Susann Ullberg (2013) illustrates this in her ethnography of  how memo-
ries of  urban flooding in Santa Fe, Argentina, are materialised in monuments 
and documents, and enacted in rituals and public demonstrations. Her work 
demonstrates that memories of  floods are not only dynamic, involving both 
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active remembering and forgetting, but that such memories are also highly po-
litically charged, as they are “differently distributed over the various sections of  
society and scale of  public life, which are linked to historical processes of  social 
geography” (2013:15). She concludes by offering an argument that disaster 
memory essentially says more about society than it does about hazard: 
 
Remembering and forgetting are therefore shaped not only by experience and social in-
teraction but also by moral understandings, social relations and political interests, stem-
ming from the past as well as shaped in the present. Hereby a crucial insight is confirmed, 
namely that the way an environmental disaster unfolds and is handled has more to do 
with society and societal relations than with nature and the hazard involved (Ullberg 
2013:255). 
 
Referring back to the introduction of  this thesis, there are many commonalities 
to observe between my research in Dresden and Ullberg’s point above. Ullberg 
proposes the term memoryscape to denote the struggles of  influence and repre-
sentation in the remembrance of  floods in Santa Fe. She defines memoryscape 
as “the situated and dynamic configuration of different memories in a particular 
social setting” (Ullberg 2013:14). 
 But sometimes reactions to past events move in the opposite direction: 
towards forgetting rather than remembering. In Edward Simpson’s study (2013) 
of  the 2001 Gujarat earthquake, forgetting the event became something of  an 
imperative for many locals as they built new houses and homes in the same area 
that had been completely destroyed by the earth's movement. As Simpson 
notes, referring to the political forces at play in dealing with the aftermath of  
the earthquake, “the political will of  amnesia made it possible to go on” (Simp-
son 2013: 265). This contrasts with other examples of  post-disaster remember-
ing; for instance, the case of  earthquakes in Chile that have spawned a massive 
culture of  disaster remembrance. “In Chile,” Simpson remarks, “to forget an 
earthquake is seen as risking death; in provincial India, not to forget an earth-
quake is seen as risking life” (ibid.). 
 In Dresden, there has been a great deal of  activity concerned with inscrib-
ing different kinds of  flood memories in the public sphere in the wake of  the 
2002 floods, amounting to Ullberg’s concept of  a memoryscape. The public 
memory of floods exists as visible inscriptions – symbols and signs – not only 
in the city’s urban environmental landscape, but also in places such as museums 
and government offices. The existence of signs of the floods can therefore be  
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Figure 14. The Great Wave of  Kanagawa, or Die Woge, on the Augustus Bridge in Central 
Dresden, with a setting sun in the background. Photo: Kristoffer Albris, 2014. 
 
 
Figure 15. Watermarks in Gohlis, Dresden. The above watermark is from the 2002 floods, 
and the faded, older one, is from the 1784 floods. Photo: Kristoffer Albris, 2015. 
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seen as a kind of public practice, sustaining the importance of past flood events 
in a visible, yet subtle manner.  
 In the middle of  the old baroque Augustus Bridge linking Dresden Alstadt 
and Neustadt across the Elbe River stands a strange monument. “Strange,” be-
cause it commemorates an event that most visitors to Dresden do not associate 
with the city, the floods. The monument is entitled Die Woge, and is a reinter-
pretation of  the famous The Great Wave off  Kanagawa, by nineteenth-century 
Japanese artist Katsushika Hokusai. “The Wave”, as it is commonly called, has 
arguably become the most familiar symbol of  tsunamis and floods around the 
world, and it stands on the bridge as a monument to the 2002 floods. At the 
bottom of  the iron sculpture, an engraved text reads “Elbehochwasser 2002 – Spie-
gel der Fluten Andernorts”, which directly translates to “Elbe floods 2002 – a mir-
ror of  floods elsewhere.’ The city erected Die Woge on the bridge in 2008 as a 
symbol of  the destruction and devastation that Dresden and the surrounding 
area experienced in 2002. However, the engraved text also points to a wider, 
globalized context of  disasters and climate change, indicated by the word ‘An-
dernorts’, meaning ‘elsewhere’ (Landeshauptstadt 2008). 
 Watermarks indicating the maximum water level in flood events are a 
well-known phenomenon throughout the world, and are indicative of  a cultural 
practice of  inscribing physical memories of  flood events into the built environ-
ment. They are also widespread in Dresden.  
 In most cases in Dresden, the marks show the height of  the recent floods 
in 2002 and 2013. They are most often painted on a house wall, with a line 
indicating where the water level stood at its highest point, accompanied by the 
year, and sometimes also a specific date. Sometimes, home owners have com-
missioned a small metallic plaque or plate. Most of  these watermarks can be 
found on the walls of  regular homes, but some have been placed there by the 
city, such as the ones on the Augustus Bridge, which record three of  the major 
historical flood events in Dresden. Some display a historical series of  floods, 
dating as far back as the sixteenth century. They indicate the date and height of  
several flood events, allowing for a comparison between these events in relation 
to the specific location in which they are erected.  
 Watermarks, however, are not merely symbolic representations of  the ex-
istence of  past events. They serve as place-specific indicators of  the extent to 
which local communities have been affected by floods throughout history. In 
other words, the damage can be indirectly imagined by observing the heights of  
the watermarks. The watermarks, I would argue, symbolise the way Dresden’s 
history is intrinsically tied to these flood events, and that to understand that  
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Figure 16. A wall of flood maps in the Ortschaft offices in Cossebaude, to the west of Dres-
den Altstadt. Photo: Kristoffer Albris, June 2015. 
 
 
Figure 17. One of  the many info stands that make up the Dresden Altstadt ‘Hochwassertour’, 
where the public can be informed about floods and what the city has done to implement pre-
vention measures. Photo: Kristoffer Albris, June 2014. 
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history is to understand its past flood events. As with Die Woge on Augustus 
Bridge, the watermarks are tied to a collective memory of  events that have uni-
fied people through common hardship. Moreover, given that the watermarks  
compare previous flood events, they are also indicators of  how high future 
floods may or may not reach. They are thus not only signs tied to a collective 
memory of  floods: they are also omens of  events that might reoccur.  
 The watermarks also serve a statistical function. It is quite common for 
historical data on floods collected by scientific and government institutions to 
consist of  local measurements. Often, flood heights vary considerably between 
places, even within a demarcated geographical region or specific river catch-
ment, making it hard to construct a comprehensive data set. Local measure-
ments by households, factories, businesses or public institutions can fill a vital 
gap in this statistical record, although they tend to be less reliable than expert 
hydrological measurements. On the interactive online map provide free by the 
Dresden government (www.themenstadtplan.de), where anyone can look at dif-
ferent sets of  the city’s geographical and demographic information, as many 
watermarks as possible have been plotted in. The Dresden city  administration, 
it seems, is also interested in the watermarks as indicators of  historical flood 
heights. 
 As I argued above, the symbolic traces of  floods are not only found as 
watermarks on house walls and public buildings, but appear in many other 
forms as well. For instance, when you enter the local Ortamt offices in the Dres-
den districts of  Cossebaude and Leuben, both areas prone to flooding, you are 
met by paintings, posters, and maps of  flood information, some of  which are 
provided as a service to citizens to help them evaluate their own flood risk ex-
posure. Another example is the so-called ‘Hochwasser-tour’ (Flood Tour) in the 
Alstadt, consisting of  a number of  information signs along the Elbe where the 
public can read about how the city has dealt with flood protection. As a very 
different example towards the end of  the contemporary exhibition in the Mili-
tary History Museum, there is a section on the modern military and the Bun-
deswehr. The point of  the exhibition is to illustrate the many humanitarian and 
civil missions and functions that the German military has performed in recent 
years. A substantial part of  this illustration concerns the military’s role during 
the 1997 Oder floods and the 2002 Elbe and Danube floods. The display fea-
tures dozens of  pictures showing how soldiers have built sandbag dikes and 
distributed relief  materials, food and water to victims. As an element in the 
exhibition, a line of  sandbags has been placed on the floor, indicating the strong 
symbolism that people attach to the sandbag in connection with flood response. 
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Interestingly, and as I will discuss in the next chapter, the only other function 
that sandbags are usually associated with is the building of  wartime barriers for 
combat soldiers. The same type of  aesthetic representation can be seen in the 
German History Museum in Leipzig, where images of  the Bundeswehr engag-
ing in civil rescue missions are also accompanied by sandbags. 
 As I will discuss in the next chapter, the militarisation of  flood events, 
both during the emergency and after the fact, is a form of  symbolic expression 
that can also be detected among citizens who engaged in the response efforts 
during the next great flood of  2013, amounting to what one of  my informants 
called “an army of  citizens.” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 18. Montage of  photos and sandbags, illustrating the participation by the Bundeswehr 
in the 2002 floods in Germany. At the Military History Museum in Dresden. Photo: Kristof-
fer Albris, June 2015. 
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Chapter 3 
 
An Army of Citizens 
 
 
 
You have an enemy, the flood. Together, you stand against it.  
- Günter Koch, Gohlis, Dresden. 
  
If there had been no private initiatives, we would have been flooded. 
- Jörg Vogel, Übigau, Dresden.  
  
A change in the weather is sufficient to recreate the world and ourselves.  
- Marcel Proust, The Guermantes Way, Remembrance of Things Past, vol. 6, 1921. 
 
 
 
In late May 2013, several consecutive high-pressure systems over Central Eu-
rope created the second highest amounts of precipitation in the region since 
1881 (Freistaat Sachsen 2013:2). Massive volumes of water flowed through and 
filled up the major river catchments of the region. As the Elbe rose above the 
seven-meter mark at the measuring station in Dresden’s city centre, the fourth 
and final alarm level was reached and activated disaster preparedness plans on 
June 3 (ibid.:6), both government entities and civil society initiatives started to 
act to prevent the hazard from turning into a disaster.  
 Over the following days and weeks, additional fire department teams, the 
technical emergency agency, the police and the Bundeswehr were brought in to 
help fight the rising water masses. Extra personnel and machinery were brought 
in from Hamburg and other German cities. Evacuation procedures were com-
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menced, mobile floodwall defences were put in place, and areas at risk of flood-
ing were closed off to the public. 13,300 persons were evacuated within Dres-
den’s municipal borders. 8,500 houses were without power. A number of public 
schools closed. Several bridges were closed, and highways and city streets were 
cut off. Some areas, such as Laubegast, turned into isolated islands, and in a 
few cases, boat transportation corridors organised by the authorities provided 
the only access to these areas (Dresden Brand- und Katastrophenschutzamt 
2013).  
 Hundreds of homes were flooded in what was in many areas a painful 
repetition of the 2002 floods. Yet, the 2013 flood was less damaging than the 
one eleven years before. In an independent official evaluation of the event 
(Kirchbach et al. 2013) the response efforts were in general deemed successful, 
and the report praised risk reduction measures that the city had taken in the 
years since 2002. The heightened awareness of what major flood events entail 
since 2002 and 2006 had made its mark on the ability of the professional agen-
cies to respond in a timelier and more satisfactory manner in 2013. However, 
to the surprise of the authorities, civil response initiatives were also much better 
and more swiftly organised during this event. 
 Like most other people in late May 2013, Daniel Neumann, a young man 
living in the town of Radebeul on the outskirts of Dresden, sensed that things 
were going the wrong way. It had rained for weeks on end. Radio and television 
news had begun to report floods upstream in the Czech Republic. Feeling he 
had to do something, Daniel started a Facebook group called Fluthilfe Dresden 
(Flood Help Dresden). His idea was to create a digital platform where citizens 
could share information about the emergency as it developed. Daniel had not 
thought much about what role the group could have beyond this, and as he 
launched it, he had no idea whether or not anyone would even notice it. On 
Monday morning the 3rd of June, the page had only 45 followers, but that num-
ber quickly rose to 12,000 by the end of the day. By Wednesday evening, it 
peaked at over 50,000 followers. In just three days, and with the help of a group 
of friends, Daniel had established a network of citizens representing about a 
tenth of Dresden's total population. Daniel’s group became a platform where 
flood victims could ask for help, and where volunteers, in turn, could offer it. 
The group thus took on a function much like a telephone switchboard, connect-
ing those that offered help with those that needed it, and vice versa; I call this 
the switchboard mechanism. 
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 Over the next days, hordes of civil volunteers would participate in the race 
against the clock to prevent the rising Elbe from flooding Dresden. Many citi-
zen volunteers participated in these activities by consulting online platforms 
such as Daniel's Facebook group. The massive mobilisation of helpers resulted 
in widespread flood response activities in and around the Dresden city area. As 
Daniel described it when I interviewed him, “An army of citizens suddenly 
formed out of nowhere.”  
 People provided sand and bags and used them to build contingency flood-
walls. 1.6 million sandbags were distributed in rows along the Elbe (Dresden 
Umweltamt 2014), the majority of them by citizen volunteers, according to Al-
exander Lange, one of the founders of Fluthilfezentrum, another initiative, which 
we will hear more about later in the chapter. Some volunteers also provided 
homemade food and drink to flood victims and other volunteers working on 
the dikes and floodwalls. Families opened up their homes to those without a 
roof over their head, and neighbours stepped in to aid others in need with re-
sources and time in the attempt to fend off the water masses. This civil partici-
pation occurred alongside and in cooperation with the professional agencies 
and the organised volunteer NGOs such as the Red Cross, the Maltesers, and 
the Johanniters.  
 In some cases, volunteers orchestrated response efforts by themselves, 
since professional entities like the fire department could not see to all the af-
fected areas in time. Many reports that I have come across, both written and 
oral, state that there were far too many volunteers relative to the needs of the 
flood response efforts, which in some cases actually hindered the work of the 
professional entities. In a few cases, moreover, the mobilisation of volunteers 
created an almost carnival-like atmosphere. Newspapers reported scenes of 
people drinking and dancing to loud music as the threat of the Elbe waned (Die 
Zeit 2013). Civil society came alive in a way that only comes about during cer-
tain moments of crisis (Solnit 2009). The looming disaster had turned into a 
social spectacle, and the emergency into a celebration of society. 
 This was not to everyone’s liking, however. Since the floods, an ongoing 
debate has arisen in Dresden regarding to what extent members of the public – 
or “non-affiliated volunteers”, as they are often called – should be able to par-
ticipate in tasks and activities that are officially meant to be executed by profes-
sional agencies like the fire department or officially-recognised NGOs like the 
Red Cross.  
 In this chapter, I will examine what happened in the course of the 2013 
flood emergency in Dresden by asking what such urgent situations reveal about 
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the relations between the state and its citizens (Guggenheim 2014; Beckett 
2013), in ways that move beyond seeing the state of emergency as extensions 
of political power as conceived of by Carl Schmitt (2005) and Giorgio Agamben 
(2005). I will examine how citizen-driven initiatives emerged during the 2013 
floods, how they were organised, how they operated alongside and in coopera-
tion with professional government response efforts, and how their contributions 
were subsequently both praised and criticised by the authorities. The purpose 
of this chapter is thus to present how the 2013 flood event in Dresden unfolded, 
what happened, who did what, and who blamed whom in the aftermath of the 
event, through the retrospective accounts of both citizens and government rep-
resentatives that I followed and interviewed during fieldwork. 
 The previous chapter dealt with how the city of Dresden forgot what 
floods entailed, and how a range of public memories have been generated in 
the years after the great shock of 2002. However, the experiences of 2002 also 
prompted a different change, namely a realisation that citizens need each other 
during emergencies, and that citizen-driven flood response activities will occur 
whenever there is a need for it. This chapter thus explores how an emergency 
provides a condition of possibility, or a window of opportunity, for people’s 
desire to participate in collective action to be acted out. In this sense, I argue, 
participation became an end in itself, because participating in the flood response 
became a way for people to act in accordance with the seldom-articulated ideals 
of civic virtue and of defending society from a collective threat. Indeed, the title 
of the chapter alludes to the symbolic parallel that people themselves draw be-
tween disaster response and war. 
 If flood emergencies in Dresden are increasingly expected by both the 
state and civil society to be more frequent in the future, as recurring usual disas-
ters, then the question of who gets to act in preparation and response is never 
merely a matter of management or governance. It is also a political question of 
how a government relates to its citizens through social contract, what a govern-
ment expects of its citizens, and how citizens perceive the government to be 
effective, just, and cognisant of their role and agency. I take the 2013 flood 
emergency in Dresden to be an analytically useful moment in which the con-
figurations between the state and civil society were momentarily renegotiated, 
providing a window of analysis into the inner workings of society (Oliver-Smith 
1996:320).  
 After having discussed how sociologists of disaster have conceptualised 
the tension between top-down government responses and bottom-up citizen-
driven initiatives, I will present different ethnographic stories of how citizens 
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retrospectively reflect on how they acted as the flood emergency escalated by 
participating in the collective response efforts. I also describe how social media 
platforms were used as a new means to coordinate and mobilise non-affiliated 
citizen volunteers, resulting in the emergence of initiatives that aim to create a 
standing army of volunteers that can be mobilised during future flood events. I 
then explore how the different government entities in Dresden reacted critically 
to public participation in the flood response efforts, just as citizens voiced cri-
tiques of the professional agencies’ ability and capacity to respond to the 
floods.19 
 
 
Models of Response 
 
Disasters are by definition events or processes that are filled with uncertainty 
and often disorder; from a governmental point of view, these need to be con-
trolled. It is, therefore, no coincidence that the dominant logic employed by 
Western governments to handle disaster emergencies is the so-called “com-
mand and control model” – what disaster sociologist Russell Dynes labels the 
“military” model (Dynes 1994:142). The logic behind this model implies that 
in an emergency, certain actors, such as the military, emergency management 
agencies, fire departments and the police, are granted special authority to deal 
with the extreme situation. As an ideal, the command and control approach 
entails a highly rigid and formalised structure of management and governance. 
Commands are sent from above in the organisational hierarchy, and actions are 
executed on the ground. The more control the top has over the actions per-
formed on the ground, the more the logic has served its purpose, leaving little 
room for any type of actor that does not fit into its scheme.  
 It is not called the military model by coincidence. Such ways of dealing 
with situations clearly resemble, and are in fact modelled upon, military-style 
governance. As Tierney, Bevc, and Kuligowski (2006) have shown in the case 
of Hurricane Katrina, certain political discourses on disorder and lawlessness 
during disasters can call for a greater role of the military in disaster manage-
ment, and of militarism as an ideology, in all aspects of how societies deal with 
disasters. In Dresden and across Germany, the military (Bundeswehr) played a 
                                                 
19 As I addressed in the introduction to the thesis, my stance on such debates takes a prag-
matic point of departure. My critical approach is in line with Luc Boltanski’s notion of an em-
pirical form of critique – or a critique of critiques – that is determined not to posit its own au-
thoritative judgment, but rather to illuminate what is at stake in the controversies over flood 
response in Dresden by following the critiques put forward by the actors themselves. 
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central role in supplying extra personnel for building sandbag dikes and provid-
ing logistical aid. As I will touch upon later in the chapter, military metaphors, 
and the symbolism of objects like the sandbag, have interestingly also created a 
kind of militarisation of citizen-driven response efforts, albeit in a different 
manner; this may indicate that citizen-driven movements also drift towards 
more institutionalisation, hierarchy, and structured order after one emergency 
and in anticipation of the next.  
 The effect of the military command-and-control-model, however, is that 
the rights and requirements of ordinary citizens are restricted in emergencies. 
Indeed, in emergencies democratic governments strip people of their status as 
citizens with rights, and instead assign them that of victims or bystanders (Gug-
genheim 2014:9). It follows from such a logic, that an emergency cannot be 
democratic. 
 From point of view of the military model, citizens are essentially blocking 
or hindering state actors from executing emergency response plans when they 
to try to interfere. Citizens – or non-affiliated volunteers, as they are often la-
belled – are by definition not included as active and contributing agents in most 
emergency policy models and plans, but rather, as subjects that are either po-
tential victims or disruptive elements (Scanlon et al. 2014). The population 
within a disaster zone thus becomes not only an object in need of protection, 
but from the state’s perspective, also an object in need of governance. The dis-
aster emergency becomes, in other words, governmentalized, governed by and 
through a series of anticipatory logics and rationalities of preparedness whereby 
the emergency has effects on the political configurations of society also before 
it has even materialised (Anderson 2010; Lakoff 2007).  
 It is not surprising then, as Scanlon et al. (2014:44) note, that emergency 
management agencies and governments in Western societies have been quite 
reluctant and unsuccessful in incorporating citizens or “ordinary people” into 
official response structures. Nor is it necessarily the case that citizens want to 
be incorporated into emergency plans. Yet, one could argue that there is an 
underlying consensus that, at least ideally, more integration of civil actors and 
public participation in emergency plans could benefit the overall aim of reduc-
ing disaster risks (Tierney 2012:358). Given the fact that most victims whose 
lives are at risk in disasters are rescued and saved by first responders and vol-
unteers who converge on the disaster site (Drabek and McEntire 2003), such 
actors do not just have a role to play, but are indeed vital in minimising both 
the human and economic costs of disasters.  
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  The phenomenon of large numbers of helpers and volunteers converging 
on a disaster scene has been termed emergent self-organised response and has been 
discussed and analysed by disaster scholars since the middle of the twentieth 
century (Fritz and Williams 1957). In Samuel Prince’s (1920) pioneering soci-
ological study of the Halifax explosion, accounts of volunteers and ordinary 
people engaging in the response and relief efforts were central. Indeed, account-
ing for how people react more or less spontaneously to emergencies and crisis 
was one of the central reasons why the first disaster studies emerged in post-
war United States: they were commissioned by the government to research 
whether or not people would panic during a nuclear attack, and how such mil-
itary strikes would affect public morale (Bankoff 2004:24).  
 The concept emergence has a specific meaning in disaster studies, pointing 
to the sudden rise of actions, norms, values, modes of organisation and forms 
of behaviour (Bardo 1978:89).20 Emergent activities and emergent groups can 
take many different forms and characteristics. These can range from large-scale 
citizen-driven initiatives to individuals making small adjustments in their habits 
in order to adapt to the circumstances of the disaster. For instance, in an anal-
ysis of pro-social behaviour during Hurricane Katrina, Rodriguez et al. (2006) 
describe how citizens who owned boats engaged in search and rescue missions 
to save people who were unable to exit their homes. Kendra and Wachtendorf  
(2002) similarly describe various instances of creative and improvised solutions 
by citizens and authorities during the 9/11 attacks, efforts that were vital in the 
first dramatic hours after the World Trade Center towers had collapsed. 
 Scholars have repeatedly observed emergent responses by non-state ac-
tors, and the 2013 flooding in Dresden is no exception. Disaster scholars 
acknowledge that any investigation into the politics of disasters needs to ad-
dress how such extreme events reproduce, reinforce, or reconfigure relations 
between the state, citizens, and other non-state actors that are mobilised or play 
a role during emergencies. Indeed, as disaster sociologist Kathleen Tierney 
writes, the concept of disaster governance, as opposed to management or gov-
ernment, has arisen out of the recognition that functions that have historically 
been handled by public institutions are “now frequently dispersed among di-
verse sets of actors that include not only governmental institutions but also pri-
vate sector and civil society entities” (Tierney 2012:342). What happened dur-
ing the 2013 floods in Dresden is a clear example of this development. In other 
                                                 
20 The word emergence has of course a range of different meanings in philosophy and the so-
cial sciences, not least in its Deleuzian version. For the purposes of this chapter, I restrict my 
use of emergence to how it has been conceptualised in the discussions around disaster re-
sponse in disaster sociology. 
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words, the state of emergency is not merely a situation in which state control is 
extended through extraordinary governmentalised techniques of control, but 
also where the structures of society are both potentially revealed and changed, 
rendering such moments productive to reflect upon (Guggenheim 2014; Beckett 
2013). 
 In the following section, I begin to approach these issues empirically by 
exploring how the citizens of Dresden mobilised and organised collective re-
sponse efforts during the floods. 
 
 
Finding a Place to Help 
 
During fieldwork, I collected as many different stories and retrospective ac-
counts of the 2013 flood emergency as possible. As I arrived in Dresden in April 
2014, one of my strategies for getting in touch with people who had volunteered 
during the flood event a year earlier was simply to write to people who I could 
see had been active on the social media groups. This might seem at first to be a 
somewhat “easy” approach to getting in touch with informants. It proved to be 
highly fruitful, however, and became a way to record a range of different nar-
ratives about how the flood emergency played out in all its chaotic, disorderly, 
and confusing shapes and forms.  
 The first person I contacted was a young medical student at the university 
named Hans. Born and raised in Dresden, Hans’s family have been living here 
for generations. He lives in Löbtau, a neighbourhood in the southwest part of 
Dresden, where I coincidentally also lived during the first fieldwork trip in 
2014. He vaguely remembers the 2002 floods: how his father had rushed out to 
help friends in need, and how their own basement was flooded when the Weis-
seritz, a tributary to the Elbe, inundated parts of Löbtau.  
 In 2013, however, Hans was himself ‘on the barricades’, as he says, help-
ing out in the response efforts. On the first day he went out, Monday, June 3, 
he helped in the part of Dresden known as Neustadt (New Town). He met a 
friend there, but initially there was not much to do. There were no sandbags to 
fill or distribute. The Bundeswehr and the professional firefighters were late to 
arrive, so people started to collect whatever bags and sand they could find in 
stores, and a handful of individuals took charge of the situation. It all seemed 
to happen very fast, according to Hans. When the Technisches Hilfswerk 
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(THW)21 trucks eventually began to arrive with large amounts of sand and bags, 
people quickly and effectively started building dikes on the streets along the 
river. They formed long chains to transport the sandbags from person to person, 
becoming in a very concrete sense what Simone (2004) has termed ‘people as 
infrastructure’.22 Such images of people forming long lines have become iconic 
of the civil participation during the floods. Indeed, one could argue that the 
German media's attention to the widespread civil flood response participation 
has been driven by a motivation to report stories of civic virtue and of a society 
in decline rising to the occasion in the hour of need; the images of long rows of 
people captured those ideas (Obergassner 2013).  
 Existing social groups and networks, such as student clubs and local com-
munity networks, as well as individuals on their own initiative, arranged for 
food and drink for helpers. There were about 200 people there – maybe more, 
Hans recalls – and more kept coming. Yet the sand soon ran out. At some point, 
people started taking sand from improvised places, such as beach volleyball 
courts, some of which are located in so-called ‘beach clubs’ along the Elbe. Alt-
hough Hans came alone, he made new friends on that first day, and they de-
cided to meet up again. The next day, the Facebook groups helped Hans and 
his new comrades to locate where people needed the most help. They went to 
a place on the opposite side of the Elbe, east of the Altstadt. Here the situation 
was quite different. People were anxious about their homes and their posses-
sions. As was the case the day before, there was no sand to begin with, and 
people had to improvise in any way they could to create some kind of barrier 
against the water. “There were so many people, but so little to do, because 
sandbags were in constant shortage,” Hans explains. People worked hard, and 
Hans was on the brink of exhaustion when he left for home that night. On the 
third day, Wednesday, June 5, he went to the area known as Pieschen, in the 
northwest part of Dresden, where a mass of people had gathered along the Leip-
ziger Strasse.23 Here the mood was once again quite different from the day before. 
There were perhaps 500 people there, and civilians coordinated everything. 
One person in particular, who walked around on crutches, seemed to know 
                                                 
21 Technisches Hilfwerk (THW), is the German emergency management agency that provides 
technical support in emergency situations. It has local divisions in all major cities and towns. 
22 Simone uses the idea of people as infrastructure in a slightly more generic sense than I do 
here, but the very idea of people using themselves as a way to transport things like sandbags 
indicates coordination at the collective level, turning the bodies of individuals into an infra-
structure that performs a specific function. 
23 It was probably the area that received the largest number of volunteers, as evidenced by a 
tally of the frequency of words appearing on the three major Facebook sites (Fluthilfe Dresden, 
Hochwasser Dresden, and Elbpegelstand) that I conducted. 
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what he was doing and shouted out orders to other volunteers: an example of 
the sudden emergence of local “leaders” about which we shall hear more (see 
also: DNN-Online 2013a). Hans sensed that a party atmosphere was beginning 
to emerge. People passed around chocolate, beer, and in some cases, even ma-
rijuana joints, it has been reported to me. People were working, and when they 
did not work, they just “hung out”. People reported an almost euphoric vibe in 
the parks and public spaces along the Elbe. In the days after the emergency had 
calmed down and water level of the Elbe had lowered, numerous festive events 
took place, often in the form of fundraisers for flood victims. A month later, the 
MDR (Central German Radio) also staged a donation event on a major stage 
by the banks of the Elbe with the title “Together against the Floods – We Say 
Thank You!” (Gemeinsam gegen die Flut – Wir Sagen Danke!), which attracted 
thousands of people. 
 Stories such as Hans’ are common. Many people watched in anticipation 
of the coming floodwaters’ crash into Dresden and wanted to contribute in one 
way or another with their time and help. Yet in many cases, it was harder to 
offer help than one would expect. Some people in Dresden explained to me that 
they had turned up at sites along the Elbe that were about to be flooded to offer 
their help, but were asked to leave because there were simply too many people. 
Sebastian, a good friend with whom I often discussed politics, found himself in 
such a situation when he tried to help: there were too many people helping 
everywhere he went. He rode his bicycle downstream along the river, and even-
tually ended up in a small village a few kilometers away from Dresden where a 
group of locals welcomed his help. Others remember how they felt bad about 
accepting the food and drink being offered to volunteers at the sandbag filling 
stations because they felt they had done hardly anything to deserve it. It was 
clear to everyone that there was both an oversaturation of help and a mismatch 
between the severity of the hazard and the mobilization of civil volunteers. 
 Many sources, such as Facebook, official government reports, newspa-
pers, and my informants, also report an overflow of material items donated to 
victims and volunteers, including some that were useless and unnecessary. This 
is not uncommon in disaster situations (see e.g. Hastrup 2011), as many profes-
sional disaster management professionals will surely testify to. It is moreover 
not a tendency reserved for the affluent parts of the world, but is often observed 
in situations where people in poverty are presented with donations of things 
they have no use for. 
 Volunteers have reported to me in interviews that in some parts of the 
city, they had organised response efforts long before authorities arrived. When 
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floods occur in Dresden, the water hazard threatens many different areas at 
once, far too many for the fire department to respond to adequately and in equal 
measure. Although the Bundeswehr and extra firefighters were brought in from 
Hamburg (an article from Der Spiegel (2013c) mentions 6000 people working in 
an official capacity in Dresden) several areas were neglected, presenting an op-
portunity for volunteers to take charge in the absence of professionals on the 
ground.  
 In some cases, the fact that volunteers stepped in and took charge had a 
profound effect on preventing damage to buildings and infrastructure by the 
water masses. This is also an example of how publics rally around a common 
problem that existing institutions, whether governmental or non-governmental, 
are not able to deal with (Dewey 1954). An official from the Dresden fire de-
partment admitted to me that the sheer number of citizens enabled in some 
cases a more effective response effort than the professional firefighters could 
have provided. For instance, he estimated that at one sandbag filling station set 
up by the fire department, their automated machines could fill approximately 
1500 sandbags an hour, whereas the volunteers on site could fill approximately 
5000 an hour using shovels and their bare hands. These numbers have been 
supported by volunteers who report that in some cases the firefighters aban-
doned the filling machines in favour of the manual method, with the help of 
volunteers. 
 I wish to emphasise here that both the accounts I have collected and con-
temporary news reports indicate that there was a larger degree of cooperation 
between non-affiliated volunteers, affiliated volunteers, and professional emer-
gency agencies (including the Bundeswehr) than official accounts from the au-
thorities suggest (Friedrich 2013; Dresden Brand- und Katastrophenschutzamt 
2013). This is an important point to keep in mind, as we shall see later on. 
 
 
The Emergency Goes Digital 
 
When an individual is in harm's way, no one helps. However, if a city or community is 
threatened, everyone helps, because it affects everyone! In 2002, help was poorly organ-
ised, because Facebook did not exist back then, and the floodwaters came so fast that 
people had almost no time to react. In 2013, it was completely different. (Petra, volunteer 
during the 2013 floods) 
 
Although I focus on the events surrounding the 2013 floods, it should be made 
clear that emergent responses to floods have occurred throughout the history of 
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Dresden; it is not a new phenomenon. Citizen-driven flood responses were also 
widespread during the 2002 floods. Flood-affected residents of Dresden still re-
member how strangers came and offered their help without hesitation. Today, 
however, the professional response efforts of 2002 are remembered as being 
weak and chaotic in comparison to those of 2013. This has, without a doubt, 
something to do with the lack of cultural and institutional memory of floods in 
Dresden, a result of the disaster memory gap (Pfister 2011) discussed earlier. 
Yet the coordination and the organisation of civil volunteers during and after 
the flood emergency also developed in a different manner in 2013 because the 
world had entered the digital age. 
 Social media platforms and digital technologies are increasingly being 
used in a variety of ways for emergency and crisis management (Alexander 
2014; Hughes and Tapia 2015). Most of the research on social media in disas-
ters and emergencies has focused on how these new forms of media are chang-
ing crisis communication, since they allow for entirely new ways of sharing, 
circulating and disseminating information (Crowe 2012). With social media, 
members of the public can be kept informed about the progression of a disaster 
by authorities, and citizens themselves can share pictures, videos and news sto-
ries in a much faster and more dynamic manner through Twitter, Facebook, 
Instagram, YouTube, and other platforms. Yet this has also resulted in a quan-
titative explosion in the amount of information being shared, which presents a 
risk of false or inaccurate information being circulated. This was the case, for 
instance, during Superstorm Sandy in 2012, when Photoshop-manipulated im-
ages of flooded areas circulated on Twitter (Alexander 2014:725). 
  There are still more ways in which social media platforms and digital 
technologies are put to use in the context of disasters and emergencies. ‘Google 
Person Finder’ and Facebook Safety Check have helped people locate missing 
family members (Alter 2015; Tabuchi 2011). Disaster relief operations have 
benefitted substantially from cash donations collected through social media or 
text messaging services (Lobb et al. 2012). Crowdsourced and interactive maps 
by volunteers and so-called micro-mapping teams have also proven effective in 
emergency response (Petersen 2014). Such crowdsourced maps were also used 
during the 2013 floods in Dresden, and worked in concert with the Facebook 
groups. Moreover, it also gives rise to translocal networks of digital humanitar-
ians who contribute to the mapping of events even if they are located far away 
(Hughes and Tapia 2015; Hughes and Palen 2012). 
 I have already mentioned Daniel Neumann and his Facebook group 
Fluthilfe Dresden. This was not the only emergent online network that connected 
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people. Two other groups on Facebook – Hochwasser Dresden (High Water Dres-
den) and Elbpegelstand (Elbe Level) - quickly became just as popular. In addi-
tion, several smaller groups started popping up. Some aimed primarily at shar-
ing information, others focused on the clean-up phase after the floods, and still 
another was created to debate the perceived insufficiency of government re-
sponses to the emergency. Across Germany, indeed across all of Central Eu-
rope, such Facebook sites and groups emerged in the span of just a few days, 
and were used alongside other digital platforms like Twitter and Google Maps 
to aid emergency response in inundated areas (Kaufhold and Reuter 2016). 
Sven Mildner, a young IT expert from the Dresden area, received the German 
federal civil innovative award for the Google Map he made during the floods 
in Dresden that was widely used by the public. The Facebook groups also re-
ceived a good deal of attention from German media, where Daniel was hailed 
as a remarkable citizen who had acted promptly and in solidarity with his fel-
low townsmen (Obergassner 2013). 
 As his Facebook site gained momentum, Daniel began to receive mes-
sages from eyewitnesses along the river and posted updates about which areas 
needed help. Here is how Daniel reflects back on those days: 
 
It was crazy. By Monday evening, I was receiving about 60 emails a minute. I got two 
of my friends to help me because it became too much to handle. Most of the people who 
wrote were offering help because they felt they needed to do something. So they offered 
bread, clothes, anything to help. But this quickly became impossible for us to respond 
to. I decided that we would only answer those who requested help, not those who of-
fered. The bread must find the people, and that was what the Facebook page was able 
to do. We connected people who needed help with those who offered by posting where 
people needed to go on the site. We didn’t inform people about the flood, although it 
was a tough balance. (Quoted from field notes) 
 
 Daniel would direct followers to areas where locals were requesting help, 
and would inform people about what kind of help or materials were needed 
(e.g. sand, sandbags, transportation, food, etc.). People could then help by 
transporting sand, filling sandbags or preparing food. Local companies and 
shops donated resources such as food and drink for the helpers and posted their 
offers through the Facebook groups. In other words, the Facebook groups be-
gan to function much like a telephone switchboard, receiving and directing in-
formation between those that needed help and those that wanted to help, while 
also being the main venue for individual citizens, businesses, and even the au-
thorities to show support for the flood response efforts in a public forum.  
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 Daniel posted updates from the authorities such as the fire department, as 
he did not feel that his site should be seen as in opposition to the professional 
agencies’ work, but rather as a supplement to it. Yet, as the emergency un-
folded, the Facebook groups also became a forum in which people voiced their 
worries and frustrations with what they perceived as an insufficient response 
from the government’s side. 
 The rise of social media presents a new type of problem for professional 
public emergency professionals. The comparatively fast, dynamic, and flat-hi-
erarchical character of social media platforms enables people, especially admin-
istrators and initiators of online networks, to play highly important roles in the 
orchestration of civil emergency response (Hughes and Tapia 2015). Because 
of the lack of clear hierarchical structures on social media, David Alexander 
argues, these platforms are better-suited to collaborative governance rather than 
command-and-control approaches to emergencies. As he puts it, “Issuing or-
ders to the general public is likely to generate an adverse reaction on social me-
dia, whereas issuing requests for collaboration may elicit a more positive re-
sponse, based on involvement rather than alienation” (Alexander 2014:721). 
Social media groups, I would argue, not only permit new ways for citizens to 
participate in emergency response, but also amplify the feeling of being part of 
a movement: indeed, not just a response movement, but also a civic, grassroots-
based political movement that arose in the course of a just few days. 
 As we shall see, citizen-driven initiatives that were born out of the flood 
emergency in 2013 are slowly becoming more institutionalised, and here social 
media platforms have been central. The groups have created a set of digital in-
frastructures that can be used as tools to help people communicate when the 
next flood comes and to mobilize volunteers (Der Spiegel 2013a). As one fol-
lower of Fluthilfe Dresden remarked when the neighbouring town of Meissen 
was badly hit by a mudslide in May 2014 and Daniel called on people to help, 
“We have been sleeping for a year now, but we are ready!” 
 
 
Emerging Structures 
 
Importantly, online networks such as Fluthilfe Dresden also collaborated with 
groups that were organised on the ground. One example of such a group was a 
student club called Bärenzwinger. Peter Bautzner was one of the central figures 
in the club, whose facilities are located in the city centre just beside the Dresden 
Fortress in a small, enclosed area prone to flooding. As the Elbe climbed the 
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alarm levels, members started sharing individual posts on the internal student 
club networks, encouraging people to help. At that time, and in the coming 
days, no resources were delivered by public entities. Instead, the club collected 
and bought their own sandbags, received donated shipments of sand from 
friends and others in their personal networks, and began filling bags to construct 
a temporary dike.  
 Peter explains that in the beginning, they coordinated everything them-
selves, but at a certain point, firefighters and Bundeswehr officers started arriv-
ing on the premises. Ordinary citizens kept coming to their filling station be-
cause of its central location despite the fact that many other areas of Dresden 
were in much greater need of assistance. But the club quickly set up a couple of 
pavilions and a computer station, and used street signs to hang posters inform-
ing people where to go if they wanted to help. Importantly, they instructed peo-
ple to consult Fluthilfe Dresden for more information, which was an attempt to 
set up a mechanism that could help to distribute volunteers around the city as 
effectively and evenly as possible. 
 I met up with Peter in September 2014. He was kind enough to show me 
around the student club facilities, indicating where they placed the sandbags 
and how high the water had been. As he tried to help me visualise where the 
sandbags were placed and how they had set up their coordination base, he 
points out that there was indeed a problem with inaccurate reports, which were 
coming in some cases from the Facebook sites. Still, they shared as much infor-
mation as they could with Fluthilfe Dresden to verify what was actually happen-
ing around the area. Three people were occupied at all times with coordinating 
helper activity, equipped with laptop computers and smartphones. According 
to Peter’s estimate, as many as 500 people would stop by their station in a day; 
they would consult the information posters, some would log on to Facebook 
on their smartphones, and they would proceed from there. For Peter, it was 
important to have this coordination on the ground and not just online, to be 
able to communicate with those who came to help in a face-to-face manner. 
Daniel and his team of friends also used ‘scouts’ that would ride along the Elbe 
on bicycles to verify the information they were receiving from people writing 
to them and from the authorities.  
 As at other locations along the Elbe, a kind of festival atmosphere 
emerged at Bärenzwinger, as people got excited. Peter was to a certain extent 
unhappy with the idea of parties arising from the flood response activities; he 
was more concerned with actually managing the situation. However, Peter 
said, “A couple of beers and some good times weren’t a problem. They also 
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Figure 19. Work at the sandbag dikes by the Bärenzwinger Student Clubhouse. Top: unload-
ing of sand and a group of volunteers waiting to fill bags. Bottom: Bundeswehr and volun-
teers coordinating in cooperation with one another. Photo used with permission. 
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bring a bit of spirit and morale to people.” He reflects, “And of course, food 
and drink were necessary for people to keep on working. Around Thursday, 
when the water started to recede, we could relax a bit more. The unity was 
unbelievable.” 
 Temporary clusters of coordination teams and groups like the one just 
described sprang up in many parts of the city where volunteers assembled. Of-
ten one person or a small group of people became unofficial leaders (Führers). 
When Daniel himself came out to some of the places where people were busy 
filling sandbags, he was treated with respect. “I explained that I was from 
Fluthilfe Dresden, and when I started talking, everyone was quiet. I had never 
experienced that before.” 
 Alexander Lange is the founder of one of the other Facebook sites, 
Elbpegestand. He was as surprised as Daniel was when his site reached 83,000 
followers at the height of the flood emergency. Alexander used the group pri-
marily to disseminate information about the flood emergency to the public, and 
less as a means to direct action towards certain areas in need of help. From his 
perspective, this was a good idea, as he did not want the Facebook groups to 
end up competing against each other to attract followers. Alexander told me 
that he has been in contact with Daniel to discuss how the Facebook groups 
might cooperate during future events. They have discussed a planned flow of 
information, in which Fluthilfe Dresden will deal with incoming information 
from people who need help and publicise their needs, while Elbpegelstand will 
communicate information about developments in the emergency. This division 
of labour quickly became something that needed addressing during the 2013 
floods, since neither Alexander or Daniel were interested in multiple Facebook 
groups performing essentially the same function. 
 Alexander was also one of the architects of an initiative that collected re-
sources and donations at the Dynamo Dresden football stadium, where people 
could go and pick up supplies (water bottles, shovels, sandbags, etc.). Since the 
floods, he and a group of others who were involved in the coordination efforts 
have founded an association called Fluthilfezentrum (Flood Help Centre). The 
point of Fluthilfezentrum is to create a network that citizens can join that will be 
directed by Alexander and his collaborators during future flood events. People 
sign up via a comprehensive application form that collects both their personal 
details as well as any skills they have that might be useful during floods, such 
as medical training or engineering expertise. Fluthilfezentrum will also provide 
volunteers with an ID card, indicating their affiliation with the initiative, which 
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in a sense transforms them from the category of non-affiliated to affiliated vol-
unteers. Alxeander has also been in dialogue with the Dresden fire department, 
hoping that Fluthilfezentrum might become a recognised partner in the emer-
gency plans and structures that the authorities use as a blueprint for action dur-
ing flood response. 
 Fluthilfezentrum is but one example of the many different initiatives that 
have arisen following the flood event and are evolving into institutions that re-
cruit teams of volunteers in preparation for the next flood. Ziviles Katastrophen 
Hilfswerk (ZKHW) – its name evocative of the Technisches Hilfswerk (THW) – is 
an initiative in Dresden that, like Fluthilfezentrum, was born out of the resource 
collection at the Dynamo Football Stadium. In fact, Alexander and some his 
collaborators broke away from the ZKHW to found Fluthilfezentrum because 
they wanted to create an organisation whose primary purpose was to address 
flood issues specifically, not all types of hazards and emergencies. This was met 
with criticism by the ZKHW in a news article in which they blamed the organ-
isers of Fluthilfezentrum for being disloyal, and a kind of competition between 
the two initiatives seems to have emerged (Sächsische Zeitung 2014a).  
 Other initiatives are more locally-oriented, and not as intent on building 
up an organisation with a digital platform that attracts volunteers from all over 
Dresden and beyond, as is the case with Fluthilfezentrum. For instance, in the 
neighbourhood of Übigau in west Dresden on the northern bank of the Elbe, 
which is also prone to flooding, a building entrepreneur named Jörg Vogel has 
founded with other community members a local flood response association that 
will act as the main contact and mediation point between the fire department 
and the inhabitants of Übigau. The organisation was born out of the realisation 
that if there had been no private initiatives to fill sandbags during the 2013 
floods, then they might very well have experienced significant flooding. Jörg 
feels it is important, however, that the initiative work alongside authorities as a 
local contact point for the fire department and the central emergency manage-
ment coordination centre, which happens to be located just next to Übigau. 
After the floods, they arranged for a course on how to fill sandbags with a rep-
resentative from the fire department, and invited other locals from Übigau to 
participate. Such local groups for flood protection are found elsewhere in Ger-
many; in some places, they are called Deichwehr (‘dike protection’). 
 What these different examples of civil society organisations around flood-
ing problems suggest is that the public’s perceived need for more mechanisms 
and institutions in society that can absorb non-affiliated volunteers has set in 
motion new and emerging structures that did not exist before the 2013 floods. 
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I would also suggest that the rise of digital and social media platforms, along 
with the fact that the 2013 event was the third major flood in just eleven years, 
has motivated people like Alexander and Daniel to organise different ways to 
turn flood events into a matter of public concern, and something that can be 
anticipated in a different manner than before. 
 Moreover, I argue that it was not coincidental that Daniel Neumann used 
the phrase, “an army of citizens formed out of nowhere,” to describe how peo-
ple mobilised and participated in the flood response efforts. Nor was the way 
Günter Koch, a resident of Gohlis, put it: “You have an enemy, the flood. To-
gether, you stand against it.” Such military symbolism and metaphorical lan-
guage are heard often on both social media platforms and in the interviews I 
conducted. The sandbag itself conjures up a symbolism of military enterprise. 
The humble bag, at the end of the day, is only used for two purposes: to fend 
off floodwaters and to shield soldiers from enemy bullets. The act of participat-
ing, of being able to make a difference, was a heady tonic, and it could be in-
ferred that civilians felt proud to be recognised as equals by the fire department 
and the Bundeswehr, which was the case in some instances. Proving that, as a 
citizen, you could make a difference, was “an intoxicating experience,” as Peter 
calls it; the bonds that were created were a certain kind of communitas (Turner 
1969) resembling that of being brothers in arms. 
  The point here is not to suggest that there is an inherent militarism un-
derlying civil response initiatives, as Tierney et al. (2007) have argued regarding 
professional response structures in the United States. Rather, I wish to point 
out that there is an affective side to the organisation of flood response in Dres-
den that makes participation an end in itself because it is meaningful per se. 
Much more is at stake here than merely flood response and protection. It is 
about the kindling of the idea of civil society, of citizens being able and allowed 
to demonstrate collective agency at a time when they sense it is needed. It is 
also, of course, a matter of people who have positioned themselves strategically 
to obtain influence and status as leaders of civil society, such as the Facebook 
group administrators. I do not wish to paint too idyllic a picture of the citizen-
driven response initiatives here. Indeed, as we shall see in the next section, these 
response efforts did result in some poor decision making.  
 I do at this point want to add that the degree to which the kinds of civil 
society organisations that have emerged in Dresden are able to sustain in the 
medium or long term the role and function they may have had in the immediate 
aftermath of the 2013 floods is not a given. In the long term, civil society and 
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state actors sometimes become dependent on one another, and if risk reduction 
plans are to be effective, the two camps must find common ground.  
Critiques 
 
Just because you can fill sandbags and put them somewhere doesn’t mean you have to.  
- Dresden city official. 
 
How did the authorities react to the widespread civil response during the 
floods? Although the fire department, as a section leader told me, is generally 
sympathetic to citizens’ willingness to aid their fellows and their city in times 
of imminent collective threat, such good intentions can pose problems for the 
proper execution of flood response tasks from their point of view. From the 
authorities’ perspective, the emergency becomes not merely a question of man-
aging the external hazard (the flood), but also of having to deal with the differ-
ent actors that converge on the area of risk. As a result, a public debate has 
arisen in Dresden in the wake of the floods concerning the question of what the 
proper role of the public should be in flood emergencies (Grigutsch 2013). 
  In an evaluation of the 2013 floods by the Office of Environment, Agri-
culture, and Geology of the Free State of Saxony (Sächsisches Landesamt für 
Umwelt, Landwirtschaft und Geologie 2014), special attention is given to the 
social networks that formed. The emergence of volunteers through social net-
works is initially described as an impressive phenomenon because of the way 
reached and activated a large number of people within hours (ibid.:112). As the 
report states, the many people that showed up to help is evidence of the public’s 
need to engage in mitigating threats to the city as a whole. Yet while the report 
grants that in some places civil volunteer aid was highly useful, as in the case 
of filling sandbags, it quickly points out that there are “great dangers” associ-
ated with the scale of participatory flood response that occurred in June 2013. 
The main problem is that too many volunteers can obstruct the plans of emer-
gency management professionals and can result in misguided efforts to help. 
The supply of help was out of proportion to the demand, relative to the actual 
threat. As indicated earlier, this was also the experience of several of the volun-
teers I interviewed. In other words, far too many sandbags were placed, many 
of them in an incorrect manner. In other places, sandbags stabled the wrong 
way or placed in the wrong location and had to be removed or rebuilt, resulting 
in unnecessary and redundant work for the fire department and the THW.  
 The best-known example of how the self-organised civilian initiatives 
“got it wrong” was a section between Pieschen and Neustadt on the northwest 
bank of the Elbe. As people began to place sandbags along the roads beside the 
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river, they put a large number of them on the permanent floodwalls, where mo-
bile steel-plate extensions were meant to fit on top. The 10,000 sandbags that 
had been placed on top of the wall would thus have to be removed to accom-
modate the extensions. The fire department ultimately decided not to remove 
them because it would be too time-consuming, and the water level was not ex-
pected to exceed the height of the floodwall in any case. Volunteers also placed 
sandbags just behind the wall, which from a technical perspective makes little 
sense, as the water would overtop the sandbags very quickly once the wall had 
been overflowed, as a report by the fire department notes (Friedrich 2013). In 
another example, volunteers built a wall of sandbags 1.5 metres high and 1.8 
km long, even though the official emergency plans only prescribe the building 
of a wall 0.8 metres high and 900 metres long. The doubling-up of the propor-
tions was, a report concludes, “completely unnecessary” (Sächsisches 
Landesamt für Umwelt, Landwirtschaft und Geologie 2014:112). 
 Although citizens and government agencies stood side by side in the effort 
to build sandbag dikes and distribute resources, some government officials that 
I interviewed perceived members of the public who took part in the response 
efforts as dilettantes that could hinder the ability of the responsible agencies to 
execute their mandated obligations during future floods. In an official presen-
tation, a high-ranking Dresden fire department employee described the volun-
teer participation as an expression of Erlebniskultur, a culture in which people 
seek out an experience for the sake of the experience itself.   
 I visited the fire department in July 2014, and was welcomed by a section 
leader who was eager to answer all my questions, especially where he could 
share his personal opinions on the matter. Giving me a chair in a conference 
room, he made a presentation that explained all aspects of the flood event and 
concluded with harsh criticism of the civil participation. According to the fire 
department section leader, to whom I listened for four hours, Dresden has al-
ways had people who have wanted to help during floods, which the fire depart-
ment and other official entities have accepted to some degree. However, espe-
cially with the rise of social media, there has arisen some confusion in the way 
the agencies normally characterise the various types of actors that are involved 
in emergencies. Normally, the section leader explained, there are the profes-
sional units, teams, and agencies that are supposed to lead the execution of 
response tasks, such as filling sandbags for building temporary dikes. Then 
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Figure 20. Wrongly placed sandbags along Kötzschenbroder Strasse in Dresden. Bags have 
been placed on top of the permanent floodwall, which prevents the fixing of a steel plated ex-
tension on top of the wall. Sandbags behind the wall would be overflowed in minutes if the 
water overtopped the wall. Photo by the Dresden Fire Department (Friedrich 2013), June 
2013. 
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there are affiliated volunteer actors, such as volunteer fire squads that can assist  
and help the professionals, as well as the Red Cross, the Maltesers, Johanniters, 
and other charity NGOs that deploy during large emergencies. Finally, civilian  
volunteers can in some cases provide extra hands. However, as the section 
leader forcefully argued, the social media phenomenon has disturbed this divi-
sion of labour. Now, someone with no experience or knowledge of how to do 
even the most basic emergency tasks can suddenly arrive on the scene and begin 
telling people where to go and what to do with the touch of a screen. People 
that were once thought to be disorganised and disorderly are now well-organ-
ised and connected thanks to the new online networks and groups. 
 The citizen-driven networks on Facebook came as a surprise to the vari-
ous government entities. “They were not ready for it,” the fire department sec-
tion leader explained to me. The government agencies were monitoring mes-
sages in groups such as Fluthilfe Dresden and could see that many of them were 
spreading inaccurate information. He also believes that the Facebook group ad-
ministrators were not being cooperative and were reluctant to integrate their 
knowledge with the fire department and other public entities. 
 While remaining critical, however, the local government has also deemed 
it necessary to praise the “solidarity of the people” during the flood emergency, 
including the work of the social media networks. They did this, for instance, by 
awarding thousands of flood response medals in both 2002 and 2013 – a prac-
tice that also existed in the communist era (more on this in Chapter Four). This 
presents a peculiar situation, in which the government expresses approval of 
the public’s role in flood response because there is substantial public support for 
these efforts, while it also must exert its authority as those ultimately responsi-
ble for the proper execution of flood response. The various citizen groups and 
social media networks also became easy targets to blame; as Kuhlicke et al. 
have argued, responsible government administrators can take advantage of 
these networks to “delegate responsibility and blame to those stakeholders par-
ticipating in risk management in case ‘something goes wrong’” (Kuhlicke et al. 
2015:318). 
 Citizens have also levelled critiques at the government, the fire depart-
ment and other public entities following the floods. Perhaps the most fre-
quently-heard criticisms from citizens were that the public agencies were too 
slow, and that the response efforts were concentrated in certain key areas of the 
city that had been predetermined in official emergency plans to be of special 
concern. Many of the volunteers I interviewed acknowledge that the city needs 
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to work within certain limits; for instance, that it cannot act unless official warn-
ing has been given about a threat of disaster. However, especially to younger 
people who were generally among the most active in the flood response, it 
seemed there was “too much bureaucracy from the government’s side,” as 
Hans phrases it. Conversely, the social media platforms showed that some of 
the roles that government agencies normally perform could also be accom-
plished by citizens, without the bureaucratic barriers that kept things from “just 
getting done,” as another student volunteer remarked in an interview. Further-
more, the platforms facilitated coordination of non-affiliated volunteers on a 
scale that, although not necessarily larger than previous events like the flood in 
2002, was more focused and effective. 
 Several of the people involved as administrators of Facebook groups or 
Google Maps have expressed interest in collaborating with the local govern-
ment during future flood emergencies. Yet these same people have also criti-
cised the government’s lack of interest in the potential of new online platforms 
for volunteer participation (Grigutsch 2013). As mentioned above, one Face-
book group was created for the sole purpose of exchanging ideas and experi-
ences about the government’s ineptitude in dealing with the floods.  
 Nevertheless, a growing number of conferences, public events, and news 
articles have continued to address the question of how to integrate volunteers 
and social media platforms during future floods, including new types of coor-
dinators like Alexander and Daniel. It is also evident in my ethnographic re-
search that city officials recognise that the Dresden government needs to be 
better at integrating the public; people will want to respond to floods no matter 
what, and this impulse has taken on new dimensions in the digital age. The 
organisers of Fluthilfezentrum, for their part, hope that they may be granted an 
official mandate by the city government to organise citizen-volunteers in the 
future. For its part, the Dresden government recently stated that it was looking 
into ways to build upon the experiences of the 2013 floods by creating a strategy 
around using Facebook and Twitter in future emergencies (Brüggemann 2016). 
It is unclear for the time being, however, what this strategy will entail. 
 From Fluthilfezentrum’s perspective, one of the major issues facing the 
Dresden government is that it does not have the necessary competencies to en-
gage with emergent online networks. This is not, as Alexander explained to me, 
just a question of the digital competencies of public employees, but also of what 
governments can and cannot do. Governments are constrained with respect to 
issues of data protection, for instance. “People cannot post their contact infor-
mation on a Facebook site if the government controls it,” says Alexander. 
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“That would require a circumvention of the law. But private actors can do 
that.” 
 In this sense, citizens using social media can navigate the state of emer-
gency in more flexible ways, unhindered by bureaucratic and legal restrictions. 
I asked Hans what he thinks about the future of volunteer participation in flood 
response. “First,” he replied, “there needs to be a plan, and better coordination 
among everyone. There needs to be a solid communication infrastructure. For 
example, where should the filling stations be placed, and who coordinates 
where people should be directed when the alarm is raised?” Hans was explicit 
in his desire for the city administration to demonstrate less arrogance in their 
approach. While he did not elaborate on what he meant by this, it is clear that 
from his point of view, he and other volunteers would at least like to be taken 
more seriously. “Of course,” Hans opines,  
 
the party in government will almost always try to become more popular when floods 
happen, as it is a chance for them to show a willingness to do something and to appear 
to be strong. But times are different now, especially because of social media. In 2002, 
you got information on the floods via radio, TV and the Web 1.0, which did not allow 
for feedback. Now, it is a completely different game. 
 
 In the neighbourhood of Pieschen, central figures in the citizen-driven in-
itiatives told a local newspaper that they were held back by authorities in their 
attempts to prevent the water from flowing into a house. They also experienced 
either having plenty of sand, but no bags to put it in, or having plenty of bags, 
but no sand. In their view, the authorities did not perform in a satisfactory man-
ner, since they ought to have provided the means for people to help with the 
building of sandbag dikes. One of the volunteers that was active in Pieschen 
notes that at first, the firefighters who showed up did not know how to build 
dikes with sandbags, and it was not until one of the most experienced officials 
arrived on the scene that the sandbags were placed according to official guide-
lines. He offered the following reflection and critique of the fire department: 
 
In Pieschen, nobody in an official capacity was there was on Monday, only civilians. On 
Tuesday, it was the same situation. A few people who had received some training from 
the fire department or the THW stopped by, but they were isolated individuals. In the 
evening, the Bundeswehr began to arrive. On Wednesday, finally, two firefighters who 
were apparently responsible for the whole area along the Leipziger Strasse came. Why 
did these two firefighters not get there on Tuesday? And why were there suddenly twenty 
people there at the same time? It was unnecessary. The mistakes made by civilians in-
correctly placing sandbags were already made at that point. Later, I came to suspect that 
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the authorities had planned to allow the lower part of Pieschen to be flooded, but then 
were completely surprised by the half-finished sandbag dikes that citizens had built. 
  
 This type of critique resonates with statements made by other volunteers. 
In other cases, citizens also witnessed a lack of knowledge among those who 
were supposed to possess it. One of the people I lived with during my first stay 
in Dresden, Sabine, told me about some of her experiences last year. She re-
members volunteering in Cossebaude, and while they were building dikes with 
sandbags, she realised that the fire department people who were there did not 
know how to build a proper dike. Someone would come along and say, “Oh 
no, this is no good, you have to rebuild it.” Even within the fire department, 
there was disagreement regarding how to build a proper sandbag dike. 
 Yet there are clear differences in how people perceive the effectiveness of 
the government’s performance during the flood emergency depending on 
whom you talk to. Flood-affected people, especially those in the outlying areas 
of Dresden that are the focus of the bulk of this thesis, generally think that the 
fire department and other agencies did very well, and that they care about citi-
zens’ well-being. In many of the interviews I conducted with flood-affected peo-
ple in city centre, however, it is not uncommon to hear about overly-forceful 
evacuations by the police as well as puzzling priorities in the fire department’s 
construction of sandbag dikes. However, such stories are more common in re-
lation to the flood of 2002 than that of 2013, as I noted in the previous chapter. 
 In an interview with the magazine Der Spiegel (2013c), a firefighter from 
Hamburg that had come with 170 colleagues to help in 2013 (Hamburg and 
Dresden are partner cities) expressed his admiration of civil society. “It is in-
credible what the citizens of Dresden are capable of. (…) Packing things, pre-
paring food, distributing water – every Dresdner helps where he can.” When 
comparing this statement to the other remarks made by fire officials, a some-
what ambivalent, almost Janus-faced position emerges with respect to the agen-
cies. However, this ambivalence is also evident in members of the public. For 
instance, Florian Meier, who lives in Pieschen, was one of the most active par-
ticipants in the flood response efforts. In an interview after the event, Florian 
critically reflects on the local Pieschen administrative office, the Dresden mu-
nicipal administration, and the fire department: 
 
I was terribly angry. On Friday, the local authorities issued flood protection certificate 
forms for companies and freelancers, especially for potential victims of groundwater 
damage. But this weekend, the authorities issued a directive stating that all groundwater 
victims have been excluded from emergency aid. We here along the Leipziger [Strasse] 
are thus punished for the fact that we succeeded in keeping the water away from our 
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houses and from where we work. In the face of this, we must defend ourselves and vig-
orously protest! 
 
However, in another case, he praises the Bundeswehr, with whom he and the 
other volunteers apparently had a much better experience: 
 
The "dam-builders" and "flood-fighters", as we call ourselves here along the Leipziger 
Strasse in Dresden, also have to thank the Bundeswehr for their help in rescuing our 
road and all the districts on this side of the Elbe. They were really great. 
 
 Such simultaneous praise and criticism testify to the fact that the citizens 
I encountered in Dresden were not out to criticise the government from a kind 
of anti-authoritarian position, aimed against all personifications of government. 
Moreover, it also goes to show that when we speak of the state or the govern-
ment, those terms point to a general category that does not reflect the pluralistic 
nature of the people working on emergency tasks for the Dresden municipal 
agencies, or of those employed as soldiers in the Bundeswehr for that matter. 
Peter Bautzner from the Bärenzwinger student club remembers how a number of 
Bundeswehr soldiers were on standby next to their assembled group of volun-
teers, waiting for a command from above that would allow them to participate. 
Using the federal Bundeswehr for state and city tasks costs the municipality 
money, so there was a moment when the soldiers had to wait. Peter remembers 
how some of them, frustrated with waiting but still wearing uniforms, said they 
were now acting as civilians, and began to help the volunteers. Such examples 
point to a momentary blurring of boundaries between state and civil society 
actors (Gupta 1995) that occur in moments of great urgency when a collective 
is threatened, even though the command-and-control model is premised on, 
indeed depends on, this very distinction in order to govern an emergency. 
 
 
Participation as an End in Itself 
 
I have not as of yet addressed the question of what drives people to be engaged 
in the issue of flood response in Dresden in the first place. What compels them 
to act? What are people’s motivations behind these assemblies, where social 
interactions become much more frequent and active? I would like to end by 
dwelling on this question, not as a conclusion to this chapter, but as a bridge to 
the next.  
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 I asked Hans, the young medical student whom we met earlier in the 
chapter, if he could remember why he decided to help during the floods. He 
paused for a long time and then answered, “I do not think I thought that hard 
about it. It just seemed natural to me.” For Hans, the decision to help seemed 
almost instinctive. It was not a decision that required careful thought. In hind-
sight, it seemed like a natural thing to do. 
 Peter Bautzner thinks that people should always ask themselves the ques-
tion:  
 
What you would do if you were the one whose house was threatened by floods? Would 
you sacrifice a bit, like taking off from work to help? It is about saying: ‘I want to help!’ 
(‘Ich möchte helfen!’).  
 
This reflection indicates that helping is a moral choice. As Peter says, “People 
who have been affected personally by flood damage to their homes, of course, 
have to deal with floods in a very different manner than the volunteers did. For 
the people who are not directly affected, it is a rather different question.” Nev-
ertheless, I would add, participation is as much about morality as it is about 
participation as an end in itself: of being part of a collective that only comes 
about under rare circumstances. In this sense, the emergence of widespread cit-
izen-driven initiatives that do not evolve into more institutionalised structures 
(as the case of Fluthilfezentrum indicates) is an indication of how floods catalyse 
certain kinds of changes. These changes are not limited to issues of response 
and prevention, but also entail the activation of civil society and the politics of 
emergence in the emergency, whereby the ability to participate in a field of 
command-and-control is an assertion of the legitimacy of citizens to safeguard 
their city from collective threats. In other words, as Scott has argued in his man-
ifesto on anarchism echoing Dewey, protest movements preclude organisa-
tions, insofar as the rise of institutions and organisations in society comes about 
through the process of people’s own actions pushing governments to act and 
change (Scott 2012: xvii). 
  I argue that participation in flood response is not so much the immediate 
ability to see one’s actions bear fruit by keeping areas dry from floodwaters. 
Rather, it is the feeling of communion and of being able to perform direct, col-
lective action, which only events such as disasters are able to generate, because 
they pose a collective threat. In this sense, the response efforts were a collective 
action that took on a spectacular and effervescent character and are now slowly 
crystallizing into various standing networks, associations and social media plat-
forms that citizens have set up to be activated when the next flood comes.  
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 Drawing on Anthony Wallace (1956), Anthony Oliver-Smith asserted 
that it is in disasters, “when ‘all hell breaks loose’, when the innermost workings 
of communities are revealed” (1996:320). In this sense, anthropologists and 
others (Solnit 2009) have seen disasters not merely as emergencies and periods 
of great urgency, as has been the topic of this chapter. They have also been 
analysed as liminal phases where notions of identity, class, hierarchy, norms, 
values and social roles are potentially renegotiated and reconfigured. It is to this 
transformative character and capacity of disaster solidarity that the next chapter 
turns. 
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Chapter 4 
 
After Solidarity 
 
 
 
Solidarity: Unity or agreement of feeling or action, especially among individuals with a common 
interest; mutual support within a group. 
- Oxford Dictionaries 
 
It was the single greatest experience of my life. 
- Christa Hoffmann, Kleinzschachwitz, Dresden. 
 
 
 
It is characteristic of disasters that when they strike, social utopias and commu-
nities based on ideals of equality between people of different social groups seem 
to emerge from them. But the strong social bonds between people who come 
together during tragic events are also fragile, and tend evaporate when the ur-
gency of the disaster is over (Oliver-Smith 1999c). If disaster solidarity cannot 
endure in a vibrant manner, then what kind of afterlife does it have? In this 
chapter, I engage with the question of what characterises post-disaster solidar-
ity. What happens to the altruistic bonds formed between people in a disaster-
affected area after things have returned to ‘normal’ again? In other words, what 
happens to solidarity after solidarity? 
 For many of the flood-affected people I encountered in Dresden, the so-
ciality and solidarity that emerged during the floods is a topic they are eager to 
talk about, discuss, and understand themselves. It is a matter of concern then, 
not just for me in an academic sense, but also for the people upon whose flood 
experiences this research is based. But solidarity in post-flooding Dresden has 
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had a diverse afterlife, as I will attempt to show, keeping in mind that, as Ed-
ward Simpson notes, “the aftermath of disasters comes in waves” (Simpson 
2013:267). A study of the afterlife of disaster solidarity, then, entails an atten-
tiveness to how the traces that are left appear in different forms, guises and 
shapes, and at different tempi.  
 This chapter is structured as follows. First, I provide a theoretical over-
view of how anthropologists and others have tried to understand disaster soli-
darity as an (arguably, at least) universally-occurring phenomenon. I discuss 
how disasters momentarily do away with social divides and hierarchies, and 
how disaster emergencies can be seen as liminal phases, harbouring an anti-
structural character saturated with communitas (Turner 1969); I suggest, how-
ever, that a series of critical questions about how such Turnerian concepts de-
rived from ritual studies can be transposed to the study of disasters has yet to 
be posed. I then examine how people from selected communities in Dresden 
that have experienced flood events reflect on their own actions and the actions 
of others during times of crisis by tracing three kinds of transformations that I 
take as central in the afterlife of disaster solidarity in post-flooding Dresden: 
idealisation, institutionalisation, and politicisation.  
 The point here is to analyse a set of transformations that post-disaster sol-
idarity between the citizens of Dresden has taken in the years following the 
flood events. More specifically, I will show that these transformations point to 
how solidarity’s afterlife is affecting relations between the citizens of Dresden 
and between the state and the public in ways that also extend beyond those 
directly affected by the events. 
 The first, what I call idealisation, refers to the process of how people who 
have endured multiple flood events in Dresden reflect back upon them as peri-
ods of immense altruism, seething with spontaneous social activity. I argue that 
a form of idealisation or mythologizing occurs, as the form of sociality during 
times of urgency holds a mirror up to ordinary life, in which people living in 
the same neighbourhood or community are generally perceived as strangers to 
one another.  
 With institutionalisation, I am pointing to the fact that several community 
associations, festivals, neighbourhood events and volunteer emergency re-
sponse initiatives (as we saw in the previous chapter) emerged after the floods 
of 2002 and 2013 in different parts of Dresden. New types of collaborations 
between members of civil society in local districts and neighbourhoods 
emerged, that have transformed over months and years into institutions – here 
taken in a broad sense to mean stable patterns of organisation – that continue 
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to have a role in the organisation of social life in the impacted areas after the 
floods. 
 The third transformation that post-disaster solidarity undergoes, politicisa-
tion, refers to the process by which the explosion of solidarity during the floods 
has become a topic of political discussion and interest in and of itself. The dis-
cussion around what solidarity during floods means, or what it symbolises, was 
further stimulated by the rise of the PEGIDA movement in 2014 and the sub-
sequent refugee crisis in 2015, in which the question of whom people in Dres-
den should show solidarity toward became central. Political parties have sought 
to harness political support from this solidarity, which mobilized thousands of 
people in the city.24 
 I should note that these three transformations ought not to be taken to be 
analytically equal. The transformation I label idealisation is, in a sense, a prereq-
uisite to the other two processes because it involves a set of normative memory 
practices that catalyse and feed into the formation of local associations, institu-
tions, and festivals, while also creating political symbolism that was used to 
turn solidarity into grounds for both political gain and division with respect to 
what solidarity should be in times without flooding. 
 
 
Disaster Solidarity and Communitas 
 
Since the emergence of disaster studies as an interdisciplinary field rooted 
mostly in sociology, scholars have documented how the worst of times bring 
out the best in people in a variety of case studies. Although there are vast dif-
ferences in terms of the impact and scale of disasters across time and space, in 
the immediate aftermath and for a certain period after a disaster, scholars gen-
erally observe that human groups show increased signs of social cohesion and 
solidarity (Fritz and Williams 1957; Rodriguez et al. 2006). Disaster research-
ers have continuously reiterated this point, because the classic image of human 
nature in disasters is one of panic, social disorder, chaos, stealing and looting, 
a myth that is sustained by both the mass media’s reporting on disasters and 
Hollywood’s cinema industry. As Charles Fritz put it: 
 
Even under the worst disaster conditions, people maintain or quickly regain self-control 
and become concerned about the welfare of others. Most of the initial search, rescue, 
                                                 
24 These three transformations are not exhaustive; I have singled them out as particular here 
because they resonate with what informants reported to me. Other foci on the afterlife of dis-
aster solidarity could have been included. 
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and relief activities are undertaken by disaster victims before the arrival of organized 
outside aid. Reports of looting in disasters are grossly exaggerated; rates of theft and 
burglary actually decline in disasters; and much more is given away than stolen. Other 
forms of antisocial behaviour, such as aggression toward others and scapegoating, are 
rare or non-existent. Instead, most disasters produce a great increase in social solidarity 
among the stricken populace, and this newly created solidarity tends to reduce the inci-
dence of most forms of personal and social pathology. (Fritz:1996: 10) 
 
 One of the more widely cited anthropological contributions to the study 
of disaster solidarity is Oliver-Smith’s work in the Yungay Valley in Andean 
Peru following the cataclysmic 1970 earthquake that killed over 20,000 people 
(Oliver-Smith 1986). Denoting the rise of extremely tight knit bonds between 
earthquake survivors in highland Peru as ‘a brotherhood of pain’ (Oliver-Smith 
1999c), he points out how disaster solidarity between the different groups of 
survivors was premised, indeed dependent upon, an exterior antagonist – in this 
case the Peruvian state – whose relief operations proved too little, too late. 
When the earthquake crumbled 90 percent of the structures in the regional cap-
ital, social hierarchies and divisions between ethnic groups were momentarily 
suspended, and cooperation across all social divides arose from the rubble as 
the recovery and reconstruction efforts had to be planned and organised from a 
new temporary camp located outside of the city.  
 In Yungay, as in other post-impact disaster contexts, people revert to a 
more basic form of cooperation that does not distinguish between race, ethnic-
ity or class, a kind of Durkheimian mechanical solidarity, or as David Graeber 
(2011:96) would have it, a return to a form of communism that makes society 
possible in the first place. This equalising effect exerted by disasters creates a 
momentary situation in which it is as though society is rebooted to its original 
self. Oliver-Smith’s objective in his paper on the brotherhood of pain, however, 
is also to argue against dominant models of rational choice theory and other 
positivist actor-centred approaches, which reduce the importance of commu-
nity solidarity to an emotional coping mechanism or a ‘primitive state of con-
fusion’ (Oliver-Smith 1999c:162). Contrary to such views, which would reduce 
solidarity to a psychological function, Oliver-Smith argues that these forms of 
social interaction and affection can have a critical role to play in disaster relief 
and reconstruction, but only in so far as they are treated as social phenomena. 
 In a more popular vein, non-fiction writer Rebecca Solnit (2009) has re-
cently written about disaster solidarity in her book A Paradise Built in Hell: The 
Extraordinary Communities that Arise in Disasters. In line with Oliver-Smith and 
others, Solnit notes that a disaster creates a window of opportunity for society 
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to be remade, rethought and redone. Using several historical case studies, in-
cluding the 1906 San Francisco earthquake, the 1985 Mexico City earthquake, 
and Hurricane Katrina’s ravaging of New Orleans in 2005, the book traces the 
periods of intense social activity during and after disaster emergencies. Solnit 
goes further than most other accounts of disaster solidarity, however, by paying 
specific attention to the vibrant, almost carnival-like activities that arise in the 
wake of a hurricane or an earthquake. Indeed, it is striking, Solnit notes, how 
emergent social activities following disasters resemble a carnival – a question I 
also touched briefly upon in the previous chapter. One of Solnit’s insights is 
that the feeling of communitas, explicitly framed in the Turnerian sense (Solnit 
2009:169), that arises in the worst of situations is like falling in love: it is a pe-
riod of intense joy, passion, worry, and heartache, yet it also fades away rather 
quickly. And when it fades, feuds, controversies and blame games often 
emerge, as people try to assign responsibility for the disaster. In Oliver-Smith’s 
Peruvian account, cooperation between social groups also began to fade away 
as the realities of the post-earthquake relief and recovery activities progressed, 
prompting upset survivors to exclaim, “We are not equal!” (Oliver-Smith 
1999c:159). This kind of solidarity, in other words, represents a fragile and elu-
sive social order.  
 As noted above, many observers of disasters have linked the urgent period 
of a disaster to the liminal period in the tradition of Arnold Van Gennep’s 
(1960) three stages of the ritual process, further developed by Victor Turner 
(1969) in his work on a general theory of rituals and symbols. The behaviour of 
social groups during and after disasters, it is argued (Jencson 2001; Oliver-
Smith 1999c; Solnit 2009; E. Turner 2012), have characteristics of communitas, 
an integral part of the liminal phase, in which people as members of a group 
participating in a ritual process experience an extraordinary bond. 
 Although the concept of communitas is of course associated with the work 
of Victor Turner, it was his wife Edith that commented most directly upon the 
rise of communitas in disasters following the death of her husband. In reference 
to the 1997 Red River floods as studied by Linda Jencson (2001), Edith Turner 
notes how all the distinctive marks of communitas were present: “the great and 
famous mixing with the humble; the simplification of life; the sharing of neces-
sities; and the long hours and backbreaking work that counted as pleasure” 
(Turner 2012:76). In Jencson’s study, the people of Grand Forks, wrestling with 
the threat of massive floods, engaged in collective work in ways that would 
precisely mirror what transpired in Dresden during its three recent flood events. 
Indeed, the commonalities reported between a wide variety of disaster events, 
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also in Solnit’s work, contain the same social patterns: unexpected solidarity, 
levelling of hierarchy, bonding through shared tasks (i.e. mechanical solidar-
ity), self-sacrificial dispositions, lending and borrowing with enthusiasm, and 
Jencson’s observation that “the rhythm of common work itself created commu-
nitas” (Jencson 2001:75). 
 I would argue, however, that the way communitas is commonly applied to 
describe disaster solidarity is often without deep scrutiny of how well this the-
ory fits the empirical data or of whether it actually can enlighten the study of 
disaster solidarity apart from pointing out that people experience a period of 
intense fellowship. And, more importantly, can communitas help us to under-
stand the afterlife of post-disaster solidarity? In defining the term in his work 
The Ritual Process, Turner must distinguish communitas from what it is not: 
 
[There are] two major ‘models’ for human interrelatedness, juxtaposed and alternating. 
The first is of society as a structured, differentiated, and often hierarchical system of 
politico-legal-economic positions with many types of evaluation, separating men in 
terms of ‘more’ or ‘less’. The second, which emerges recognizably in the liminal period, 
is of society as an unstructured or rudimentarily structured and relatively undifferenti-
ated comitatus, community, or even communion of equal individuals who submit to-
gether to the general authority of the ritual elders (Turner 1969:82). 
   
Here Turner is touching upon what is central to my argument here, namely that 
there is a difference, but also a relationship, between a socially unstructured or 
anti-structured communitas, and a society as a set of structured and stable social 
relations. The question is whether the feeling of general, structural solidarity in 
the Durkheimian sense is affected by a kind of liminal solidarity in the 
Turnerian sense?  
 Durkheim himself noted the phenomenon of solidarity in moments of cri-
sis as opposed to a more structural form of solidarity. In The Elementary Forms 
of Religious Life, he noted that the ecstatic character of some religious rituals and 
events reflect that of a general pattern of human behaviour during times of rup-
ture: 
 
There are periods in history when, under the influence of some great collective shock, 
social interactions have become much more frequent and active. Men look for each other 
and assemble more than ever. That general effervescence results which are characteristic 
of revolutionary and creative epochs. (Durkheim 2001:210) 
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Durkheim’s use of the term effervescence points to the invisible and elusive nature 
of a sudden burst of energy that binds people together and, one could argue, 
finds its parallel in the idea of communitas.  
 The deviant status of an anti-structure opposed to social order provides an 
opening for social change, Jeffrey Alexander writes (1988:9), reflecting on 
Turner’s work. One of Turner’s original points was that the liminal phase, in 
which ‘intense solidarity’ or communitas forms, is a potential bringer of change, 
not just for those undergoing the transformation, but for society as a whole. 
“Spontaneous communitas,” Turner argues, pointing to the chronologically lim-
ited character of such social relations, “is a phase, a moment, not a permanent 
condition. (…) Spontaneous communitas is nature in dialogue with structure, 
married to it as a woman is married to a man. Together they make up the stream 
of life, the one affluent supplying power, the other alluvial fertility” (Turner 
1969:127).  
  As I will show to be the case in post-flooding Dresden, there is a relation-
ship between solidarity in periods of floods and the kind of solidarity that holds 
society together; this latter is to be understood in the Durkheimian sense, as 
formulated in his The Division of Labour in Society (Durkheim 1984), out of which 
he distinguished between the complex organic solidarity and the simple mechani-
cal solidarity. People seem to ascribe to the perception that if society is indeed 
based on solidarity between people and that this is what binds them together, 
then it will surely become visible when floods threaten to inundate houses and 
roads.  
 In the preceding chapter, “An Army of Citizens,” I described how re-
sponses to the floods in Dresden played out, and how ordinary people from all 
over Dresden and beyond coordinated and organised response initiatives. 
Novel forms of social interaction emerged in the process, and the alienation 
that many Dresdners feel towards their neighbours in daily life suddenly van-
ished. Throughout the districts of Dresden, generosity and solidarity drove 
thousands of people to aid those who had fallen victim to the floods of 2013 by 
bringing food and water, offering shelter in their homes, building sandbag 
dikes, or rebuilding and repairing houses in the aftermath of the event. This 
chapter carries forward some of the questions and themes that were raised in 
the previous, namely how flood emergencies reconfigure and change relations 
both between citizens and between civil society and the state.  
 By focusing on solidarity, I do not mean to imply that people have not 
experienced tremendous suffering and hardship as a result of the floods. Many 
people were displaced and rehoused while rebuilding their homes, in some 
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cases for more than a year. Indeed, the stories of people that I include in this 
thesis testify to this fact. In general, recent writing and research on solidarity 
during and after disasters tends to turn something of a blind eye toward the 
those cases in which a sense of community was indeed lost, and social disinte-
gration rather than cohesion became the rule. Most notable among these is Kai 
Eriksson’s book Everything in its Path, a description of a flash flood that de-
stroyed several villages in the Appalachian Mountains in the United States in 
1972. Eriksson’s study is dark, reporting that the trauma that individuals expe-
rienced in the wake of the floods was “a reaction to the loss of communality as 
well as a reaction to the disaster itself” (Eriksson 1976:194). Erikson was sub-
sequently criticised, however, for painting too dark a picture of the event, and 
for being a rare case that diverged from almost all of the existing social science 
literature on the subject of post-disaster community cohesion (Dynes 1978).  
 Nevertheless, as with most things in life, the social life of disasters is more 
nuanced, with both loss and gain of community and solidarity occurring at the 
same time. For most of the people that endured one or more floods in the Dres-
den area since 2002, these have been periods of ambivalence. One the one hand, 
they are periods of intense urgency, stress, anxiety, and in many cases, trauma 
and despair. One the other, they are periods of intense social activity, accom-
panied by stories of help, generosity, and donations from friends, family mem-
bers and (in many cases) strangers they have never met. Hardship and solidarity 
should not be seen as opposites, then, but rather as co-existing forms of both 
individual experience and social life. Fittingly, disaster scholars often refer to 
Charles Dickens, describing disasters as ‘the best of times and the worst of 
times’ (Hoffman 1999a). 
 In the following, I will present various ethnographic cases of how people 
experienced these forms of solidarity: how friends, family members and 
strangers came to their aid as the Elbe threatened their houses. The empirical 
examples are made up of the reflections and retrospections of informants in 
terms of how they remember the flood periods today, as discussed in the intro-
duction to the thesis. 
 
 
Welded Together 
 
People were acting like ants. This was a revolution, and people were having fun. The 
floods connected people. People who live next to each other, neighbours who don’t usu-
ally talk to each other, suddenly came together. Friendships were born. (Daniel Neu-
mann, founder of Fluthilfe Dresden) 
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The people of Laubegast, a town by the banks of the Elbe east of the Altstadt, 
know better than most about the social bonds that emerge in disasters. Tobias 
Renner is a Laubegast resident who lives less than 100 metres from the river, 
and whose house has been damaged in every flood event. We will hear more 
about Tobias in the next chapter, on the local protests against the building of a 
floodwall in Laubegast. But as I interviewed him about his experiences with 
floods in the town, he reflected on the sense of community that arises during 
these events:  
 
You get to know people when things happen, when you drag sandbags and do other 
things in the emergency. The pressure from the floods welds people together, and in 
order to get things to work you have to organise, and through this organising, you get to 
know one another. When you do that for several weeks – and the clean-up work, which 
goes on for months – then you get to talk to people quite a lot. It becomes easier to greet 
each other. 2002 was incredible in terms of helpers, not just neighbours and friends, but 
participants from all over Germany. We couldn’t really believe what these people were 
doing here. Especially young people came here and asked, “So what can we do?!” Small 
groups suddenly showed up on our doorstep. So much work was organised. For exam-
ple, all the mud that is left by the floodwaters. It is impossible to remove and shovel it 
into the containers put up by the city oneself. Hordes of young people suddenly came 
with shovels and then it was full speed ahead from that point on. Possibilities for cooking 
were also scarce, and then suddenly seven or eight women came with potato salad or 
sausages, or with a pie – with ready-made meals. That was incredible! Quite surprising, 
I have to say. 
 
 In describing the social interactions between people in Laubegast, Tobias 
uses the verb zusammenschweißen, which means to weld something together, to 
force two or more material objects together through heating techniques. In the 
local idiom among Dresdners (although this use of ‘welding’ is somewhat com-
mon in the German language), this was a turn of phrase that I heard people use 
surprisingly often when I asked them about the social bonds that arose during 
and after the floods (die Flut hat uns zusammengeschweißt). Tobias’ phrase – the 
pressure from the floods “welded people together” – suggests that the floods 
have both a physical pressure and a social pressure (cf. Anand 2011). This is by 
no means the only metaphorical language that people have used to describe this 
phenomenon, but there is an important aspect to this linguistic construct, 
namely that the floods in some sense ‘forced’ people together, much as two 
alloys are forced together by the welder.  
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 As a community, the flood events have meant a great deal to the people 
of Laubegast, for better and for worse. Not all residents of Laubegast partici-
pated in the response, relief and recovery efforts after the floods. As we sat in 
his kitchen on a Wednesday afternoon, I asked Michael Scholz, the owner of a 
local tavern (Kneipe) in Laubegast close to the Elbe, whether everyone living in 
Laubegast had helped out as they were able. 
 
Michael: Well… how can I put it? For instance, you can sense that where there are ten-
ants in houses, they have all fled the scene. They have all gone. They are not interested. 
They drop everything and flee. But we who own our houses stay here. We help each 
other. For instance, our neighbour needed gas for his auxiliary power generator, and we 
gave him a ride in the boat and got some gas. 
 
Kristoffer: So did the floods bring you closer to one another? 
 
Michael: In 2002, definitely. However, in 2013, there were a few people who did not 
participate in anything. There was a lot of fellowship (Zusammenhalt), but these people 
just lived here, and had nothing to do with the flood protection. They can be put into 
three different groups: one group is just against everything; one group are Wessies who 
have never helped with a single thing before, during or after the floods; and another 
group that minded their own business. Of course, this is a village (ein Dorf), and not 
everybody has to love each other, but there is still the awareness that we are Lau-
begasters, and Altlaubegasters especially, that is really important. There is a feeling of 
community (Gemeinschaft) here, that was also there before the floods of course.  
 
Kristoffer: So how did you experience people helping you in particular? 
 
Michael: Well, there were a couple of flood tourists (Fluttouristen), and that was a bit 
annoying. I got help from my son who transported things away from the bar. But I 
needed more help. And then I called someone, a friend of mine, and then suddenly there 
was a post on Facebook saying that we needed help here, and the next minute, a hoard 
of people started coming. A lot of young people. And I presume a lot of students. We 
have a student dormitory close by. You could hear some dialect. It was good to see them 
help although it was clear that they didn’t come from Dresden. 
 
 I discussed at the opening of the chapter how disaster emergencies tend 
to level differences between people of different areas, social groups and class 
hierarchies (Oliver-Smith 1999c). This is not a given, however, as the reflections 
by Michael Scholz above indicate. The deeply-rooted antagonism between Os-
sies and Wessies – terms denoting people from the former East and West Ger-
many – is not something (in my experience, anyway) that is commonly articu-
lated among Dresdners today. When those terms are used, it is a way of point-
ing out a historical division between two groups: a division that used to have a 
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stronger symbolic meaning, but that still comes up now and then because there 
is still a sense of “them and us.” Although rarely articulated, however, there is 
still a firmly-held sense that there are two kinds of people in Dresden: those that 
lived in the GDR and those that came to Dresden after the wall came down. In 
Michael Scholz’s case, he perceived that some of the people who did not help 
in the response efforts were former West Germans, and thus draws upon an 
easy cultural historical division to explain why. As a counterexample, people 
like Tobias Renner, whom we just met, were highly active in the flood response 
efforts in Laubegast, and he moved to Dresden from the West after die Wende 
for business opportunities.   
 This issue is present with different variations and nuances in other cases 
as well. On the other side of Dresden, in Gohlis, Günter Koch experienced that 
the tensions between the former West and East that are particular to the Ger-
man context became momentarily suspended: 
 
Günther: There is always some tension between Ossies und Wessies. There is always some 
mistrust in play there, even today. But in this situation, it wasn’t even a question or an 
issue. It just worked. We were welded together. Even strangers from the other German 
states, from Bavaria, from Lower Saxony… There are 34 families in the building I live 
in in Gohlis. We did not really know each other. But after the clean up work, we held a 
party to celebrate, where we got to know each other, and we learned who needed help. 
Most people live on the upper floors, and only those on the ground floor were affected 
by the floods, apart from the communal basement facilities, so people helped them with 
anything they needed. The social bond emerged only afterwards. It wasn’t there before. 
It came after the floods. People came to know each other. (…) This is not just the case 
with floods, but also with fires and other things. And we had a party, and the people that 
had not been affected made food and prepared drinks. For the people not affected it was 
of course a good time, but for those affected it was different. It was also a financial ques-
tion, because some had insurance, while others did not. Some had insurance since the 
GDR times, and they were compensated. But for those who didn’t have insurance, they 
had to pay 60,000 euros in damage repairs in some cases. In sum you can say, whether 
it is floods, fire, earthquake, whatever, it welds people together, always. That is my opin-
ion. Because you see how you are really dependent on each other (angewiesen an 
einander). In daily life, you don’t have anything to do with one another, but during dis-
asters, you suddenly have something to do with one another, and I find that to be a great 
thing. 
 
 Apart from living in an apartment complex in Gohlis, Günter also owns 
a local tavern (Biergarten) not far from the banks of the Elbe. When floods come, 
the is the first to become cut off from the rest of Dresden because it sits on the 
river side of the dikes. As it is illegal to take boats in floodwaters, Günter cannot 
access the tavern once the Elbe has risen to a certain level. Therefore, he has 
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created some very elaborate systems that have enabled him to adapt to a reality 
in which floods are a routine occurrence – a fact of life that you have to deal 
with. What is important to highlight here, and what will be a question through-
out the next sections, is how Günter sees the sense of community and fellow-
ship as having arisen in the course of the response and recovery efforts after the 
floods. In other cases in Dresden, the people I interviewed also recognise some-
thing profound arising as a result of the floods, but they believe this kind of 
sociality was already present, or at least latent, in the way people normally in-
teracted with each other. This goes to the heart of the question of whether the 
floods changed something profoundly, or merely made more visible what was 
in effect already beginning to change (Bankoff 2004:27). For some, however, 
the time during and immediately after the floods created a version of society 
that has now become a mirror against which everyday life is put into perspec-
tive. 
 To reiterate one of the central points from the introduction to this thesis, 
a study of solidarity after the fact can portray only one side of the causal rela-
tionship between the solidarity of exceptional situations and the solidarity that 
holds society together in times of normality. My attentiveness to the afterlife of 
disaster solidarity, then, should not obscure the fact that the communities in 
Dresden that experienced substantial solidarity also had a strong communal 
feeling prior to the flood events. In this sense, the floods catalysed potentials for 
extraordinary forms of solidarity that were already present among members of 
the flood-prone communities, waiting to be awakened. 
 
 
“Why Can’t It Be Like That All the Time?” 
 
On the eastern end of the Dresden municipality, in the district of Meusslitz, 
Klaus and Gabriele Winkler live with their three children, a dog and a cat. Their 
house is far away from the Elbe itself, but because the river creates a tributary 
stream during floods that flows into areas of the eastern part of the city – known 
as the Old Elbe Arm (Alte Elbearm) – their house and property are at high risk 
of flooding. They moved to this part of Dresden in 2008. They were not directly 
affected by the 2002 floods, since they lived an apartment building; only the 
basement was flooded by ground water coming up through the sewage system. 
But in 2013, their new home was completely flooded, and they had to move 
away for several months while the house was renovated. Initially, Klaus and 
Gabriele moved to Meusslitz for many of the same reasons that people living 
 
 
129 
in the flood-prone areas of Dresden did: it is far from the hustle and bustle of 
the city, with green, wild areas for their children to play in, while still being 
within the boundaries of the city’s infrastructure system of buses and trams. 
Klaus is a physical therapist, working in a clinic in another part of Dresden. 
Gabriele works in a kindergarten. They are middle-class people, both born and 
raised in Dresden. They are part of a new generation of Dresdners who came 
of age after die Wende, the fall of the communist regime in the GDR.  
 Gabriele remembers how anxiety creeped up on them as the Elbe’s river 
level rose in early June 2013, noting the anti-structural and also paradoxical 
circumstances of the floods: 
 
Gabriele: We have three children, a dog and a cat. So what do we do now? That was 
always the question. We had three offers from friends to come, also from people here in 
Kleinschachwitz whose house was not at risk of flooding. A friend from Wesenstein, not 
far from Dresden, also came by, as did a friend from Falkenhein, which is located higher 
up in the mountains. She came and took the children and the dog, and stayed with an-
other friend close by here. And then on Tuesday, the water started to come – Tuesday 
afternoon and Wednesday morning. So, we got a lot of help from friends, neighbours, 
and also volunteers we didn’t know, who helped us to get rid of all the trash and broken 
building materials that were wrecked by the floods. But with all that help you receive, 
you really have to open up, and also make yourself vulnerable. I was pretty confused, 
with the children and everything. I was quite down and depressed… but it helped a great 
deal to see people were there to help us. (…) I really remember this extremely stressful 
point in time when I had to pack things for us and for the children. Everyone was run-
ning away in the stress, and quite comically – the streets were filled with women running 
away with their children. Almost like an image from the Second World War. It is almost 
like people have the fear of death in their eyes. People are so focused on getting away, 
and this kind of chaos… but then of course, fear of death is something else, and here you 
know who the enemy is. It took me an hour to pack and get out of Sporbitz. Klaus is 
quite vulnerable to spatial changes. I remember then going to Wesenstein, and unpack-
ing and then suddenly lying in the garden in the grass in the sunshine… that was comic, 
and abstract. Absurd…. We couldn’t do anything, but there we were basking in the sun, 
going shopping. It was ridiculous. It was like two parallel worlds. 
 
 After they had organised the cleaning of their home and their small plot 
of land with the help of friends and family, but before the reconstruction and 
renovation work could begin, they hosted what many people in post-flooding 
situations in Dresden refer to as a Flutfeierparty (flood celebration party). They 
invited people who had helped them as well as neighbours that had also fought 
to protect their own houses from the water. They had bought small children’s 
swimming pools that they filled with water – “It was meant as a joke,” Klaus 
explains – and everyone was instructed to come with rain boots, although the 
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sun was shining and the floodwaters were long gone. “That was wonderful,” 
Gabriele exclaims with a sigh. “It really bonded us together, neighbours and 
friends. We also had a lot of fun during the clean-up phases. The sadness of 
everyday life was broken.” 
 In reflecting on their experiences with floods, humour plays an important 
part in how flood-affected people retrospectively understand how they coped 
with the damage to their homes and the periods they were forced out of them. 
Indeed, humour can be seen as a kind of coping mechanism that turns the des-
pair of these events into something manageable. In interview situations like the 
one with Klaus and Gabriele, I would sit and look at photos of the flood events 
with them, and we would often dwell on those with odd and peculiar images, 
such as pianos floating around in the streets, or television sets sitting on top of 
park benches, and we would share a lot of laughs. 
 I asked Klaus and Gabriele about their own thoughts and theories on why 
it is that so many people spontaneously volunteer during the floods. In this in-
terview excerpt, Gabriele offered a long answer to this question, giving me the 
impression that this was a topic they had discussed amongst themselves. 
 
Klaus: We have actually talked a lot about that. It is like… in many situations in life, 
when something important happens, then you don’t mix things up, you concentrate on 
what is essential, what is really important. What do people actually need? In our case, 
people that I normally only see on the street came to help. They came because they knew 
there was water damage here. Many of these people we had only seen once or twice, 
and then you suddenly have a relationship with them, but some of those who helped 
were of course already good friends. In 2002, it was even more intense because more 
people were affected. It was really a basic question of people asking themselves what 
they could do for others. “What do you need? I will bring it.” I sometimes had the feeling 
that people actually wanted [the floods]… that people were energized by the fact that 
they could provide things, that they could help, realizing that suddenly “I can do some-
thing”. That was an extreme feeling of community. Fellowship. But what is incredible 
is that it is gone as quickly as it came.  
  
Kristoffer: So once things returned to normal, you don’t greet people on the street, for 
instance…? 
 
Gabriele: It is quite remarkable that once people feel that they have their feet solidly 
planted again (Füsse gefasst), that feeling is gone. You also felt that in 2002. As soon as 
the everyday feeling is there again, the community feeling is gone. When people don’t 
have their houses or their normal possibilities, then you feel it. But as soon people have 
their lives back, then it is gone. People say all the time, “Why can’t it be like that all the 
time? Why can’t we be so open all the time?” 
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 As stated in the beginning of the chapter, I am interested in understanding 
what happens to disaster solidarity after the period of urgency has passed. It 
seems relevant to ask the question I posed earlier: whether there is a relationship 
between the kind of solidarity arising in liminal periods and the kind of solidar-
ity that “holds society together” in what, for lack of a better term, we might call 
“periods of normality”? If we can say that disaster emergencies represent a kind 
of liminal phase in which people are in between states, and that such a phase, 
if we are to follow Turner’s original line of thinking, implicates some kind of 
change once the liminal phase has ended and people have been “reintegrated 
into society,” then what has changed? If we are to take Gabriele’s word for it 
that people revert back to their usual forms of social interaction in which 
strangers (a general term in itself) do not greet each other on the streets, and 
that neighbours do not feel the same kind of community feeling with one an-
other, then this would imply that no change of any significant structural trans-
formative effect has occurred, but perhaps merely shallow changes, according 
to Susanna Hoffman’s (1999b) distinction between shallow and deep changes 
after disasters. What then, is at play here? 
 I would argue that emergencies such as floods provide an opportunity for 
people to imagine what alternative, and in some cases utopian, ways that social 
life can exist. As such, the attempt to sustain a sense of community bond and 
cohesion in post-flooding Dresden is a process of mirroring what authentic 
community life could be. I should stress that flood-affected people in Dresden 
are well aware that the types of social activities that arise during times of floods 
are temporary and elusive. They do not aspire to sustain this form of commu-
nity life in a precisely such a form. In other words, people are not acting under 
some form of false consciousness, in which they want to recreate social life in 
a particular concrete manner. If there is a myth of community or an imagina-
tion of community (cf. Amit 2002; Anderson 1991), it is faced with open eyes 
by the flood-affected people of Dresden. What is at play, I argue, is rather the 
mirroring of a different kind of community life, which in itself is sustained by a 
sense of common identity and fellowship born out of the time in which people 
endure hard times together. Importantly, this mirroring of what could be also 
has a practical function or effect that is most often overlooked in technical dis-
aster risk reduction discourse: it enables people to share experiences regarding 
how to secure one’s home or what kinds of insurance one should purchase (if 
any insurance can be purchased at all). Stronger community ties bring more 
exchange of knowledge and more wisdom of how to deal with and adapt to 
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recurring floods. Solidarity can, in other words, strengthen the ability of indi-
viduals and communities to prepare and respond to disaster events, adding ro-
bustness to what Tierney (2014) has called adaptive resilience, or the ability to 
adjust to disasters. This is an important point, but there is always the risk that 
applying labels to a social phenomenon such as community solidarity will turn 
it into a quantifiable category that implies uniliniear causal thinking, a state of 
affairs that has been criticised by anthropologists in various ways over the years 
(Barrios 2014). 
 Apart from what I have referred to above as an idealisation of disaster 
solidarity, the most important transformation that helps sustain mirrorings of 
flood periods is the practice of keeping it alive through rituals and traditions. 
The idealisation of solidarity in post-flooding Dresden is thus in many ways a 
prerequisite of the second process, institutionalisation, which the two next sec-
tions explore. 
 
 
The Flutfeierparty 
 
After the 2013 floods, people in a small semi-urban village on the outskirts of 
Dresden known as Gohlis sought to retain the sense of community that had 
arisen during the floods by establishing an annual party to commemorate them, 
thereby turning their solidarity into a kind of institution. To examine this point, 
we begin by returning to Gohlis in this lengthy description written in the eth-
nographic present tense of how I met Stefan Schulz, whom we have already 
encountered in this thesis, and who became one of my closest informants dur-
ing the second fieldwork in 2015.  
 Gohlis is located west of the old city centre on the outskirts of the munic-
ipality. It is one of the places in Dresden that has felt the floods’ impact the 
hardest. When heavy rain falls in the region, the flood defences of the historic 
city centre push the water masses downstream towards Gohlis, where the flood 
dikes were outdated until recently. During all three flood events in Dresden 
since the turn of the millennium, Gohlis experienced varying degrees of inun-
dation. The area’s worst flooding came during the 2002 event, when the settle-
ment was completely flooded. 
 During my efforts to get into contact with people in Gohlis and the neigh-
bouring town of Cossebaude through local associations, I knock on the door of 
the district official’s office on the main street in Cossebaude. She welcomes me, 
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and although slightly puzzled by the presence of a Dane in Dresden doing re-
search on floods, she is eager to help. Although she unfortunately has few sug-
gestions of people to contact, she does give me the name and number of a man 
named Stefan Schulz. The district official calls him there and then, and after 
reaching him, we talk and arrange to meet the next week for coffee. As I say 
farewell to the district officer and walk out, the phone rings and she calls me 
back into the office. Stefan has called back and wants to invite me to a grill 
party that he and his neighbours are having tomorrow to commemorate the 
flood of 2013. I accept the invitation, thinking this will be a great opportunity 
to meet many different people from Gohlis. 
 The next day, I ride my bicycle fifteen kilometres west along the River 
Elbe towards Gohlis, as I would do on many occasions when I visited inform-
ants. I enter Gohlis through a bike path passage in the newly-built floodwalls 
along the Elbe and find the street called Dorfstrasse (meaning “Village Street”). 
Dorfstrasse is a central street in Gohlis that runs parallel to the Elbe River, sep-
arated from it only by a stretch of Elbwiese. The street has been flooded during 
every recent flood event in Dresden, and sits right behind the newly upgraded 
dike and floodwall system. Having been in this part of Dresden before, I know 
the local geography, but I have not yet talked to anyone. I do not know a soul. 
I do not even know what Stefan looks like. As I find the entrance to the address 
Stefan has given me, I enter a courtyard full of people who are busy preparing 
food, standing by the open grill and chatting over a beer. A group of middle-
aged men notice me and give me a curious look. I walk up to them and ask if 
they know Stefan Schulz, explaining that he has invited me to the party. One 
of the men points me in the direction of the barn, and as I approach it, Stefan 
greets me, realizing that I must be the odd person from Denmark he had spoken 
with on the phone the day before.  
 He strikes me first as a carefree person, greeting me warmly. Stefan in-
structs me to make a small donation of a couple of euros for the food and bev-
erages, opens a beer for me, and asks me to drink up before we proceed to the 
food. People have brought salads, pasta and other dishes for everyone to share, 
and a group of men are preparing long lines of sausages and steaks on the huge 
grill in the centre of the courtyard. Stefan brings me a beer from the local Dres-
den brewery Radeberger and asks me to join him at his table. He introduces me 
to his wife and to their neighbours. I am also introduced to the family who is 
hosting the event. As I explain what I am doing in Dresden, people start telling 
me where they live and showing me pictures of how the floods inundated their 
houses. I ask everyone at the table why they are having this grill party, and why 
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they call it a Flutfeierparty. Stefan eagerly says that he can answer that question. 
They have some friends who live on another street not far from here, the 
Schneider family whom we will meet in Chapter Six. After the devastating 
floods of 2002, the people on that street wanted to relive the feeling they expe-
rienced during the time of the floods of being a tight-knit community, with eve-
rybody helping one another. They have therefore held an annual community 
grill party on the same day in August since 2002. Stefan says that after hearing 
about their tradition, he became envious and wanted the same for their local 
community here on Dorfstrasse. After the Elbe showed its destructive side once 
again in 2013, a few people seized the opportunity and invited the rest of the 
community to a grill party. This is the second annual event, and Stefan and the 
others around the table say they hope to continue the tradition in the years to 
come.  
 As was the case with the party that Gabriele and Klaus hosted after the 
floods, they call it Flutfeierparty (Flood Celebration Party) because they want to 
remember and honour the feeling of community and solidarity that they expe-
rienced during the floods. Dorfstrasse is in many ways one of the ground zeros 
of Dresden floods, and most people at the party have had their houses damaged 
by floods more than once. Yet today, I do not sense the troubles that this neigh-
bourhood has seen in the past. As many of the people sitting around our table 
remark to me, people here actually speak very little about the floods, even 
though they were the reason people came together for this event in the first 
place.  
 Gohlis has a few hundred inhabitants, and I estimate that roughly half of 
them are here at the Flutfeierparty. Some people, like Stefan, are farmers, some 
are gardeners, while others work in skilled trades, like Horst Zimmermann, 
who is an electrician. Dorfstrasse is a couple of hundred metres long, and in-
cludes a mix of old and new houses. It has the distinct appearance of a small, 
self-contained village, with fields bordering it on three sides, and the Elbwiese 
to the north. 
 After chatting casually with people for half an hour, Stefan pulls me aside, 
as this is a great opportunity for me to talk to many people who have had direct 
experience with the floods. He literally drags me by the shirt over to a table with 
a man who is introduced to me simply as “der Gärtner” (the gardener), which is 
the same as the one I had talked about the absence of floods during the GDR 
era with. He is friendly, but speaks with a very strong Saxonian dialect that is 
hard to understand for someone still struggling with basic German phrases. He 
invites me to walk back to his place, as he needs to escort his wife and their 
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new-born daughter to the party. We talk along the way, and he shows me some 
of the local sites as well as his own industrial greenhouses that have been rebuilt 
several times in recent years due to flood damages. He recalls how people from 
Gohlis and other parts of Dresden – even people from other cities in Germany 
– came and volunteered to help clear his greenhouses of the sediment, debris, 
and broken glass that the floodwaters left behind. 
 As we return to the courtyard and the party, we are just in time for Stefan’ 
welcome speech. As the main initiator of this event, Stefan says to the guests, 
he thought he would say a couple of words. After having made some formal 
remarks and instructing people how to get food and drinks, Stefan says that 
there is a special guest today, indicating in my direction and asking me to stand 
up. After Stefan rhetorically wonders what might compel a Dane to come to 
Dresden – all the way out to Gohlis, even – everyone breaks out in laughter. 
Stefan explains to the crowd that I am interested in knowing why they have this 
party and encourages people to open up to me.  
 Stefan is a central figure in the Gohlis community. Not long after he had 
expanded his farm with land he bought shortly after die Wende, when land was 
once again privatised, the 2002 floods came. At that time, Stefan had been a 
member of the local volunteer fire squad for some time. He played a central 
role in the flood response efforts in both 2002 and 2013, as well as during the 
minor flood of 2006. Being a farmer and a person that “gets things done,” as he 
describes himself, Stefan takes pride in the duties and obligations that come 
with being a fire squad member. During all three flood events, he was an im-
portant contact point between the government authorities and the local com-
munity. It is not surprising, then, that he is the one who makes the welcome 
speech at the event and was one of those who took the initiative to organise it.  
 As midnight approaches, the temperature is still close to 30 degrees Cel-
sius on this exceptionally warm June night. The atmosphere is relaxed. The 
younger guests soon leave for home. The older people congregate around one 
of the larger tables. Stefan invites me over to the table and tells me that these 
people have some amazing stories to tell. I sit down across from Horst, the 
electrician, who lectures me with enthusiasm on how to secure my electrical 
instalments from floodwaters. He is keen on talking about the floods from a 
technical, managerial perspective, but also notes that the floods create the pos-
sibility for people to connect over shared experience and similar problems, of-
ten of a very basic kind, such as how to get your electrical grid to function when 
your house is several metres under water. An older couple, who have been quiet  
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Figure 21. Flutfeierparty on Dorfstrasse in Gohlis, June 2015. Photo: Kristoffer Albris, June 
2015. 
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all evening, ask me if I would like to see their photos from the floods. The hus-
band fetches a set of photo albums from their house, which is located close by. 
As we go through the pictures, they tell little anecdotes. While many of the 
photos are of inundated streets and houses washed away by water pressure and 
debris, a good deal of them portray scenes of joy: neighbours preparing meals, 
people filling sandbags, family members bringing cakes for volunteers, and peo-
ple smiling for the camera with shovels in their hands, cleaning up the debris 
and mud that filled the streets in the days and weeks after the floods. People at 
the table all agree that the floods brought something good with them, and that 
it strengthened the bonds between them. But they reiterate that they think there 
has always been a sense of community and fellowship in Gohlis, and especially 
on Dorfstrasse, even before the floods. And they want their gathering this day 
to reflect that community: although to me, Stefan referred to the party as a Flut-
feierparty, most people speak of it simply as a Dorffest, or village party. 
 
 
Community Associations 
 
In Gohlis, as we saw, the floods have resulted in the establishment of annual 
gatherings. But in other cases, the solidarity that arose during the response, re-
lief and recovery efforts has resulted in the formation of associations whose 
function extends beyond that of providing flood relief. This is most clearly ex-
emplified in the easternmost part of Dresden, in the area made up of the neigh-
bourhoods of Kleinzscachwitz, Meusslitz, Zschieren and Sporbitz. On the web-
site of the local community association, the Ortsverein Zschieren-Zschachwitz, the 
following entry was posted a few years after the 2002 floods:  
 
Shortly after the [2002] flood, our association was founded as “a support association for 
floods in Elbe Island Meußlitz-Zschieren”. We have now applied to rename the associ-
ation “Ortsverein Zschieren-Zschachwitz”. After the 2002 floods, we collected more 
than 50,000 euros in donations and distributed it to flood-affected households. In June 
2003, we organised the first Sonnenwendfeier [Midsummer festival], which was a big suc-
cess, and we now want to make it an annual tradition. 
 
 Erika Werner lives in Meusslitz. As a trained nurse, she has, in her own 
words, a “passion for helping others.” In September 2014, I paid her my first of 
several visits. She offers me coffee and the obligatory afternoon Kuchen (cake) 
as we sit down in a small wooden lodge in the middle of a meticulously well-
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kept garden. The Saxon flag is flying, and Erika tells me that they use the Ger-
man flag for special national holidays such as the commemoration of German 
unification, but that they use the Saxon flag on a more everyday basis.  
 Before I get a chance to ask my first question about the floods in this part 
of Dresden, she pulls out a huge file containing photos, documents, spread-
sheets of relief donations, and newspaper clippings from interviews with her 
and her husband, Wolfgang. This comprehensive and detailed documentation 
practice was one I encountered often in Dresden, and indicates how some of 
the people who have either suffered from floods or have been active in flood 
relief and reconstruction efforts have spent hours on end engaged in collecting 
flood-related information. People like Erika and Stefan, who have taken lead-
ership roles in their communities, have also talked to quite a few journalists and 
other interested persons over the years, including social scientists.  
 Erika was one of the central figures in the founding of a local flood relief 
association and the redistribution of donations to flood victims in their local 
area after the 2002 floods. She and Wolfgang also became leading figures in the 
Ortsverein (local association) that grew out of the flood relief association after 
the floods. It had originally begun as a Hochwasser Verein (flood relief associa-
tion), which dealt with distributing donations and aid to those who suffered 
most during the floods. But over the years, it developed into an Ortsverein 
proper. This association now has regular board meetings and yearly meetings 
for everyone in the area. It collects funds and donations from citizens and local 
companies to spend on communal things such as benches, monuments and the 
like in common areas of Kleinschachwitz, Meusslitz and Zschieren. The floods, 
Erika says, brought people together, and then it made sense to form a commu-
nity association that was about more than just the floods. Before, people nor-
mally walked past each other on the streets and would not bother saying hello, 
but now there is a forum and a connection between community members. 
Things really went so quick and easily when they founded the association; it 
was an effective way to get help out to the people who really needed it. “It was 
easier,” Erika told me, “because we were part of the community.” With the 
benefit of trust and local knowledge, issues were resolved between the associa-
tion and the flood-affected much more smoothly than with the government rep-
resentatives who also converged on the area in the wake of the floods to do 
surveying.  
 When the 2013 floods came, Erika resumed her role as local coordinator 
of the relief operations and placed around 700 phone calls to people, asking not 
only for small cash donations, but also food, drink and other resources. Some 
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also offered assistance on their own initiative. They also got a lot of help from 
the Heilsarmee (the Salvation Army), who were absolutely wonderful, according 
to Erika, bringing food to helpers and offering everything they could with a 
mobile food court. 
 Erika and the other volunteers had collected more than 50,000 euros after 
the 2002 floods. Erika said that they did not care much about the formalities 
around how the money was used after it had been distributed – that was up to 
the people who received it. It was very straightforward. Many people had par-
ticipated by donating cash, or by physically doing something; about 100 people 
from the local community helped in the efforts. The big problem was mud – 
clearing it from houses, streets and public areas. In the end, a total of 90 house-
holds received assistance from the Verein and its donations. Erika explains all 
this in a way that tells me she has made the same remarks many times before. 
 Like Gohlis, Meusslitz and the areas around it are often a bit forgotten by 
the city government, Erika thinks. They are on the edge of Dresden, and have 
the lowest priority for public agencies responding to floods. They rely a great 
deal on charitable organisations, NGOs and non-affiliated volunteers. In 2013, 
there were more than enough helpers. At a certain point they had to turn down 
some who offered to help, not because there were too many volunteers, as in 
other places in Dresden, but because there was not much left for them to help 
with. The problem was timing, not numbers. “This is often the problem,” Erika 
reflects. When the problems are really pressing, help is lacking, because every-
thing happens so fast. Then, when things are starting to get under control, there 
is more than enough help. Erika had compiled a list where people could sign 
up to say what they needed or what they could offer. It had worked well, alt-
hough the coordination of helpers was itself quite a task to handle. 
 As mentioned, in the years after the 2002 floods, the Zschieren-
Zschachwitz community association evolved from being mainly concerned 
with flood issues into a proper community association. Now it is both about 
both dealing with floods and tending to local problems in general. Erika’s hus-
band took over as director of the association after the first director stepped 
down a couple of years ago. There is a monthly meeting of the steering com-
mittee, which consists of 15 people, and then one annual assembly for all mem-
bers. There are about 300 members in all, and about 100 people show up for 
the annual meetings. 
 The association takes suggestions for improvements for the local area, like 
setting up public benches by the Elbe. There is also a small monument to the 
Second World War that someone would like to see renovated. Things like that. 
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On the second to last weekend in June, they arrange the Midsummer Festival, 
which consists of a couple of cultural days where the community comes to-
gether to socialise. They have fireworks, music, theatre, activities for children, 
and other events. People who used to live here come from as far away as Can-
ada to participate, according to Erika.  
 Local community associations and organisations are increasingly being 
seen as crucial actors in developing plans and networks for disaster risk reduc-
tion (UNISDR 2015:23). This is indeed a tendency that is happening world-
wide, and is apparent in the many community-based disaster risk management 
programmes, community resilience projects, and other such catch-phrases that 
the professional disaster management industry uses. In Dresden, there are no 
formal structures in use to bring local associations to the table to help design 
robust ways of dealing with floods. Yet it does happen, and bureaucrats and 
politicians often praise the role that these associations play. The Dresden based 
NGO, ArcheNova, for instance, has sought to strengthen the role of local asso-
ciations and community organisations after the 2002 floods in different parts of 
Saxony. 
 At my first visit to Erika’s house in September 2014, after we had talked 
for a couple of hours over coffee in the small garden lodge, she invites me to 
stay for a meeting she has scheduled right after our meeting with a representa-
tive from the Malteser Association, a relief NGO that wanted to get involved 
in flood issues in the area. 
 Erika is an example of the kind of individual that has been active in sus-
taining a form of community interaction after the flood events. Importantly, 
this kind of activity was born out of the moment of solidarity in the liminal 
period, but has an effect on what kind of community takes shape once things 
have returned to “normal” again. There are other examples of this. 
 In Laubegast, an association and festival were born out of the 2002 floods. 
The event is called Laubegast Inselfest (Laubegast Island Festival), and was held 
for the first time in 2003, a year after the floods. It has become quite popular, 
attracting people from all over the Dresden area to Laubegast. In 2014, I at-
tended the festival. In many ways, it resembles many of the other street and 
neighbourhood festivals in Dresden. Long lines of vendors sell food: German-
style sausages and steaks, eastern European dishes, and the occasional Asian 
street food. Beverages are sold from numerous stalls where vast amounts of 
beer, mostly the local brand Radeberger, are dispensed. The event is confined to 
what is known as Altlaubegast (Old Laubegast), which borders the Elbe River 
and is separated from the rest of Laubegast by Österreicher Strasse, the main 
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street linking Laubegast with the rest of Dresden to the west, and the neigh-
bouring municipal capital of Pirna to the east. There are various stages on the 
festival grounds showcasing local bands, artists and shows for the younger au-
dience. Local artists sell crafts from stalls that are erected in long lines along the 
river. One of the main events on the second night of the festival is the screening 
of a film that a group of locals edited after the 2002 floods. The film is projected 
onto a large canvas, and attracts a sizeable crowd. People sometimes laugh at 
scenes of locals holding beer bottles as they sail around in boats in the streets of 
Laubegast. But mostly, people watch in quiet awe the scenes of the water com-
pletely engulfing most parts of Laubegast. 
 The festival was originally founded for the same purpose as the commu-
nity association in Zschieren-Zschachwitz: to collect donations for flood vic-
tims in Laubegast. But over the years, it turned into a proper cultural festival, 
and is now one of the most popular festivals in all of Dresden; it is even adver-
tised by the city’s tourism board as an event worth visiting Dresden for. While 
the floods of 2013 caused the festival to be cancelled, the festival was repeated 
in both 2014 and 2015, and is as vibrant as ever. Its primary purpose is to donate 
any profits to charity causes in developing countries, in the spirit of the kinds 
of flood relief donations made to locals in Laubegast on which the festival was 
founded. 
 As I have tried to indicate with these three examples from Gohlis, 
Meusslitz and Laubegast, there are multiple cases of community organisations, 
events and festivals that were born directly out of the solidarity that emerged 
during the flood events. And there are more examples. All in all, I have heard 
mention of at least 20 different social events, annual street parties, or commu-
nity associations in the Dresden municipal area that have either a direct or in-
direct causal relationship with the flood events.   
 There is a certain parallel between the types of community associations 
described above and the emerging institutions and structures of civil emergency 
response born in the wake of the floods that I described in the previous chapter. 
Indeed, the institutions, community events, and other forms of association that 
have come about after the floods are being driven by different things: in some 
cases, out of solidarity with friends, neighbours, and fellow community mem-
bers; in others, out of a realisation that there is a need for civil organisation 
around flood response, carried forward by a confidence in the civic virtue of 
participation as an end in itself. As the next section touches upon, and as was 
evident in the previous chapter, such processes also open up a space for flood  
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Figure 22. Festival guests watching film about the 2002 floods at the Laubegast Inselfest, Au-
gust 2014. Photo: Kristoffer Albris 
 
 
  
 
 
143 
events to become politicised, in the sense that specific political questions be-
come associated with solidarity after the floods.  
 
 
“Our Society Works!” 
 
The different forms of solidarity that emerged during the floods have become a 
focus of political actors in their attempts to gain support and to capitalise on it. 
When political parties campaigned for the May 2014 EU parliamentary elec-
tions and the June 2014 local state elections in Saxony, the flood response ap-
peared in political campaign material and on social media. For instance, the 
National Partei Deustchland, or NPD, posted a picture on Facebook depicting 
flood response volunteers as a symbol of the unity and strong will of the Ger-
man people. On the other side of the political spectrum, the left-wing party, Die 
Linke, campaigned with a poster that read “Motivation and Solidarity” (Leis-
tungswille und Solidarität), with a picture of a flooded Elbe and wall of sandbags, 
implicitly connecting the kind of solidarity that people expressed during the 
floods with a more generalised, structural form of solidarity, aligned with a 
classic socialist political agenda. 
 On the back of a Die Linke flyer using the same image and slogan as the 
poster, the campaign text mentions nothing of floods, but instead argues that: 
 
(…) When politics are more attentive to people, people feel solidarity between one an-
other. Concretely, we want to get the strong involved in protecting the weak - like Robin 
Hood, but without the bow and arrow. A good life does not come about by itself. It must 
be created through protests against low wages, against Nazi marches, against state sur-
veillance and arbitrariness, and against the inadequate financing of schools, universities, 
municipalities, etc.25 
 
  To reiterate point I made earlier, at the federal level in Germany, the two 
flood events in 2002 and 2013 had remarkably similar timing. Both occurred 
mere months before federal Bundestag elections. In 2002, chancellor and leader 
of the social democratic party (SPD) Gerhard Schröder acted quickly when the 
floods washed over large parts of Germany, and paraded through flooded 
towns and villages in rain gear and rubber boots, including Dresden, as I briefly 
                                                 
25 The original German reads: Wenn Politik mehr auf Menschen hört, spürt sie ihre Solidarität. 
Konkret wollen wir die Stärkeren am Schutz der Schwächeren beteiligen – wie Robin Hood, nur ohne 
Pfeil und Bogen. Gutes Leben kommt nicht von allein. Es muss geschaffen werden durch Proteste gegen 
Niedriglöhne, gegen Naziaufmärsche, gegen staatliche Überwachung und Willkür und für auskömmliche 
Finanzierung von Schulen, Hochschulen, Kommunen usw. 
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mentioned in Chapter Two. According to some political scientists who have 
closely examined the voter dynamics in this election, Schröder’s public perfor-
mances helped secure his win in the Bundestag in 2002, by increasing the SPD 
vote as much as seven percent in flood-affected areas (Bechtel and Hainmueller 
2011). In 2013, by an odd coincidence, the June floods also came just months 
before the federal elections. Angela Merkel, who was running for her third term 
as chancellor, had clearly taken stock of Schröder’s tactics and rushed down to 
a flood-affected town to have her picture taken in front of the water masses, 
along the sandbag dikes, and among the Bundeswehr soldiers who were on the 
scene.   
 What is important to highlight here is that questions of how to respond to 
and prepare for floods are highly emotional political issues. Thus, political ma-
noeuvres to capitalise on solidarity and support the building of dikes and flood-
walls can be seen as populist attempts to attract more voters. 
 On the June 19, 2013, just as the flood emergency had faded, the Saxony 
State Parliament (Sächsischer Landtag) held a session. Stanislaw Tillich, Minis-
terpräsident (Prime Minister) of the CDU party, gave the opening speech on the 
first order of business, officially entitled The 2013 Floods: Help – Reconstruction – 
Protection. Together for Saxony! (Hochwasser 2013: Helfen – Wiederaufbauen – 
Schützen. Gemeinsam für Sachsen!). Tillich’s speech is long, emotional, and full 
of praise, as is customary for state and government leaders when they must 
address recent disaster events. In addition to acknowledging the successful ef-
forts of the professional public entities (the fire department, etc.) and the Czech 
government’s ability to reduce the impact of floodwaters downstream in Sax-
ony, Tillich reaches out to all volunteers and citizens of Saxony who partici-
pated in the response efforts. He then makes the following statement: 
 
For me it was also overwhelming that out of a virtual network, a real network came into 
being. Hundreds, yes thousands, of young people organised and helped others through 
the floods and their aftereffects on social media. From this, it is clear: our society works 
– between old and young, between the left and the right, between neighbours, streets, 
towns and villages. The people of Saxony have proved that they stand together when the 
need arises. That creates optimism – not just for the time being, but also for the recon-
struction efforts. (Sächsischer Landtag 2013:8032)26 
                                                 
26 The original German reads: Für mich überwältigend war dabei, dass aus einem virtuellen ein reales 
Netzwerk geworden ist. Hunderte, ja Tausende junger Menschen haben sich über die sozialen Netzwerke 
verabredet und geholfen, andere Menschen vor Hochwasser und den Folgeschäden zu schützen. Daran 
wird deutlich: Unsere Gesellschaft funktioniert – zwischen Alt und Jung, zwischen dem linken und dem 
rechten Nachbarn eines Hauses, zwischen Straßen, Städten und Dörfern. Die Sachsen haben bewiesen, 
dass sie in der Not noch enger zusammenstehen. Das macht Mut – nicht nur für jetzt, sondern auch für 
den Wiederaufbau. 
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The comment by the Ministerpräsident is not special because of its affective na-
ture alone, as other examples of political actors seeking advantage in solidarity 
between citizens after the floods can testify. Rather, it is his point that the floods 
were an indication, or a testing ground, for how society works or functions. In 
other words, Tillich seems to suggest that the kind of solidarity and fellowship 
that occurs in emergencies like floods is an indication, indeed a performative 
instance, of the kind of solidarity that binds people together – that is, a structural 
solidarity. What is interesting here is not so much that it was Tillich, the high-
est-ranking politician in Saxony, who said it, but rather that this expression of 
the link between liminal and structural solidarity comes up in several different 
contexts, made by different actors with overlapping political agendas, and seeks 
to tap into the feeling of community and bond formed between people during 
and immediately after the floods, so as to gain from it politically. 
 Although various actors tasked with responses to the flood emergencies 
were highly critical of the public’s participation in the flood response efforts, as 
I touched upon in the previous chapter, the Dresden city government attempted 
to act in a benevolent and inclusive manner towards the public by awarding 
flood response medals and by showing signs of gratitude on public posters.  
 Some days after the flood, a city-sponsored poster was put up in 260 
places in the streets of Dresden, showing a group of young people carrying 
sandbags. The words “thanks for the help” (Danke für die Hilfe) were seen on the 
poster. However, people in Dresden quickly became amused by the poster: 
firstly, because an official government “thank you”, seemed to display, if not 
outright hypocrisy, then at least some kind of mixed message, especially in light 
of the critiques of civil response efforts that I described in the previous chapter; 
and secondly, because one of the young men pictured in the background wore 
a shirt with the acronym “ACAB” (All Cops Are Bastards), an anti-authoritar-
ian slogan used by anarchists, Hells Angels and the punk movement. The city 
administration did not seem to be aware of this at first, and given the unfortu-
nate connotations of such a representation, the posters were removed earlier 
than planned, to the amusement of the local media and the government-critical 
left-wing milieu of Neustadt (Bild 2013). One could also argue, that in publicly 
displaying a message of gratitude, the local government also implied that han-
dling the emergency is at the end of the day, the responsibility of the authorities, 
and that public participation in the response efforts were to some extent redun-
dant.  
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Figure 23. Die Linke campaign poster for the Saxony Parliamentary elections, 2014. Photo: 
Kristoffer Albris 
 
 
 
Figure 24. Dresden city government poster saying Thank you for the help. Dresden takes care 
of things together, 2013. Photo used with permission. 
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 There are also other examples of how the local government sought to re-
ward the willingness of civil society to aid those affected by the floods. Follow-
ing in a historical tradition that was also prevalent during socialist rule in the 
GDR, the city awarded flood medals to volunteers. After the 2013 floods, a 
total of 30,000 medals of the so-called Flood Helper Order were given to people 
who could demonstrate their active involvement in the response efforts and 
who were nominated by another person (Sächsische Zeitung 2014b). The cere-
mony was meant to be a sign of appreciation of the forces in civil society that 
stepped up to the task when they were needed.  
 Yet many citizens saw the medal-awarding ceremonies as window-dress-
ing: a charade in which the city tried to appear benevolent and welcoming to-
wards emergency volunteers, while in fact being highly critical of the public’s 
engagement in the flood response efforts. Some of the volunteers mentioned 
earlier also received these medals, but many thought they were excessive. In-
terestingly, one of the recipients of the flood response medal was a man named 
Lutz Bachmann. A year and a half later, he would become one of the most 
(in)famous individuals in all of Dresden. 
 
 
Solidarity for Whom? 
 
The very idea of what solidarity means became a highly debated subject in 
Dresden with the rise of the right-wing movement PEGIDA, and the refugee 
crisis that peaked in the summer of 2015. It was particularly interesting to ob-
serve the way in which the debate around how the city of Dresden should act 
towards refugees was often linked to how people behaved during the times of 
the floods: that is, with solidarity and altruism. 
 In the winter of 2015, I was back in Copenhagen, between field trips to 
Dresden. One of the founders of a new initiative that would mobilize volunteers 
during future flood emergencies wrote to share some news about the develop-
ment of their volunteer platform, and to ask for an advice. The initiative had 
received messages from people that had previously signed up as volunteers, but 
who now wanted to withdraw their membership. When I asked him for the 
reason behind this rather surprising development, he explained that people had 
put it down to the rise of the right-wing populist movement PEGIDA (Patriot-
ische Europäer Gegen die Islamisierung Des Abendsland / Patriotic Europeans 
Against the Islamisation of the West). Given that only about four or five people 
had reported that they would not volunteer to fight future floods in Dresden 
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because of PEGIDA, this would not severely affect the overall pool of flood 
volunteers, but it still worried him. I described the rise of PEGIDA in Chapter 
Two, but here it should be emphasised that he was writing in the winter of 
2014/2015 when PEGIDA was at its peak popularity, with over 25,000 follow-
ers taking to the streets every Monday night in Dresden.  
 The volunteers who had withdrawn from the volunteer initiative were 
from other parts of Germany (although he did not know from where exactly), 
and were asking why they should help a city with so much hostility to people 
from other places. In addition to informing the volunteers that the initiative had 
nothing to do with PEGIDA, he said they were also planning for some kind of 
cooperation with a local asylum centre, to find a way for asylum seekers could 
be involved in future flood response activities. 
 He also reflected on why people might connect PEGIDA to the volunteer 
intiative, and remembered that Lutz Bachmann, the founder and leader of 
PEGIDA, had been active during the 2013 floods at the local football stadium 
where the precursor to the initiative had setup its organizational base. Pictures 
of Bachmann active in flood response activities might have connected him to 
the flood issue as such.  
 The rise of PEGIDA came as a huge shock to large parts of the population 
of Dresden, and since then, a symbolic battle between PEGIDA and other 
right-wing movements on one side, and the city’s administration respected cul-
tural institutions like the Semperoper opera house on the other, has played out. 
Institutions and citizen demonstrations have attempted to signal that Dresden 
is a city open to the world, encapsulated in the slogan Für ein weltoffenes Dresden, 
printed on banners hanging from the buildings of such institutions.  
 But what, one might ask, does PEGIDA have to do with floods and soli-
darity, apart from the brief example I mentioned around Lutz Bachmann’s par-
ticipation in the flood response? At a more general level, the populist and po-
lemical questions and controversies that PEGIDA has raised are questions of 
to whom the city of Dresden and the German people should show solidarity: a 
fundamental question of who the people –the citizenry – are. While solidarity 
during floods appears to be non-political, in contrast to the contested notions 
of solidarity in political battles, these latter forms of solidarity are now being 
turned into a question of a politics for whom. Let me illustrate with an example. 
 In June 2016, I returned to Dresden for a last short visit before concen-
trating solely on writing the thesis. I arranged for a few final follow-up inter-
views, and made appointments to visit friends in the Neustadt. It was also a 
chance to see if anything had changed on the surface of things in Dresden; 
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whether there was a different kind of “vibe” in the air since I had left the city I 
had grown so attached to in August 2015.  
 On Monday evening, a few hours before I had to catch the bus back to 
Copenhagen, I stopped by the Altmarkt square in the Altstadt where PEGIDA 
had arranged for yet another one of the weekly demonstrations and city walks 
it had been holding since October 2014. I had attended a number of these 
demonstrations and other PEGIDA events. The demonstrations usually follow 
the same pattern. People start gathering in the square around a small stage that 
the PEGIDA leadership has set up in advance. Police units are stationed 
around the perimeter of the square, but PEGIDA people also stand ‘guard’ 
around the congregated crowd, wearing white armbands to indicate that they 
are there to keep the peace. A few counter-protesters will sometimes attend, 
with signs defending refugees, tolerance, and respect. A fair number of journal-
ists and other curious types can also be found, including me. On this day in 
June 2016, the first speaker is PEGIDA founder Lutz Bachmann, who rages in 
a ritual manner against Islam, refugees, the German federal government, 
NATO, the USA and the EU. He then passes the microphone to the guest 
speaker of the day, Michael Stürzenberger, a well-known German blogger, Is-
lam critic and right-wing political activist. Stürzenberger begins his speech with 
an example from Schwäbisch Gmünd, a town in the state of Baden-Württem-
berg near Stuttgart, which had recently experienced flooding due to torrential 
rain:  
 
Friends, we're always talking about the lying press (die Lügenpresse). And how so? 
Rightly so. Did you notice what happened in Schwäbisch Gmünd? There is this terrible 
flood right now. For three days, citizens have dealt with the chaos that the flooding has 
caused, working day and night. After three days, a camera team from Austrian television 
showed up, and approached the town hall in Schwäbisch Gmünd. They want to film 
how asylum seekers have helped with cleaning up after the floods. (Crowd boos) People! 
And then they went to the refugee asylum centre, and found some "refugees" with leather 
shoes and smartphones (...), and told them to stand by a flooded house. And then they 
took the already-cleared things back into the basement, and brought them out again for 
Austrian television cameras, filming how these refugees helped with cleaning up, as if 
refugees had helped here in any way. (The crowd boos again, and begins to chant 'lying 
press'). 
 
 The point here is not to suggest that the speaker at the PEGIDA event 
was making a direct comparison between the flood response and the refugee 
situation, but rather, that in his version, the Austrian media committed a “cap-
ital offense” by using the flood response as an excuse to promote a particular  
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Figure 25. Demonstration against PEGIDA, organized by left-wing parties in Dresden, 2015. 
Sign reads: Clean out the stables: flood the flood canal (with water). Photo: Kristoffer Albris 
 
 
Figure 26. Semperoper, the Dresden opera, with signs below windows reading: For a world 
open Dresden, 2015. Photo: Kristoffer Albris. 
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political view of the refugee crisis by portraying refugees as good people via 
their participation in flood clean-up.  
 The European refugee crisis exacerbated tensions that were already high 
in Dresden in 2014 and 2015 around the question of nationalism and multicul-
turalism. In 2015, refugees and asylum seekers were distributed to centres and 
homes around Germany. Protests were particularly fierce in the Dresden area, 
with weekly protests in the Freital area, south of the city. When the DRK 
opened a refugee camp in east Dresden, NPD protesters met the refugees with 
protests and signs saying “Go back home!” A counter protest was staged, but 
the police were able to prevent the parties from clashing. When refugees were 
to be sent to the town of Heidenau, just outside of Dresden, protesters, both 
PEGIDA followers and others, took to the streets; some engaged in violent 
night-time demonstrations against the police. When Chancellor Angela Merkel 
came to visit Heidenau in those days to plead for calm, she was meet with a 
fierce crowd, who booed her. One Twitter user commented on the Heidenau 
affair by posting a picture of the town at the height of the 2002 floods, when it 
was completely engulfed by water, saying, “When strangers came to Heidenau 
back then to help with flood damage, probably no one protested.” 
 
 
It Rises, and It Fades 
 
This chapter started by asking what happens when the kind of social bond that 
emerges between people in an emergency is gone. What happens to this form 
of liminal solidarity after its effervescent character dies out and fades away? To 
what extent do disasters and critical events like them change society? What do 
they leave in their wake?  
 I have aimed to portray how disaster solidarity in Dresden has an afterlife 
that takes various forms. I have focused on three forms, which have I called 
idealisation, institutionalisation and politicisation. As the progression of the chapter 
has indicated, the analytical distinctions I have drawn do not do justice to the 
complexity of the solidarity arising from the floods; it is not reducible to these 
three forms. That solidarity became institutionalised into local community as-
sociations, for instance, also means it has been both idealised and politicised. 
Moreover, it should be stressed again, I see the recent flood events in Dresden 
as both catalysing specific forms of solidarity and being catalysed by pre-exist-
ing forms of solidarity, but as this circular reasoning would suggest, it is unclear 
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in which direction the causality operates. Indeed, the separation between insti-
tutionalisation and politicisation obscures the point that the building of institu-
tions, broadly defined, is also a kind of politicisation, in that it is a way for new 
local forms of organising to arise.  This, too, has political implications, as was 
evident in Chapter Three.  
 On a final note, signs of solidarity in Dresden materialised in some strik-
ingly concrete ways. Such was the case in Gohlis, when in the summer of 2014, 
I came across a bench that locals had erected to symbolise and signal their grat-
itude to the many volunteers who had helped them. When I returned to Dres-
den in 2015, the bench was nowhere to be found. It might have been moved, or 
it might also have faded away.  
 In the next chapter, although the theme of solidarity is still present in the 
background, we now delve into the question of flood protection. More specifi-
cally, the chapter takes a closer look at how the planning of floodwalls and 
dikes in Dresden has generated political controversies and finger-pointing be-
tween the state and its citizens. 
   
 
 
 
 
Figure 27. Public bench on Dorfstrasse in Gohlis reading Thank you all flood volunteers June 
2013. Photo: Kristoffer Albris, July 2014. 
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Chapter 5 
 
Wall Trouble 
 
 
 
Niemand hat die Absicht, eine Mauer zu errichten! (Nobody has an intention of building a wall!) 
- Walter Ulbricht, in 1961, GDR head of state from 1950 to 1971. 
 
Schutz ist relative. (Protection is relative) 
- Stefan Schulz, Gohlis, Dresden.  
 
Environmental knowledge controversies refer to those events in which an environmental disturb-
ance of some kind forces people to notice the unexamined stuff on which they rely as the material 
fabric of their everyday lives, and attend to its powers and effects.  
- Sarah Whatmore (2013:45). 
 
 
 
When the Elbe River flooded parts of Laubegast in early June 2013, Dresden 
mayor Helma Orosz of the CDU party publicly condemned the citizens of Lau-
begast, holding them responsible for another flooding of their own town. In a 
documentary produced by German television channel ZDF27 and broadcast just 
after the floodwaters had receded, she said, “It could have turned out better if  
citizens had not resisted flood protection. (…) We cannot allow that anymore! 
(...) And I hope that the majority of  citizens who have been affected will also 
understand this situation.”28 Her comments were primarily directed at a citi-
zen’s initiative (Bürgerinitiative) that had opposed the city administration’s plans 
                                                 
27 “Flutkatastrophe mit Ansage? Das Versagen des Hochwasserschutzes”, ZDF, 2013. 
28 I have used a quote from the website www.mauerzoff.de, that refers to the ZDF documen-
tary. 
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to build a floodwall along the banks of  the Elbe. After the flood of  2002, plans 
to build, upgrade, and extend walls and dikes had become a high priority both 
for the Dresden municipal government and for the Free State of  Saxony. Hun-
dreds of  plans were drawn up to protect areas at risk of  flooding in Saxony 
(Sächsisches Staatsministerium für Umwelt und Landwirtschaft 2007). Most of  
these proved easy to implement, without too much resistance from locals. Lau-
begast, however, was a different story.  
 The various areas of  Dresden were assigned different priority levels by the 
city council and the agencies involved in environmental urban and rural plan-
ning, most notably the Umweltamt (the Environmental Office). The flood prob-
lems are particularly complex to manage, because they are formally placed un-
der the jurisdiction of  the Free State of  Saxony, as the Elbe cuts through all of  
Saxony, and also involves negotiations with the German federal government as 
well as the Czech Republic, which participate in the management of  the upper 
part of  the Elbe catchment. After the 2002 floods, a wide range of  initiatives 
were planned and executed to mitigate flood risks in the river catchment. But 
places like Laubegast, small peri-urban areas without significant industry, were 
among the last to be addressed in terms of  realising the flood protection plans. 
This was also due in part to the geographical placement of  the town, which 
made flood protection a more complex issue here than in most other parts of  
the Elbe Valley. The delay in political action prompted dissatisfaction among 
the locals in Laubegast, who felt they had been forgotten by the authorities.  
 Then, in early 2008, the Dresden city council and the Umweltamt publicly 
announced their intention to build a wall in Laubegast as the primary solution 
to the local flood problem, presenting a study that outlined what such a protec-
tion scheme could entail. The study proposed a massive wall, an average of  two 
metres high29 and 1.8 kilometres long, along the riverbanks at Laubegast. The 
wall plans came as a shock to the locals, and the conflict began to escalate. 
Citizens organized protest events, and wrote critical articles both in the news-
papers and on a collaborative blog named Mauerzoff (Wall Trouble). The city 
officials charged with building the wall were taken off-guard at the level of  op-
position to something they thought citizens would welcome: protecting their 
town. At first, such opposition indeed might seem counterintuitive; why would 
people oppose an initiative that is meant to safeguard them from future harm? 
                                                 
29 The height of the wall would vary along the riverbanks of Laubegast because the height of 
the banks themselves varies. The local bakery is known to be the lowest point by the 
riverbanks in Laubegast, for example, and so the wall would have to be higher there than in 
other places. 
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Why did the people of  Laubegast oppose something that would so obviously 
benefit them?   
 The public debate continued, and the conflict escalated as political parties 
quickly tried to position themselves on the issue, pushing for political agendas 
that did not necessarily have anything specific to do with the floodwall. As pro-
tests persisted, the city administration decided to initiate a citizen participatory 
process (Bürgerbeteiligungsprozess) in which locals, flood experts, and govern-
ment representatives could collaborate and discuss what solutions would be 
best to deal with floods in Laubegast. This process was the first of  its kind in 
Dresden, and it concluded that a permanent wall would not be the best solution 
and that other more environmentally adaptive solutions could be pursued. Four 
weeks before the 2013 floods, the Dresden city council decided that the wall 
would not be worth the effort and expense. Although everyone knew something 
could still be done about the flood issue, plans and solutions lay idle.  
 A number of  questions remain unanswered regarding why the wall was 
never built, and why it perhaps never will be. What was, and still is, at stake in 
this controversy, and why did the citizens oppose a wall meant to protect them 
from future floods to begin with? If  the decision to drop the floodwall plans was 
ultimately made by the city administration, then why did the mayor blame the 
citizens of  Laubegast? And finally, what does the case of  the wall trouble in 
Laubegast reveal about disaster prevention and protection as a specific space 
and moment in which different values held by different actors collide? In other 
words, what are the politics of  such walls? 
 In the two previous chapters, I examined how the recent flood events in 
Dresden mobilised the public and created intense feelings of  solidarity between 
volunteers and flood-affected citizens in 2013. Such activities were politicised 
in various ways, perhaps not least because of  the intensity of  the extraordinary 
urgency that arises during and after such an emergency. This chapter deals with 
an issue that has a longer temporal horizon than response and recovery, namely 
how to prevent and protect areas against floods. This temporal horizon reveals 
the darker sides of  the afterlife of  floods: accusations of  blame, political oppor-
tunism, community division, and local protests against state-imposed “quick 
fixes” to complex environmental problems. 
 My aim in this chapter is not to discuss whether flood protection walls are 
inherently either useful or problematic, nor to settle the question of  who was 
wrong or right in the controversy that unfolded in Laubegast. Indeed, the fact 
that floodwalls were built in many parts of  Saxony and Dresden after the 2002 
floods without similar conflict arising indicates that it is not so much the wall 
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that is the problem, but rather the particular configuration of  the wall and the 
local area in question. Instead, the chapter attempts to understand why the con-
troversy erupted in the first place, what was – and is – at stake for locals in 
Laubegast, and also, to understand the position of  the local government. In 
other words, it is to approach the controversy from a pragmatic position that, 
as Luc Boltanski (2011) argues, does not seek to settle the disagreement or the 
controversy, but instead sees instead sees the analysis of critiques as the best 
way to understand what is at stake for those involved through their own retro-
spective accounts. In other words, I attempt to analyse the wall controversy as 
a particular case of  flood politics arising from the tension between the logics of  
adaptation and prevention. The wall controversy, to put it differently, is an in-
stance of  the intertwinement of  society and flood disasters in Dresden as it has 
played out for years, producing particular dispositions of  antagonism and 
blame as a result of  such frictions (Tsing 2004). 
 
 
The Politics of Walls 
 
Across Germany, floodwalls and dikes are often the subject of  intense conflicts 
between local authorities and citizens (Otto et al. 2016). Quite a few cases have 
been identified in the last couple of  decades, perhaps most famously in the town 
of  Grimma, between Dresden and Leipzig, where the national media has used 
the term “Wutbürgern” (“Angry Citizens” or “Protesting Citizens”) to describe 
the hostile local opposition to flood protection plans (Der Spiegel 2013b). This 
label is often used by planners and politicians as a depoliticising statement, 
which suggests that the citizens are irrational and motivated by NIMBY (“Not 
in My Backyard”) concerns, protesting plans that disrupt their particular local 
habitat. Such local criticisms and blame games, as the mayor of  Dresden’s 
above criticism indicate, were also part of  the public debate that filled media 
stories during the 2013 floods, or, as Kuhlicke et al. (2015) note, a “criticism of  
public engagement in participatory processes was one of  the dominant and also 
defining narratives presented in the media during the 2013 flood.” 
 Recently, Otto et al. (2016) published the first comprehensive overview of  
controversies around flood protection and management across Germany. The 
study mapped a range of  conflicts over existing or proposed plans to protect an 
area against floods, whether such protection is in the form of  dikes, walls, water 
basins, dams or designated inundation areas, also called retention fields. The 
study looked at a total of  67 cases, of  which seventeen concerned conflicts over 
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dikes and walls. Interestingly, the authors note, such conflicts seem to most 
prevalent along the Elbe River, and that “quite a number of  disputes are situated 
in the Free State of  Saxony” (Otto et al. 2016:4). This could be explained in 
part by the fact that some German states, including Saxony, have responded to 
the EU Flood Directive of  2007 merely by continuing existing routines, pursu-
ing a top-down approach to governance of  flood issues, rather than opting for 
participatory and bottom-up approaches (ibid.:8). Laubegast, however, was one 
of  the first examples of  a participatory approach in Saxony when its process 
was initiated. 
 The study furthermore identifies four main themes among the conflicts 
and tensions in these cases: a desire for safety, nature protection, economic in-
terests, and participation aspects. As the authors note, in most controversies 
more than just one conflict line is present and critical questions are interrelated 
with each other in various ways (ibid.: 7). As will be clear in the case of  Lau-
begast, all four of  these lines of  conflict (and more) are present, testifying to the 
fact that although sweeping comparative analyses of  flood controversies offer 
insight into their variation across time and space, to fully understand them, one 
needs to examine how a particular controversy is configured as a complex web 
of  different kinds of  tensions. 
 Several of  the plans to build permanent protective installations and infra-
structure in Saxony and Dresden have resulted in controversies and debates be-
tween local government actors (politicians, administrative sections, experts, 
etc.) and residents of  flood-prone areas, who have formed associations and 
movements to protest the building of  dikes and floodwalls. Opposition to flood-
walls in Dresden, of  which Laubegast is the primary example, is often framed 
in aesthetic terms: “a wall is an ugly concrete barrier that would separate us 
from the river,” remarked one resident of  Laubegast to me in an interview. The 
opposition that I have examined through interviews with locals and documen-
tary research testifies to a vehement disdain for concrete walls that upset the 
treasured and well-tended social and environmental ‘habitat’ that exists along 
the banks of  the Elbe at Laubegast. But aesthetics is not everything. Rather, 
opposition to flood protection is also an expression of  a more deeply-felt desire 
to simply be able to define what it means to live with, by and close to the river, 
even if   this necessarily entails living with floods on a more or less regular basis, 
as will be discussed later in this chapter and in Chapter Six. Moreover, as we 
shall see, citizens in Laubegast gradually modified their critique with more tech-
nical arguments, challenging the use of  a wall to protect the area from water 
masses: they said the approach would make little sense, as the flood would 
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simply inundate Laubegast through the ground water, and moreover, it would 
push the water downstream into other parts of  the city. In sum, they argued for 
a more visionary and holistic approach than a concrete or sandstone wall. This 
kind of  protest was a main reason the wall plans were abandoned. Citizens’ 
arguments against the plans, included all kinds of  arguments of  course – aes-
thetic, existential, and technical – but they are different protest claims. 
 As I will attempt to show, beneath the struggles over how to protect (or 
not) a local area from flooding is also, in the case of  Laubegast, a struggle over 
competing notions of  how people ought to live with the river and its adjacent 
terrain as a cultural landscape, or as I suggested, a floodscape. In Dresden, most 
of  the opposition to structural flood protection - pump systems, dams, walls, 
dikes and water basins – has been directed towards two problems: either they 
do not solve the problem at all, or merely create problems for localities down-
stream or upstream; or, they disrupt the aesthetics of  the landscape, spoiling the 
very reason people choose to live as close to the river as possible (and in most 
cases, pay high prices to do so). This well-documented phenomenon of  feeling 
safe behind dikes that are only built to withstand particular kinds of  events is 
sometimes called the ‘dike paradox’ (Hartmann and Spit 2016:363). Dikes or 
walls that promise total protection can create a false sense of  security that has 
been studied in many parts of  the world, where the plans that are meant to 
prevent disasters end up contributing to their severity (Mileti 1999). 
 As mentioned, after the record-breaking flood disaster of  2002, the Free 
State of  Saxony initiated several technical development plans aiming to safe-
guard those parts of  the state most at risk from future events, including zones 
within the Dresden municipal area (Sächsisches Staatsministerium für Umwelt 
und Landwirtschaft 2007). After the minor flood in 2006 and the major event 
in 2013, demands for such new types of  structural protection gained momen-
tum within the political system and from public opinion in general. In Dresden, 
the city and the Saxon state have invested millions of  euros in dikes, walls, 
drainage systems, pump systems and other technical engineering solutions in 
recent years (Dresden Brand- und Katastrophenschutzamt 2013), which have 
changed the aesthetics of  the urban landscape in many ways, most notably in 
the western part of  the city, while the eastern parts, including Laubegast, 
Meusslitz, and Kleinzschachwitz, have seen less upgrades to flood protection. 
 As I also discussed at length in Chapter Two, in many parts of  Dresden 
that border the Elbe River, a strip of  green parkland known as Elbwiese (Elbe 
Moor) has historically retained most of  the water in periods of  minor flooding 
(Korndörfer 2001). By law, new building schemes are forbidden in these moor 
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retention areas, and the government of  Dresden owns the land, using it as a 
recreational common area for the public when the river level is low. The green 
retention areas provide enough protection for many parts of  Dresden during 
most flood events. However, in some areas, dike systems or walls are needed in 
order to prevent inundation. Before the 2002 floods, many existing dike systems 
had become worn out, and comprehensive development schemes for upgrading 
the dikes have been effectuated in the last couple of  years. As a prelude to the 
Laubegast wall controversy, a conflict about a floodwall in Pieschen in western 
Dresden escalated when citizen initiatives criticised plans to build a short sand-
stone wall that could be made taller by the addition of  mobile elements. A long 
line of  trees had to be cut down to build the wall, and other changes to the river 
landscape were met with critique by associations such as the Dresdner Erben, 
a local interest association that promotes green and sustainable policies. 
 According to Wiebe Bijker (2007:109) dams and dikes – and here we can 
include walls – are “thick with politics.” Structures relating to flood prevention 
and water management are imbued with values by those that have decided to 
build and finance them. Moreover, they are thick with politics since such con-
structions are often contested, pitting locals against authorities and private com-
panies who have a vested interest in keeping certain areas dry; there can also be 
fights within the communities themselves. In other words, such protection plans 
are produced by politics, and they, in turn, produce politics. (Guggenheim 
2014:9). 
 All kinds of  structural solutions to flood hazards can potentially create 
problems between those that decide on their implementation, design and func-
tion, and those that have to live with them. For a Dresden city official at the 
Umweltamt, this has a very logical explanation: these issues are fundamentally 
about the access to and ownership of  land. But compared to a dike or a water 
basin, a wall is perhaps the most “concrete” form of  protection, as it aestheti-
cally represents in its very materiality the mind of  the planner, akin to what 
James Scott (1998) in Seeing Like a State called ‘high modernism,’ as well as the 
bureaucratic ethos of  finding solutions to problems (or of  finding problems to 
ready-made solutions) from the office, and not from the perspective of  the local 
area itself.  
 As mentioned, much of the controversy over the wall in Laubegast con-
cerns aesthetics. As Wendy Brown (2014) asserts in her recent analysis of the 
politics of walls intended to contain and exclude populations, they often 
amount to little more than theatrical props. Walls, Brown argues, address hu-
man desires for containment and protection in a world increasingly lacking 
 
 
160 
these provisions. Yet these same walls often amount to little more than aesthetic 
forms that are meant to symbolise political action, echoing what Brian Larkin 
has called the “poetics of infrastructure,” in which “Infrastructures are the 
means by which a state proffers these representations to its citizens and asks 
them to take those representations as social facts. It creates a politics of ‘as if’.” 
(Larkin 2013:315). 
 I mention these points in order to set the stage for the rest of  the chapter, 
in which I see the wall that was never built in Laubegast as a useful object to 
explore analytically in relation to why it needs to be built, who says it is neces-
sary (and why), who opposes it, what kinds of  socio-political effects it has be-
fore it is even materialised, and why a wall has a strong symbolic connotation 
specifically in eastern Germany, given the political history of  the region. In 
other words, a wall is an object that offers a rich framework of  interpretation 
from an ethnographic point of  view. Before continuing with the story of  the 
wall, however, I will first provide a few details about Laubegast. 
  
 
Protecting Laubegast 
 
Laubegast is a small town of  roughly 12,000 inhabitants30 and is part of  the 
administrative district of  Leuben, located a few kilometres east of  the Dresden 
city centre (Landeshauptstadt Dresden 2016:150). The origin of  the town dates 
back to the fifteenth century, when it was a small fishing settlement. Like many 
other parts of  Dresden, Laubegast was once an independent village, but it was 
incorporated into Dresden in 1921 as the city expanded beginning in the late 
nineteenth century. Laubegast has a reputation for being a special place. De-
spite the destruction of  World War II and the communist era that drastically 
changed the appearance of  many parts of  Dresden, Laubegast retains in some 
respects an aesthetic character reminiscent of  the days before the industrial rev-
olution. The scenic Elbe River landscape that is famous in Germany and be-
yond is maintained at the riverbanks in Laubegast, and locals take pride that 
Laubegast is a central part of  the cultural heritage landscape that used to be on 
the UNESCO heritage list (Barth et al. 2011:7). Small shops, cafes, and restau-
rants line the riverbanks to receive local guests, including the many bicycle tour-
ists that stop for a short break before continuing on the Elbradweg (Elbe bicycle 
                                                 
30 Locals in Laubegast estimate that the village has a population of 8,000. This depends on 
how you demarcate the town limits; in the Dresden city statistics, Laubegast is grouped to-
gether with Alttolkewitz, and has a total population of 12,000. 
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path) that runs from the Czech Republic in the south all the way to Hamburg 
in the North.  
 The district of  Leuben, of  which Laubegast is a part, is more diverse de-
mographically than Laubegast itself. Towards the south is a large industrial area 
located near the train line that connects Dresden to Prague. To the southwest is 
an area of  Plattenbau buildings (GDR housing projects), where the majority of  
residents are working-class people. To the east and the north, towards the Elbe, 
are the towns of  Laubegast, Kleinzschachwitz, Meusslitz and Sporbitz, which 
are predominantly middle and upper-class areas containing mostly single-fam-
ily homes, of  which many were built in the last few hundred years. In this re-
spect, Laubegast in particular stands out, as its old town centre, Altlaubegast 
(Old Laubegast) consists almost entirely of  houses dating from well before the 
nineteenth century – in some cases as old as the thirteenth century – and is 
separated from the “newer” parts of  the town by the main street, Österreicher-
strasse. The atmosphere and aesthetics of  Altlaubegast have an almost alt-
modisch character, which is attractive to tourists, especially during the summer 
months. This is also the site of  the Inselfest that I mentioned in the previous 
chapter.  
 Laubegast is arguably the part of  Dresden’s riverscape where the question 
of  flood protection has proved the most complex to solve. As I have mentioned 
earlier, Laubegast has a unique geographical location. Heavy rain over consec-
utive days in the upper parts of  the Elbe catchment in the Czech Republic will 
cause the river to rise in all parts of  Dresden’s riverine area. However, at Lau-
begast, and adjacent areas, the rising Elbe splits into a temporary tributary river, 
called the Der Alte Elbarm (The Old Elbe Arm), which then flows back into the 
Elbe downstream past Laubegast. The creation of  this tributary river turns Lau-
begast into an island, enclosed by the arm on one side and the Elbe on the other 
(hence the festival’s name, Island Festival). The town is thus threatened by water 
from three different angles: water from the Elbe itself, water from the Old Elbe 
Arm, and ground water that usually starts to rise as the river level begins to 
recede. The majority of  the houses flooded in Laubegast were those located on 
the side of  Österreicherstrasse facing the Elbe, whereas the other parts of  the 
town were primarily flooded by water from the Old Elbe Arm and/or by ground 
water. 
 As a consequence of  centuries of  habitation in the Laubegast area, the 
built environment is so close to the riverbanks that a green retention area or a 
system of  dikes and pumps is not a feasible solution, as in other parts of  Dres-
den. The settlement is located too close to the river for any such solutions to be 
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effective. Instead, a sandstone or concrete wall has been seen by many, most 
notably the local Dresden government, as the ideal solution. The city initiated 
plans to build such a floodwall following the 2002 and 2006 floods. In 2008, a 
study was presented that described a possible scenario of  what such a wall 
might look like, as I mentioned in the introduction. Although this was only a 
preliminary study, locals claim that the city acted as though the wall would be 
built swiftly and without too many hindrances. What the city had not taken 
into account, however, is that such a solution would be contested. And it was, 
on several grounds.  
  
 
The Protests  
 
Laubegast was a bit on a knife’s edge. It was not clear whether it made sense cost-benefit-wise. Then 
the administration of  the city commissioned a small study of  what the protection line should be, 
and how high it should be to avoid a certain degree of  flooding.  They finished that, and they said 
that in theory, the wall had to be built, it will be so and so long, high, wide, and costs this much. 
This was not a grand study. They gave that to the press, and suddenly the press started saying that 
Laubegast would get a floodwall by 2014. Those of  us living here knew nothing about the process, 
but suddenly it was in the local press. 
- Tobias Renner, Laubegast, Dresden. 
 
Not long after the city announced its intention to build a wall in Laubegast, an 
initiative surfaced called “Citizens’ Initiative against a Floodwall in Lau-
begast” (“Bürgerinitiative gegen eine Laubegaster Flutschutzmauer”). It consisted of 
a group of citizens who lived close to the river, and who were highly critical of 
the intended wall. They created a blog, which they aptly named Mauerzoff  (Wall 
Trouble). They posted information about the plans to build the floodwall in the 
coming years, acting as an outlet for the critical position taken by a faction of  
the Laubegast citizenry on the issue, but that more and more would come to 
support as discussions around the wall issue developed.  
 The first critique to surface from the protesting citizens came not long 
after the first intentions to build the wall had been revealed, and appeared in a 
local journal of  Laubegast called Die Laube, which featured the following com-
ment by one of  the locals, exemplifying the first startled reaction to the pro-
posed plans: 
 
Actually, this journal was reserved for poetic pictures of the most beautiful Elbe river 
landscape, as an alternative to capitalist advertising. And what do we see here? Neither 
of these. Instead, a nightmare. A vision of the ugliest river in the world. A gruesome 
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fantasy that could become reality in the near future, according to the wishes of the con-
crete manufacturers’, steelmakers’ and politicians’ lobby. The magic words used to le-
gitimise the mad plan are "jobs" and "flood protection". Walls are to protect us from 
barbarians, from Mongolian cavalry, from fascist imperialists, and now from the evil, 
evil Elbe! And who protects us from the protectors? Here are four reasons against the 
wall and only one in favour of it. 
 
Against the wall: 
1. It looks, if you don’t mind me saying, like shit!  
2. No pig would want to sit in front of a wall, why force people to do it?  
3. A wall can collapse because of faulty construction, or because Osama Bin Laden is 
on holiday in the Elbe valley! 
4. A wall creates work in the construction industry for a year ... and then permanently 
destroys the same amount of jobs in the gastronomy sector, in tourism, in small busi-
nesses, and the ukulelisation of the Elbe valley! 
 
For the wall:  
1. No one can feed the common grey geese behind a wall; their exodus would be the 
only advantage. 
(Die Laube, Heft 14/2009:16)31 
 
 This highly ironic, sarcastic, and perhaps even provocative, form of  pro-
test runs through many of  the online posts. On the blog site Mauerzoff, one of  
the first posts was a picture of  the Berlin Wall, photoshopped in along the banks 
of  the Elbe, accompanied by a statement saying that it was “insane” to build 
over two metres of  concrete wall in a place where people come to enjoy the 
river view. Another photo of  the Berlin Wall in front of  the Elbe read, “Nie-
mand hat die Absicht, eine Mauer zu errichten”, alluding to the famous quote 
by Walter Ulbricht, leader of  the GDR in 1961, just before the Berlin Wall was 
built. That phrase, “No one has any intention of  building a wall,”, has a very 
                                                 
31 The original German reads: Eigentlich war diese Seite für poesievolle Bilder vom schönsten Elbufer 
der Welt vorbehalten, ersatzweise auch für schnöden Kommerz, kapitalistische Reklame, egoistische 
Geldeintreibung. Und was sehen wir hier? Nichts von beidem. Sondern einen Alptraum. Eine Vision 
vom hässlichsten Elbufer der Welt. Einen grausige Phantasie, die nach den Wünschen einer Lobby von 
Betonfabrikanten, Stahlwerkern und Politikern schon in naher Zukunft wahr werden könnte. Die 
magischen Wort zur Legitimierung der wahnwitzigen Pläne heißen „Arbeitsplätze“ und 
„Hochwasserschutz“. Mauern sollen vor Barbaren schützen, vor mongolischen Reiterheeren, vor 
faschistischen Imperialisten, und nun auch vor der bösen, bösen Elbe!!! Und wer beschützt uns vor den 
Beschützern? Kontra: 1. Es sieht, mit Verlaub, einfach scheiße aus! ~ 2. Keine Sau will vor einer Mauer 
sitzen, warum sollte man Menschen dazu nötigen?! ~ 3. Eine Mauer kann einstürzen, weil sie einen 
Konstruktionsfehler hat - oder weil Osama Bin Landen gerade Urlaub im Elbtal macht! ~ 4. Eine 
Mauer schafft für ein Jahr Arbeit in der Baubranche... und vernichtet dauerhaft selbige in der 
Gastronomie, in Tourismus, Kleingewerbe und bei der Ukulelisierung des Elbtals! ~ Pro: Hinter 
Mauern kann niemand die gemeine Graugans füttern, ihr Exodus wäre der einzige Vorteil. 
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special significance in the former East Germany, as it symbolically encapsulates 
the untrustworthy character of  a government that hides its true intentions. 
 The protests took other forms as well. Locals in Laubegast staged several 
protest events to display their dissatisfaction with the plans for a floodwall, 
which they saw as obstructing their way of  life close to the river. At the official 
unveiling of  a newly-built sculpture by the banks of  Laubegast in 2009, at which 
Helma Orosz, the mayor, participated, citizens showed up with protest signs 
bearing cleverly ironic slogans, such as “Mauer am Fluss, Mauer im Kopf” (“wall 
by the river, wall in the head”). This  alludes to the much-debated notion that 
former GDR citizens in eastern Germany have a hard time letting go of  their 
communist past, because they still have the Berlin Wall “in their heads”. This 
is also is tied to the notion of  Ostalgie, the suggestion that East Germans have a 
strangely nostalgic relationship to the GDR past (Boyer 2006), as I discussed at 
length in Chapter Two. Another initiative created a proxy model of  the wall 
and placed it by the riverbank to demonstrate how the wall would look if  it were 
to be built, hoping to show people who passed by Laubegast that the scenic 
landscape would be disturbed by the wall.  
 These protests, and in particular the artistic demonstration events that lo-
cals staged in the period of  the conflict’s escalation, were an attempt to make 
the wall real, since it still only existed on the drawing board of  the municipal 
planners and bureaucrats. In this way, local protestors attempted very con-
cretely to make the wall visible, and to attract general public support for their 
protest from the rest of  Dresden. 
  The city officials were surprised by the reaction from locals in Laubegast. 
As one of  them explained to me as we walked along the Elbe one day in June 
2014, “We thought they were crazy! Why would they think we would build 
something like the Berlin Wall?”  Not only was the response from the commu-
nity members in Laubegast so swift and heated, the official thought, but the fact 
that they associated the plans for a floodwall with one of  the most politically 
significant symbols in modern human history – in Germany in particular – re-
vealed that much more was at stake for the protesters than the question of  
providing a technical solution to future floods.  
 During my research, I identified and interviewed different types of  locals 
in Laubegast. Naturally, I had a keen interest in those who had participated in 
the protests. In May 2015, I paid a visit to Tobias Renner, who had been active 
in the citizens’ initiative against the wall. I arrived at the home of  Tobias and 
his wife early in the morning, and as I entered the gate leading to his backyard  
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Figure 28. Walter Ulbricht quote above a photoshopped Berlin Wall by the riverbanks at 
Laubegast:  „Niemand hat die Absicht eine Mauer zu bauen.“ From www.mauerzoff.de. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 29. Protests at the revealing of a sculpture by the riverbanks in Laubegast. 
From www.mauerzoff.de. 
 
 
166 
 
 
Figure 30. Installation by locals, indicating how long and wide the wall would be. From 
www.mauerzoff.de. 
 
 
 
Figure 31. Proxy model of the wall. From www.mauerzoff.de. 
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where a couple of  chairs had been put out for our meeting, I passed construc-
tion workers putting the final touches on the building’s façade as part of  the 
reconstruction work after the last floods almost two years earlier. For many 
people, repairs and reconstruction work take several years, since they have to 
wait for funds to be allocated through either their individual flood insurance, if  
they have it, or through government support funds. In Tobias’ case, this is the 
third time since 2002 that he has had to hire repairmen to mend damage from 
flood waters. 
 We sat in the inner garden, which was beautifully arranged. As with so 
many of  the houses along the Elbe, there are these small hidden gems that es-
cape the attention of  passers-by. We drank sparkling water with apple juice, or 
Apfel Schorle, a fizzy apple soft drink that is a common refreshment throughout 
Germany.  
 Tobias explains how their opposition to the wall slowly shifted from mere 
dissatisfaction with its aesthetics to the deeper question of  whether it would 
make any difference in terms of  flood protection. I also ask him why they did 
not want a solution like in other places, where the wall is not a high concrete 
wall, but a lower wall that can use mobile elements: 
 
The more we looked into the issue, the more questions came up, like what will they do 
with the groundwater, and what will they do with rain water? I know a bit about this 
issue myself, in part through having done business in Hamburg. And then it began to be 
clear that they had not thought about the project very hard, and that it was merely a 
political decision by the city council without much technical consideration behind it. 
And the matter of  the height of  the wall – that was a story in itself. There were different 
proposed heights of  the wall in different sections of  Laubegast; by the bakery, it was 
supposed to be 4 meters high. Even when you say that the upper part of  the wall should 
be mobile, the stable lower part that holds the upper part in place needs to be at least 2.5 
meters high. We then made some calculations ourselves, as we have a building expert 
here in the local community who could do that kind of  calculation. We mobilised skills 
and knowledge from different people in the community, and we began discussions with 
the city. And they said that the mobile solution was just one of  many alternatives. But 
we were sceptical. And the fire department clearly said that they could not pay to store 
the mobile elements for the wall. The more we calculated, the more obscure it became, 
and it became apparent that the mayor herself  was not informed about it, which was 
pretty incredible. 
 
 The mobile elements that Tobias talked about refer to a solution that has 
been implemented in Pieschen, Gohlis, and in the Altstadt, where a low wall 
of  concrete or sandstone is constructed with metal plates at the top to permit 
an additional steel wall to be fitted onto it when flood risk is imminent. This 
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Figure 32. Floodwall in Pieschen, western part of Dresden. Low wall solution, where steel 
plate extensions can be fitted on top. Photo: Kristoffer Albris, July 2014. 
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solution, however, was also abandoned in the discussions that followed, as it 
required the elements to be stored somewhere, which needs to be funded. In the 
case of  Laubegast, this was deemed infeasible. 
 Leaving these technical discussions aside for a moment, I want to ask in-
stead about what exactly was at stake for the locals when they presented these 
kinds of  protests? How, for instance, are we to interpret the symbol of  the Berlin 
Wall in this context? Ought we to take it literally – that the citizens’ initiative 
believed that the city, like Walter Ulbricht, was attempting to wall in Laubegast, 
without any consideration to the concerns of  locals? Or should we see it as a 
powerfully ironic use of  historical symbolism to gain leverage in an attempt to 
make the controversy a matter of  public concern? In the next section, I will visit 
another Laubegast local who lives close to the river, in order to gain further 
insight into these questions.  
 
 
The Conflict Escalates 
 
Ernst Fischer lives in Altlaubegast, directly on the banks of  the river. He runs 
his own store that has been in his family for generations. The store has occupied 
the same location by the banks of  the Elbe River in Laubegast since 1872. As I 
knock on the door one Tuesday morning in 2015, he greets me and invites me 
upstairs to his private residence. We sit down in the kitchen, which, as Ernst 
explains, they have built on the first floor to reduce the risk of  it being flooded. 
Growing up, Ernst knew that the Elbe could flood. He still remembers how his 
father would talk about the Elbe floods of  1941, and how they would have to 
spend weeks on end rebuilding and cleaning the house. Yet he had not experi-
enced such an event himself  before the great flood of  2002. As our conversation 
moves forward in the chronology of  the wall conflict, Ernst recalls how the city 
announced plans to build the wall along the Laubegast, and how the conflict 
started to escalate as local protests began: 
  
Kristoffer: I have seen this Mauer im Kopf, Mauer am Fluss phrase being used in the 
protests. I of  course know the meaning of  this phrase, and that it should be understood 
ironically.  
 
Ernst: Well yes, and no. So, in 1961, Walter Ulbricht said nobody had any intention of  
building a wall in Berlin, and four weeks later there was a wall in Berlin. And so we 
also hung Ulbricht up here, and we had artists that did art projects. We put up fabric 
that was three metres high, and on top there was a ballerina, a tightrope walker. And 
then people saw how high the wall would be, which was not obvious to the public. And 
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people would say “That high!? I never realised that!” You wouldn’t be able to see the 
Elbe anymore. Only concrete. So, a lot of  art projects. And that was not received well 
by the politicians. We had a lot of  initiatives. It was a good time. 
 
 In the following, Ernst explains why floodwalls and structural flood pro-
tection is such a big issue in Saxony and Dresden: 
 
The general rule is to build massive constructions, and as few mobile constructions as 
possible, because they have to be stored somewhere. That is a political issue (eine Poli-
tikum), and that is why we’ve had this conflict with this floodwall, where we have said 
that this wall solves nothing since the water will still come. It will come through the 
basements and wells. It makes no sense. But it is a political issue. More money will be 
allocated for concrete than for other solutions. 
  
 A question that became central as the conflict developed was how many 
of  the locals were for the wall, and how many were against it. According to 
those I talked to, including city officials, the issue divided the population of  
Laubegast at the beginning. Some citizens were eager to see a floodwall by the 
banks of  the Elbe, while others vehemently opposed it. Indeed, one of  the re-
sults of  the wall controversy was that the community of  Laubegast became di-
vided over the issue. Counterintuitively perhaps, the people living closest to the 
river who are most at risk of  flooding generally oppose the wall, whereas there 
is less opposition to the wall from people living in the parts of  town that are 
further away from the river. Those more exposed to the flood risk also live clos-
est to the river, and are thus also those whose everyday lives would be impacted 
the most by a stone barrier. Yet with the passage of  time, and after the partici-
patory process that I will describe in a following section, it appears as if  almost 
all citizens of  Laubegast now agree that one massive wall by the riverbanks 
would solve very little, and would end up spoiling what makes Laubegast what 
it is and has been for centuries.  
 However, as some have pointed out to me, the division of  the local popu-
lation on the wall question was in some ways orchestrated by what Ernst refers 
to as “Die Politik” (‘‘Politics”), as members of  political parties tried to hijack 
the process: 
 
Ernst: Politics also tried to divide the local community (die Bevölkerung zu Spalten). 
There were a lot of  politically-driven people during the community hearings, including 
members of  political parties. The parties had sent people to participate, especially the 
CDU, and they were in favour of  the wall because they want to secure the rights of  
homeowners. They want the concrete. And anyone could participate in the meetings. 
Many said, “Why don’t you want to be protected?” 
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Kristoffer: So, these party members intervened to create an atmosphere of  many people 
being for the wall? 
 
Ernst: Yes, correct. And that is propaganda. And these were the same people who tried 
to drive a wedge in the community, by writing in the newspapers that the Laubegast 
people are idiots because they do not want flood protection. We do want flood protec-
tion, but it has to be a solution that works. We don’t want protection that doesn’t work. 
But then the mayor (Oberbürgermeisterin) said after the 2013 flood event that the peo-
ple of  Laubegast only have themselves to blame for being flooded again, and that they 
don’t want to be protected.  
 
 Ernst brings a roll of  maps to the kitchen table where we are talking and 
shows me in detail where the proposed wall was supposed to be built. As we 
look at the entire city of  Dresden, I ask him about the other floodwalls in Dres-
den: 
 
Kristoffer: But there are other floodwalls in the Dresden area, in Pieschen for instance, 
that is only a half-metre high and reasonably nice-looking. I thought that it would be the 
same kind of  wall in Laubegast? 
 
Ernst: But you have to remember, Laubegast is much lower than most other places. We 
are actually the retention area for the city centre. And what does that mean? It means 
that the water would be pushed with greater velocity towards the city centre if  there were 
a wall here. And then you would have to build even higher there. And the water would 
be going even faster when it got to Meissen [further downstream from Dresden]. The 
fact is, actually, and this was also the conclusion of  the process, that you can really not 
solve that much here. It has to be solved at the EU level with the Czech Republic, where 
you would need to create many more retention areas, which they have already done, 
where fields can be flooded.  So the solution would be to divert water away before it 
reaches us here in Laubegast. 
 
Kristoffer: That is also part of  the newer understanding of  flood protection, that you cre-
ate retention areas.  
 
Ernst: Yes, but for the state of  Saxony, this is not part of  the solution. It is really a political 
problem. Now we have a new city government, but before, there was a different puppet 
master in control of  the officials. So some of  the people in the administration were ac-
tually glad that some of  the experts who were part of  the process said – with authority – 
that this Laubegast project could not be pursued anymore. They covered their backs. 
That was four weeks before the 2013 floods. 
 
Kristoffer: But the argument to cancel it was a financial one, right? 
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Ernst: Yes, the costs. You would have had to spend so much money, and the question 
became whether that money would not be better spent on rebuilding and replacing in-
stead of  walling Laubegast in. And this is the context of  the message from the Mayor, 
saying that we are to blame for the floods because we didn’t want any flood protection. 
And that is propaganda. 
 
 What is important here, is that Ernst refers to the problem as a political 
one, and also one of  propaganda. It is not, then, an economic, social, cultural, 
or even bureaucratic problem. By calling it a political problem, Ernst is attempt-
ing to attach a specific meaning to the issue of  the floodwall, and to problema-
tize it in relation to a broader issue than merely being for or against the wall. 
As Matei Candea writes, “Claims about the political or non-political nature of  
various spaces are an intrinsic part of  the performative process that make such 
spaces ‘exist or inexist’.” (Candea 2011: 321). In other words, by framing it as 
a political problem, and not merely a technical one, Ernst assigns the issue to 
the realm of  politics – and specifically, as we shall see, between the city of  Dres-
den and the Saxon state. But he herewith also assigns it to the realm of  issues 
dividing the political parties on the left and right, especially whether the river 
and floods should be managed with protection or through “green” solutions, 
such as retention room.  
 As Ernst’s concerns about the escalation of  the conflict in the meetings 
that were held prior to the participatory process (see next section) also indicate, 
the political parties have sought to position themselves on flood protection is-
sues in many different ways. As was the case in the previous chapter on solidar-
ity, campaign posters have been used to indicate their stands on flood protection 
issues. For example, the right-wing party Alternative für Deutschland (Alternative 
for Germany) argued on its posters for “Dikes not Drones” (Deiche statt 
Drohnen), indicating that people need protection rather than surveillance. A 
poster endorsing the conservative CDU was more direct in arguing for greater 
flood protection measures (“Hochwasserschutz bauen”), clearly signifying the 
stand of  the major party in Saxony to protect home owners from damages by 
floods, fires, lightning strikes and other natural hazards. On the other end of  
the political spectrum, the socialist party Die Linke made a flyer arguing that 
rivers needs more space, and that people need more protection (Die Flüssen mehr 
Raum, den Menschen mehr Schutz), a broad statement that fails to specify precisely 
how either of  these goals could and should be attained. 
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Living with the River 
 
As with most controversies, retrospectively developing a precise chronological 
ordering of  the events as they occurred can be a challenge, not just for me as an 
outside observer, but also for the people who were engaged in it. However, in 
an attempt to retain some form of  timeline, I will now turn to the participatory 
process, which I have referred to in various ways in the comments above by 
Ernst and Tobias.  
 As a result of  the protests’ increasing momentum thanks to both the local 
media as well as public demonstration events in 2009 and 2010, the city council 
acknowledged that it could not merely brush this opposition aside. In 2010, a 
participatory process was called for by the city council on the initiative of  the 
Umweltamt, in order to “improve the protection of  the Laubegast area against 
floods from the Elbe in an intensive participatory process” (Barth et al. 
2011:A3). The official description of  the process was given by the city council 
in the following manner: 
 
The City Council commissions the mayor to define the protection objectives as a prereq-
uisite for planning to improve the protection of  the district of  Laubegast against floods 
of  the Elbe River in an intensive participatory process, as well as to elaborate basic re-
quirements for the location, form and shape of  appropriate protection facilities, taking 
into account conditions of urban planning and natural spatial boundaries. (Dresden 
Stadtrat, in Barth et al.  2011:A3).32 
 
 Citizens of  Laubegast, government representatives, flood experts, and 
other stakeholders were included in the process, as it was open to everyone who 
wanted to participate. Such participatory processes are found in various guises 
in many different contexts, and resemble the kinds of  citizen knowledge groups 
that Sarah Whatmore and her colleagues have been engaged with setting up 
and studying for some years in flood-prone towns in England (Lane et al. 2013; 
Whatmore 2013). They also resemble what Callon et al. (2009) have called ‘hy-
brid forums,’ consisting of  a heterogeneous mix of  both experts, government 
representatives, and citizens of  various ilks. It also mirrors the kinds of  com-
munity-based disaster risk reduction programmes that international humanitar-
                                                 
32 The original German reads: Der Stadtrat beauftragt die Oberbu խrgermeisterin, als Voraussetzung fu խr 
Planungen zur Verbesserung des Schutzes des Stadtteils Laubegast vor Hochwasser der Elbe in einem 
intensiven partizipatorischen Verfahren die Schutzziele zu definieren sowie grundsa խtzliche Anforderungen 
an Lage, Form und Gestalt entsprechender Schutzanlagen unter Beru խcksichtigung sta խdtebaulicher, 
gestalterischer und naturra խumlicher Randbedingungen auszuarbeiten. 
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ian and development agencies have used for decades, (ideally) taking the con-
cerns of  people in vulnerable communities as the primary source for producing 
risk reduction plans and knowledge. Or, as Sheila Jasanoff  (2010) and Kathleen 
Tierney (2012), among others, have argued, this incorporation of  a larger and 
more diverse set of  actors in disaster risk reduction signals a paradigm shift 
from an expert-based disaster management to a broad, multi-stakeholder-based 
disaster governance. 
 The purpose of  the process was to hear what the local population wanted 
to do about the flood problem. This was, according to reports given to me by 
locals, the first time such a process was initiated in Saxony in relation to flood 
management, given the tendency for flood management policies in Saxony to 
be governed by top-down principles  (Otto et al. 2016:8). The process included 
representatives from the Dresden Environment Office as well as the Leuben 
Ortsamt leader, Jörg Lämmerhirt, who is very well-liked among people in Lau-
begast and other areas in the district, and who is known to be highly engaged 
in flood issues, often serving as a mediator between locals and the Dresden mu-
nicipal administration.  
 The first meeting was held in November 2010. In this interview excerpt, 
Tobias Renner describes the beginning of  the process: 
 
The next step was suggested by a division leader in the Umweltamt who had an idea that 
we should hold a community meeting with a moderator whereby we could collect dif-
ferent opinions, and that through this meeting, they could convince the community to 
build the wall. Most of  us were sceptical about this meeting, but it turned out to be in-
formative, and an architecture professor came from Leipzig with a highly professional 
presentation on this subject. But that was not the actual point of  the meeting. The point 
was merely to get emotions out, apparently. So this first meeting was a complete scream-
ing contest (die reine Pöbeleie). In the next phase, a woman conducted a series of  inter-
views with people as well as a survey that was not really scientific, because there was too 
little data. But she came to the conclusion that 100 percent of  the population in Lau-
begast wanted the wall. This seemed very unlikely, but it made an impression on the city.  
 
The second meeting was held in February 2011, with over 200 people partici-
pating. According to the final report that came out of  the process, plans to pur-
sue the building of  one massive wall by the Elbe riverbanks in Laubegast were 
abandoned as early as this meeting, despite the fact that the survey had indi-
cated widespread support prior to it (Barth et al. 2011:9). The next phase was a 
series of  three workshops in early and late March 2011, which included a total 
of  90 participants with different backgrounds and interests, as Tobias explains: 
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Then came the working groups, which included city representatives, citizens, and water 
experts, but also the fire department people. So we had people there who dealt with both 
prevention and emergency management. The groups addressed different questions about 
the wall, or what could be done in the Czech republic, and the process came as a surprise 
to many, since people finally got some form of  recognition for the work that they do – 
including the fire department, which seemed not always to be the case. And then came 
another phase – these working groups had further meetings, focused more on results and 
applicability, and carried forward by moderators. People in this process also had to take 
responsibility for the recommendations they made in their group work. The final docu-
ment was edited in the Volkshaus [People’s House], and compiled, and the formulations 
were quite carefully revised for 6-7 hours. It was quite interesting, for instance when a 
local who works as a doctor had to talk about things he didn’t know about, like hydrology 
and the flow of  water. We were a bit concerned that we did not include any of  the polit-
ical parties in the participatory process. We discussed a bit with them, but we sensed that 
the parties were trying to use the situation to advance their agendas, not only on floods 
but on a range of  different issues.  
 
 The details of  the process, the creation of  the final document, and the 
technicalities of  what kinds of  discussions took place regarding flood protec-
tion are far too comprehensive to retell here. What is important for this present 
purpose is to understand how the controversy developed over time, and how it 
went from being a ‘hot situation’ (Callon et al. 2009) to cooling off. To the locals 
in Laubegast who were sceptical at first about the city’s intentions to involve 
them, the process was generally well received. According to Ernst Fischer: 
 
Ernst: It was a good initiative. Especially because the city of  Dresden and locals talked 
to each other on the same level. It had never occurred to the city administration that 
this could be a good idea. But it was interesting. There were also experts (Fachleute) 
invited, and they said that if  you want a flood protection installation, it must be around 
the entire area of  Laubegast and at least 18 meters deep, because the water goes around 
on the other side. The conclusion was that the wall would have to be 2 metres high on 
average by the riverbanks in Laubegast. By the Bakery, the wall would have to be some-
where between 2-3 metres high. 
 
 Tellingly, the document that resulted from the participatory process bears 
the title Living with the River (Leben mit dem Fluss), suggesting that the overall 
question is not how to protect oneself  from floods, but how does one live with 
the river as a disturbing actor that will occasionally disrupt normal life. This 
was an intentional formulation chosen by locals, indicating that the needed ad-
justments did not solely relate to floods, but to living with the river more gener-
ally. 
 The story of  the document itself, which was finalised in late May 2011, is 
interesting for a number of  reasons, as such documents lead a social life of  their 
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own as artefacts of  modern knowledge, making them interesting ethnographic 
objects in and of  themselves (Riles 2006). After the final document had passed 
through a long editing process by locals in the Volkshaus (People’s House) in 
Laubegast, a group of  representatives of  the process from Laubegast went to 
the city council to present it. They received standing ovations from the politi-
cians, as the process was hailed as one of  a kind and as a role model for how 
politics ought to include the voices of  citizens in public planning. Indeed, the 
process and its resulting document have become exemplars across Germany for 
how to do bottom-up participatory inclusion of  citizens. As Tobias explains: 
 
So we had the opportunity to go to the city council with our results and recommenda-
tions to present them. Four or five people from the process went, and all the representa-
tives clapped after the presentation; they were excited about the engaged citizens. Then 
it was decided that the wall should not be built, apparently also because there was some 
legal and political issue with the Saxony Water Act, which needed to be adjusted. But 
there are a number of  unanswered questions that have nothing to do with the water law. 
They didn’t want the wall anymore! But then after the 2013 floods, they said that we 
were the ones who had prevented it, and blamed us. 
  
 The process ended in 2011 with the conclusion that neither a complete 
wall nor a wall with mobile elements would solve the flood problem in Lau-
begast; most of  the participants in the process that I spoke with feel this was the 
right conclusion. Yet, it has left Laubegast without any form of  structural pro-
tection, leaving the management of  flood risk up to individual households, and, 
as I noted at the beginning of  the chapter, with blame assigned to the citizens 
for the flooding of  the town. 
 
 
The Wall that Nobody Wanted to Build 
 
Since 2002, a lot of  things have happened. A lot of  things in the Czech Republic, a lot of  things 
with the smaller streams from the Erzgebirge. It is no longer a question of  a flood wave, but a slow-
rising sort of  flood, and so the warning time for us is quite different. And this is why the floodwall 
doesn’t make sense. It is typical of  a German bureaucrat, who thinks of  everything from their desk, 
without any kind of  practical information or experience. 
- Michael Scholz, Laubegast, Dresden. 
 
As I have already mentioned, local media interest in the Laubegast floodwall 
was intense over the years, culminating in a competition to cast blame after the 
2013 floods. But blame has also been directed by local media onto city planners 
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and bureaucrats who were involved in the collaborative process (Sächsische 
Zeitung 2009a, 2009c, 2010). 
 It would be easy and straightforward to state that the city representatives 
in the various municipal and state departments involved in the Laubegast flood 
prevention plans conform to James Scott’s definition of  high modernists. As he 
wrote, “The carriers of  high modernism tended to see rational order in remark-
ably visual aesthetic terms. For them, an efficient, rationally organised city, vil-
lage, or farm was a city that looked regimented and orderly in a geometrical 
sense.” The locals’ perceptions of  these bureaucrats echo Scott, critiquing them 
for pursuing only one solution to the flood problem – a wall – and suggesting 
and in the process that they were still shaped by a particular socialist way of 
thinking (i.e. Mauer im Kopf). Yet the high modernist label would hinge in part 
on the stereotypical notion that government representatives never recognise the 
perspectives of  locals. This is mirrored in David Mosse’s critique of  critical de-
velopment studies, where he claims, “Little wonder that critics such as Fergu-
son apparently spent so little of  their time talking to development workers,” 
(Mosse 2005:6). In my experience, the perspective of  the Dresden city bureau-
crats reveals a different and valuable aspect of  the wall controversy in Lau-
begast: most importantly, that they never had the intention of  building a wall 
like the kind that the locals criticised, which has also been stated in news reports 
(DNN-Online 2014). 
 In June 2016 I was in Dresden to do follow-up interviews. Having done 
almost all of  my research on the floodwall conflict through interviews with lo-
cals, I felt that I had come to view the issue solely from their perspective, and 
needed to incorporate others as well. I arranged to meet with a city official at 
the Umweltamt offices, a square and dim-looking building, reminiscent of  a 
socialist building style. 
 The official welcomed me in a friendly spirit. He began by reiterating what 
I had heard on numerous occasions: that the 2002 floods changed everything. 
It had been almost a hundred years since Dresden had experienced a really bad 
flood, and there were no coordinated teams or units to take care of  flood man-
agement at the Umweltamt, the office charged with long-term environmental 
planning at the municipal level. This changed very quickly after the 2002 floods 
– not only institutionally, but also mentally, according to the official. Because 
of  the shock, floods were now the main issue of  concern for city administration 
and politicians, which meant a really significant change in how the Umweltamt 
was organised. The lack of  organisation prior to the 2002 event also meant that 
many of  the prevention and response plans were inadequate, which led to poor 
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management of  the disaster, official says. A lot of  citizens felt abandoned by 
the government, because they expected them to be there and take care of  things.  
 The official explained the importance of  understanding that Dresden’s re-
lationship to floods is premised on ideas accumulated over centuries. That is 
hard to change. The administration knows this to some extent now after the 
2002 event, but the citizens seldom acknowledge it. That is why, for instance, 
the Umweltamt was not overly concerned by the passage of  years after the 2002 
flood before significant initiatives regarding flood prevention and flood risk 
management were effectuated in Dresden. But there is anger on many sides.  
The official understands people’s frustration; they want to be protected even if  
that does not mean a permanent wall. But it takes considerable human and 
economic resources to plan and implement such projects, no matter what solu-
tion is chosen. The official explained that there is also a gap between the ad-
ministration and the citizens, because citizens are both close to the problems 
and to the effects of  the decisions taken, whereas the administration sees things 
from a different perspective and a different level. He says that communication 
between the city and locals is very important and was not sufficiently prioritised 
in the past. One case where it went wrong, the official explains with a sigh, was 
Laubegast. 
 Laubegast is a special and complicated case, he explains, not least because 
its homes and buildings are so close to the river’s edge, and because of  the Old 
Elbe Arm. There were so many flood protection plans to implement after the 
2002 floods that the Free State of  Saxony decided to pursue the most straight-
forward projects first, and hold off  with those that were more complicated. 
They thus waited with the Laubegast case, with its many opinions and voices. 
When the participatory process finally began, the Stadtrat (city council) allo-
cated funds for the project, meaning it would not financed through the Umwelt-
amt. But the Free State was still the responsible actor, and the relationship be-
tween the state and the city has been a principal source of  problems with respect 
to the wall in Laubegast.  
 Laubegast is a good example of  what can happen when the city admin-
istration and locals do not communicate with each other. A lot of  conspiracy 
theories arose as the conflict escalated, and what was seen as the truth was 
shaped by the locals’ beliefs and fears. For instance, the official explains, the 
idea held by some people in Laubegast that the city wanted to wall them in (‘Die 
Wollen uns Einmauern’) was not true. In fact, the Umweltamt and the city were 
caught between the state of  Saxony and the locals in Laubegast. Because the 
state was responsible (since waterways controlled at the state, federal, and even 
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bilateral and EU levels), the Umweltamt was put in a position where they could 
neither communicate with the locals nor go forward with plans and ideas they 
had, because they were restricted by political and bureaucratic circumstances. 
Nevertheless, locals blamed the Umweltamt. I asked the official why he thought 
this was the case. His explanation was clear: citizens do not differentiate up-
wards. They see all the layers of  government as one and the same.  
 The 2002 floods, the city official explained, led to a feeling of  exception 
(Ausnahme). The flood issue was everywhere you looked, and it was what peo-
ple talked about all the time. In the years after the 2002 event, he remembers, 
around half  of  all administrative resources in the Umweltamt were allocated to 
flood issues. But other issues are also important, the official says, counting them 
off  on his hand: waste, climate change, parks, flora and fauna, and so forth. 
After ten years of  massive investment of  time and energy in the flood issue, 
concerns that other areas were being under-prioritised started to surface. People 
cannot think about floods all the time. Thus, one of  the Umweltamt’s tasks, as 
the official sees it, is to try to move away from this exceptional way of  thinking, 
in order to see floods as related to other issues, and to deal with them accord-
ingly.  
 What this brief  account of  my meeting with the city official indicates, or 
reveals, is that while representatives of  the Dresden government wanted to wel-
come local perspectives on the floodwall question, they were forced to navigate 
a political and bureaucratic mine field between different levels and scales of  
government and legislation. From the government’s perspective, then, the issue 
was also a complex matter that changed over time, which stands as a reminder 
that governments are also made up of  people who seek to position themselves, 
and whose opinions shift over time. 
  
 
Beyond Protection 
 
After several years of  long debates, discussion, and bickering, followed by a 
spirit of  collaboration and many, many hours of  concentration, the floodwall 
issue still lacks resolution. Most recently, the municipal government in Dresden 
announced that it will not build the wall because it would not be a financially 
sound project. This would suggest that the citizens that opposed the wall in the 
first place have won the battle. Still, they do not feel as though they have won a 
victory. They are pleased that plans for a big and disruptive wall – which would 
solve little if  anything, in their opinion – have been cancelled. But the flood 
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problem itself  has not been solved.33 When I asked him what he thinks about 
the future of  flood protection for Laubegast, Ernst Fischer offered the following 
reflection:  
  
Ernst: Through the process, we learned that every building plan or scheme must be eco-
nomically sound (rentabel sein). We made the proposal that a fund of  3-4 million euros 
could be established that would then be there to compensate victims for rebuilding, and 
then new money could be collected for the next flood. That is, money could be stored in 
a serious bank for when we need it, and people of  course would pay a share of  that 
themselves.  
 
A solution such as a fund would perhaps help locals in Laubegast. But at the 
same time, they recognise that the issue is much bigger than Laubegast, and 
that this needs to be taken seriously. As Tobias Renner remarked when I posed 
him the same question regarding the future, the issue is always one of  scale; the 
flood issue is never only a local problem, but is tied to other localities in Dres-
den and beyond: 
 
Kristoffer: Do you know what the plans are for a wall or any other solution now?  
 
Tobias: We don’t know! We are waiting for the city to take up the discussion that we have 
furthered through our input in the process. Whatever we do here at Laubegast will also 
cause changes in other areas here along the Old Elbe Arm and in Dresden. That is of  
course another discussion. But it is all connected. This is important to remember. 
 
The deliberation between possible solutions has been put to a halt, parked 
somewhere in the dialogue between the City of  Dresden and the Free State of  
Saxony that have consistently been unable to resolve the political and adminis-
trative issues concerning management of  the river, a river that has no respect 
for artificially-constructed regional or national borders.  
 The situation in Laubegast and the adjacent areas is now suspended and 
unresolved. There are currently no political, administrative, or community de-
mands for either a wall or any other kind of  structural protection measures in 
or around Laubegast. Plans for lower walls along the Old Elbe Arm are on the 
drawing board, but the plans that locals feared, to build one massive concrete 
                                                 
33 The latest development in the saga of floods in Laubegast is that the city has commissioned 
a scientific study to investigate how to raise Salzburger Strasse, one of the three main roads 
into Laubegast, so that it will not be inundated during floods of the magnitude of those in 
2002 and 2013. This could ensure easier and safer transportation in and out of the central part 
of Laubegast, which was not inundated, but instead turned into an island. 
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or sandstone wall by the banks of  the Elbe itself, have effectively been aban-
doned for the time being. 
 To recall the question I posed at the beginning of  the chapter, what can 
the conflict over the wall in Laubegast tell us about the public life of  floods, and 
about how such events continue to shape, and be shaped by, other social and 
political issues?  As I highlighted earlier, the controversy over the wall in Lau-
begast is as much about the technicalities of  a certain type of  structure (height, 
width, thickness, location, etc.) as it is about the affective, symbolic and aes-
thetic qualities that it generates. As the conflict developed, local protests grad-
ually became focused on the technical aspects, as it became apparent that the 
calculations and measurements surrounding the wall’s effectiveness in contain-
ing water masses from the Elbe were inadequate. Echoing what Sarah What-
more (2013) and colleagues (Lane et al. 2013) have observed in similar flood 
management conflicts in the United Kingdom, the protests initially aimed at 
defying the wall on disruptive aesthetical grounds. Yet they soon turned into 
claims arguing against the technical knowledge on effectiveness of  the wall, 
which prompted a new configuration between the actors to take the controversy 
in to its next phase. Or, as Whatmore puts it:  
 
Only as a knowledge controversy did flooding become a generative event, in which ex-
pert reasoning was forced to ‘slow down’ and a space for reasoning differently opened 
up, involving those affected in new political opportunities and associations. (Whatmore 
2013:45) 
  
 Still, for the citizens of  Laubegast, the floodwall was not merely a ques-
tion of  the technicalities of  flood protection, but a question of  living by and 
with the Elbe, and as such, a fundamental political and moral question (Schnitz-
ler 2013:671) centred on resisting an infrastructure of  containment planned by 
the local government. Just as it would contain and prevent the movement of  
water, the proposed wall would simultaneously affect the aesthetics of  the land-
scape and the local population’s access to the river area as a space they inhabit 
as part of  their environment. The controversy, then, was and is about much 
more than just a wall. It concerns, I would argue, deeper questions of  living in 
proximity to water, with a river that has a will of  its own. 
 It follows that questions regarding flood protection involve struggles over 
what protection itself  means, and whether total protection should be forfeited 
in favour of  a more risk-based approach, whereby some degree of  damage from 
inundation should be accepted. I have often been struck by how intelligently 
people who have endured multiple flood events in the last fifteen years have 
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come to terms with such unusual events by adapting to the circumstances. For 
many in Laubegast, altering one’s life to suit the Elbe River is the price they 
have to pay for living where they do. Although they do want some form of  
protection, it has to be the right kind. And in the face of  no better alternative 
than a disruptive wall, they choose to adapt in the best way they can.  
 People in Dresden often talk about what it means to live with floods and 
with the river itself  as two sides of  the same coin. Hence, living with floods is 
not just that, but living with the Elbe in general.  Although it might appear to 
be a standard kind of  report catch-phrase, the title of  the final document from 
the participatory process, “Leben mit dem Fluss” (Living with the River), was a 
slogan used on blogs and in newspaper articles, and is a kind of  mantra for 
people living by the banks of  the Elbe in Laubegast. But what does it mean to 
live with the river, when it ultimately also means that one has to endure floods 
on a regular basis? This will be the theme of  the sixth chapter. 
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Chapter 6 
 
Where Floods Are Allowed 
 
 
  
In my view, there are only two possibilities: either you protect yourself from the floods, or you live 
with the floods. People in places like Cologne or Passau face the same problem. You have to live 
with it. People living in mountains have other problems with snow or landslides, coastal people 
have their problem with storms and tsunamis. We have floods from the river. That is how it is.  
- Günter Koch, Gohlis, Dresden 
 
During the next flood in 2013, the neighbourhood support was much better because people knew 
each other. You could even say it was kind of a routine.  
- Tobias Renner, Laubegast, Dresden. 
 
Prevention and management, because they require prediction, rely on the future of the past.  
- Franz Mauelshagen (2009:45) 
 
 
 
When I would ask locals in Laubegast what it means to live with the river with-
out a floodwall, the example of the bakery often comes up. Located at the low-
est spot in Laubegast by the banks of the river, the bakery is on the front line 
when floods come, both during major events, as in 2002, 2006 and 2013, and 
in minor ones, as in 2005 and 2011, when most other parts of Dresden are not 
under water. After having been flooded more than perhaps any other building 
in Dresden, the baker decided to move his bread and pastry production from 
the riverside shop to a location a few kilometres away on higher ground. He 
also installed a system of steel plates that can be fitted onto the façade of his 
shop to fend off the water masses to some degree (Sächsische Zeitung 2009). 
This has reduced the costs of inventory damage when floods inundate his shop. 
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Citizens in Laubegast, especially home-owners, who live closest to the Elbe 
have chosen to make such adjustments rather than wait for the authorities to 
come up with a comprehensive solution that does not involve a wall, as Ernst 
Fischer explains: 
  
I am no hydrologist or building engineer. We do not know what to do with the flood 
problem here in Laubegast. So people have to be prepared. We try to organise ourselves. 
We must use our heads and seek out knowledge on how to deal with these things. I have 
also talked to some people in Cologne over the internet to ask for advice on making these 
adjustments to our house.  
 
 Adjusting to floods has been for many a matter of trying to remodel, refit 
or restructure their homes and houses in such a way that they can withstand at 
least minor flood events. Moreover, people also devise various plans for how 
they can continue their everyday lives when the ground floor of their house is 
under water, when their neighbourhood has been isolated from the rest of Dres-
den, or when basic infrastructure utilities such as electricity are cut off. Pictures 
of people in canoes or kayaks are a common illustration of this, as locals use 
alternative means of transportation to get to dry land in order to catch a bus or 
a tram to work. Many have also moved their kitchens above the ground floor, 
thereby greatly minimising the risk of valuable items being damaged or de-
stroyed, and others have temporary solutions ready to ensure continued water 
and power supply to their house. 
 Apart from individual attempts to normalise life during floods, these pe-
riods are also marked by a sense of spectacle and anti-structure, when things 
are momentarily turned upside down, as I discussed in Chapter Four. The 
floods are a topic of public interest, and widespread voyeurism occurs; so-called 
flood tourists (Fluttouristen) are the objects of much anger among locals in fre-
quently-affected areas. While the number of volunteers explodes during flood-
ing periods, the number of people taking pictures and observing the rising water 
is at least as great. In Germany, the word Gaffer is often used to describe a per-
son who does not act, but just looks on passively at an urgent situation. A Gaffer 
is the personification of voyeurism in emergencies and is generally described as 
someone who derives satisfaction from watching public events that may be out-
rageous, painful or spectacular. 
Although people generally express frustration toward flood tourists in 
Dresden, there is also a degree of understanding; “it is simply human nature” 
(“das ist einfach die Natur von Menschen”), as Stefan Schulz told me. Some even 
try to capitalise on people’s hunger for the sensational. During the 2013 floods, 
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Michael Scholz, who owns a local tavern in Laubegast, decided to stop being 
angry at the many cyclists who looked on passively at the floodwaters and the 
locals as they prepared for the water. While he toiled to clear the tavern of fur-
niture before the water came pouring in, Michael brought a keg of draft beer 
out to the street and began to sell pints to the flood tourists, charging nearly 
double his normal price. The beer trade went so well that he ended up beating 
the tavern’s record for a single day’s sales. 
People use flood emergencies as opportunities to make the best of a bad 
situation. It is not uncommon for people to look back and laugh about what 
happened during the floods, seeing it as a period during which strange things 
occur. Humour is an important component of this experience, and as we saw 
in Chapter Four, many think of the floods as periods of both joy and sadness. 
One could argue that humour is a coping mechanism that makes floods beara-
ble for most, and people will in most cases try to adapt to the floods in the best 
way possible, acknowledging that sometimes there is no other choice but to live 
with the hardship that the Elbe inflicts upon them once in a while.  
Some however, face more critical and unnerving questions: Is it possible 
to adapt? Should they move away? What would it mean to move away? Is it 
even possible to move away? 
Its clever solutions to flood protection is not the only reason the bakery in 
Laubegast is considered important by many locals. It is also symbolic of the 
issue of who lives in the local area and who will gain access to the land if people 
decide to move because of the flood risk. As Ernst Fischer puts it: 
 
The baker has all of his bread production somewhere else, but he does not move his shop 
away. It is like us. We stay here. We know each other, and we say hello when we meet 
on an everyday basis. The bakery has been here for 150 years. If he were to sell his shop, 
and the next shop owner sold theirs, then the owners of these shops would be somewhere 
in Frankfurt or in Cologne. In this way, it remains local and personal. People who live 
here generally do not sell. 
 
Ernst’s remark testifies to a more general concern with the fact that capitalist 
interests are seeking to buy up land in areas that face periodic flood threats, 
because such actors have the means and resources to handle flood risks more 
easily than private individuals and small businesses. Concerns over whether 
people will leave areas that have experienced recurring floods is thus not only 
a problem at the individual household and family level, but is also a social con-
cern of communities. In the case of Laubegast, the residents try hard to defend 
their way of life as a town that lives in some kind of harmony with the Elbe and 
retains a sense of ownership over their buildings and public spaces, free from 
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external capital interests. It should be noted that incidences of disaster capital-
ism are rare in the Dresden case compared to the examples given by Naomi 
Klein (2007) and scholars who have observed the phenomenon worldwide 
(Gunewardena and Schuller 2008). But they do exist in various forms, as we 
shall see later on.  
 In this chapter, I will present a set of ethnographic cases that address the 
question of how and why people adapt to future flood risks, while keeping in 
mind the notion that any type of risk involves knowledge premised on “memory 
bumped forward,” as Sheila Jasanoff (2010) puts it. That is, flood risks are 
highly temporally contingent, and are shaped in tandem with the dynamics of 
both individual and collective memories. As I have reiterated several times 
throughout the thesis, the case of Dresden shows how the work of contingent 
events, collective memory and faith in one’s environment are fundamental as-
pects of the kinds of risks that people perceive they are facing and how the fu-
ture is more uncertain than people thought prior to the events. 
 This chapter can be read as a continuation of several themes I introduced 
in the previous one. Floodwalls and dikes are essentially technologies built with 
the aim of protecting a population and the built environment from flood haz-
ards. Yet protection has its costs. As the floodwall controversy in Laubegast 
illustrates, any attempt to be fully protected from floods, means that something 
else must be given up. The very ontological nature of walls is such that certain 
limits on freedom follow from the exclusion of a dangerous object (Brown 
2014). Walling out the river means that you effectively also wall in the popula-
tion you are trying to protect, and this was in part why locals in Laubegast were 
against the wall in the first place. When you give up on the ideal of total pro-
tection, however, other problems surface – namely, that some will face greater 
risks than others.  
 This chapter thus follows the politics of floods from the realm of protec-
tion into that of risk management. The technologies and forms of risk, as Fran-
cois Ewald (1991:198) observed, are essentially interwoven with “the social 
conditions that provide insurance with its market, the market for security.” In-
surance in relation to risk can thus be seen as a particular configuration of not 
only how a society deals with uncertainty and security, but also a political econ-
omy in which risk becomes a principle of governance in all aspects of society, 
or what Michael Power (2004) calls “the risk management of everything.” 
While this chapter is about the different strategies and tactics that Dresdners 
use in their attempts to normalise and routinize life with floods, which can be 
seen as risk mitigation and reduction practices, or in more contemporary terms, 
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as measures of adaptive resilience (Tierney 2014); it is also about the political 
effects of decisions to allow floods to happen, thereby exposing some people to 
greater risks than others. 
  
 
Adaptation as Necessity 
 
Right after the 2013 floods had once again sunk large swaths of Germany under 
water, researchers at the Helmholz Institute for the Environment in Leipzig, 
one of the main centres for research on floods in Germany, published a position 
paper arguing that the event made it apparent that complete protection from 
floods is impossible (Kuhlicke et al. 2013). Instead, the authors argued, sustain-
able flood mitigation and adaptation strategies should rest on four pillars: 1) 
structural flood protection is useful, but cannot provide protection for all; 2) 
providing rivers with more space and rainfall capture is necessary, but must be 
weighed against the dynamics of land-use and population density; 3) Private 
mitigation measures, such as safeguarding one's home, are an important means 
of minimising damages, but such policy appeals should be supported by subsidy 
schemes; and 4) a mandatory flood insurance requirement should be imple-
mented. This position signals a change from advocating one-size-fits-all solu-
tion, i.e. structural protection, to taking a more comprehensive approach to 
flood risks that seeks multiple solutions to the problem and places greater em-
phasis on the distribution of risk between public entities, the insurance industry 
and private citizens. Understanding how individual citizens can adapt to future 
floods based on their past experiences is thus a critical question for govern-
ments, the insurance business and citizens alike. 
 Since 2002, public discourse in Germany around the flood issue has 
slowly tilted towards urging private households to take measures into their own 
hands, city officials in Dresden explained to me. Such private precautionary 
adaptation measures can include the installation of protective water barriers, 
structural changes to the home, or simpler things such as rearranging the place-
ment of furniture (Grothmann and Reusswig 2006:102). Research has shown 
that individual household measures can significantly reduce the economic costs 
of flood damages. In the case of Cologne, another German city that experiences 
floods on a regular basis, it is claimed that private precautionary adaptation 
accounted for half of the drop in monetary losses between two similar floods in 
1993 and 1995 (Fink et al. 1996:38).  
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 In a study with greater geographical proximity to our concerns, Kreibich 
et al. (2011) analysed the flood preparedness of households and businesses after 
the 2002 and 2006 floods in the Elbe catchment area. Their data showed that 
before the 2002 event, 30 percent of households and 54 percent of businesses 
reported that they had taken no precautionary measures, and that only 26 per-
cent of households had the appropriate knowledge of how to respond to floods. 
These numbers were quite different after the 2006 event, which was not only 
far less severe in terms of flood levels, but also less surprising. Following this 
event, only 10 percent of households and 26 percent of business reported being 
unprepared.  This decrease in general unpreparedness seems rather common-
sense: when you have experienced an event in the recent past, you will be more 
aware and thus better prepared for a similar event.  
 The numbers for Dresden show an even starker contrast. In a study that 
surveyed households in Dresden after a series of floods in 2002 (major), 2005 
and 2006 (minor and medium), Kreibich and Thieken (2009) concluded that 
just 13 percent of households had undertaken precautionary measures before 
the 2002 floods. However, the number of households with some degree of pre-
paredness rose to 67 percent before the 2006 event. The message of the study is 
that it is important to “keep preparedness at a high level even without recurrent 
flood experiences.” This is supported by my ethnographic data, in which people 
articulated concern about not being able to sustain the kind of knowledge re-
quired to prepare for floods.  
 The purpose of scholarly literature like the studies mentioned above is to 
provide knowledge that can lead to a better understanding of how to promote, 
stimulate and motivate individual citizens and households to take precaution-
ary adaptive measures. This kind of research relies on socio-economic varia-
bles, perceptual models, and explanatory psychological theories that seek to ac-
count for why some people take more precautions than others. These insights 
are valuable in so far as they can provide an overall estimate of the tendency of 
people to learn from previous disaster events. However, as is often the case with 
research that relies heavily on statistical, quantitative methodologies and large 
streamlined data-sets, nuanced accounts of the complexity of people’s situa-
tions and the intermingling of reasons for why some people move away, why 
some people stay, why some remake or remodel their homes, and why others 
do little at all to secure against future events, are often precluded by the need 
for clear conclusions that can inform policy and be compared to other disaster 
contexts.  
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 Moreover, such studies tend to focus on households, families or individ-
uals as if they exist in a social vacuum and are not a part of the communities 
and larger society around them. Finally, studies that reduce people's consider-
ations about securing and adapting their houses to floods according to prede-
termined notions of what the outcome of adaptation ought to be assume that 
the memory (and therefore the know-how) of how to deal with floods is static. 
It assumes a linear learning-curve, whereby things progress for the better with 
more and more events.  
 Yet memories of extreme events, however much they stand out from the 
ordinary, are dynamic and do not always follow easily discernible trajectories 
because they do not exist in a political or cultural vacuum (Simpson 2013; 
Ullberg 2013). Disaster preparedness is intrinsically tied to memory, and 
memory by its very nature fades away over time despite public and private at-
tempts to sustain it, as is the case in Dresden and many other places. Yet in 
other cases, there are active attempts to repress such memories, as Simpson 
(2013) has demonstrated in Gujarat, India. The paradox of this is that in order 
to achieve a complete and total level of preparedness (itself a pipe dream), a 
population needs to be exposed to the damaging events on a continuous basis 
in order for individual and collective memory to remain constantly updated.  
 In the rest of this chapter, I will present three cases of individuals and 
families in Dresden who experienced the three flood events, discussing how 
they have struggled to rebuild and repair their homes; the different ways they 
experienced the flood emergencies; and their views of the future. I present these 
cases in order to show the complexity of how people are trying to adjust their 
lives to the perceived fact of recurring floods by paying attention to how they 
see this adaptation and adjustment as not necessarily having an end goal other 
than for things to return to normal as quickly as possible after their houses are 
flooded. I also aim to show how even the question of whether to move from or 
stay in a flood prone area is never a decision that families or individuals take in 
isolation, but in dialogue with the presence of floods as a matter of public con-
cern in Dresden. Indeed, as I have aimed to show throughout this thesis, adap-
tation or normalisation of extraordinary events is never merely a private matter, 
but also a social and public one. 
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Figure 33. Cleaning up after the floods in 2002 along the banks of the Elbe in Laubegast. 
Photo used with permission. 
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How to Flood Proof Your Home 
 
Let me start by returning to Ernst Fischer. In this excerpt from a conversation 
I had with him as we walked by the banks of the Elbe, he explained to me how 
they learned how to deal with floods: 
 
Ernst: 2002 was of course the biggest event. The entire property was flooded up to the 
ceiling of the ground floor. And we had no experience with that. My father had experi-
enced the last big flood in 1941, and he had always said to me, “When a new flood 
comes, you have to clear out everything from the ground floor.” But still, this was a new 
situation for us, and I guess we had forgotten that major floods could happen. So many 
years had passed where nothing had happened. We had some small incidents where the 
small stream that leads into the Elbe flooded parts of the streets, but nothing serious. 
And when you live by a river, you do not even talk about having water in the basement. 
That is normal. When people say, “Oh, we also had water in our basement,” you have 
to say that’s not really significant when you live here. But these floods were bad, partic-
ularly because we did not know what would happen when the water had gone away 
again. We thought, “a bit of cleaning, and things would be back to normal.” 
 
Kristoffer: So how bad was it? 
 
Ernst: Well, as I said, we had moved a lot of things, but we never thought the water could 
reach the height it did. We had to rebuild a lot of things. The help we got in the beginning 
was fantastic, and donations and support came from all over the world. Even from Den-
mark [Ernst points to me and laughs]. People we knew came and helped. But the worst 
part was the way the restoration and repairs were handled by the authorities. The Free 
State of Saxony has this Saxonian Construction Bank (Sächsische Aufbaubank, SAB). This 
is not an independent bank, but a government bank (Vervaltungsbank). It operates 
through policies and mandates (Durchführungsbestemmungen), not like a private bank, but 
through public policy mandates. We had a bad experience with them. Everything was 
ordered from the desk (aus Schreibtisch). But we figured out through a long process how 
we could get compensation from the SAB, and we eventually began to rebuild step by 
step. But we were not even finished before it came again in 2006, and then once again 
in 2013. 
 
Kristoffer: But that was not as high as in 2002? 
 
Ernst: Not as high. In 2013, it was about half a metre lower than in 2002 here at our 
house. And after the 2002 floods, we tried to optimise certain things. All technical in-
stallations, like heating, are placed under the roof now. Electricity and power circuits 
are also on the top floor – before, they were on the ground floor. We had not thought 
that it would ever be an issue. We improved many things. Here beside the house, there 
is a small shack, which was unused in communist times, and it had only a small flat roof, 
which was torn down. Now we have rebuilt it with an attic that can be used to store 
things when a new flood comes. We were not completely finished with that in 2013. The 
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stairs to the storage room were missing. But it proved its worth nonetheless. We did not 
use any sandbags in 2013. None. All the doors and windows were taken off their hinges 
and moved upstairs so they could stay dry. 
 
Kristoffer: So sandbags make no difference? 
 
Ernst: No difference. It is wishful thinking. It’s for people to say that we did something, 
that we tried to do something at least. But it does not really make a difference. The water 
runs through them. 
 
Kristoffer: Do you find that people living in other buildings here in Laubegast have made 
the same changes that you have? 
 
Ernst: Changes yes, but they are different from case to case. In some places they had 
mixed success in 2013, because everyone tried to do what they could for their own prop-
erty. Some of our neighbours are overwhelmed by the financial costs of the floods, so 
they could not rebuild properly. And rumours began to spread, like, “These people made 
these changes,” and so on. But the properties are so different, and everyone must try to 
find solutions that fit their particular case. And this is where the help from the city and 
the state failed. They never came and said, “We are responsible for the SAB at the end 
of the day, so we recommend that you do this and this to secure your houses.” That 
never happened. 
 
This leads us to the question of insurance, which was to me always a very tricky 
subject, because it is never altogether clear or transparent whether or how peo-
ple were able to get insurance policies. In a few cases, people said that they 
would rather not talk about the insurance, or they instructed me to keep their 
insurance business confidential. But not Ernst: 
 
Ernst: We were insured here during the 2013 floods, but only up to the present value. So 
that does not cover new buildings or add-ons to existing buildings. The insurance distin-
guishes between new value and present value (Neuwert und Zeitwert). After the 2013 
floods, the insurance company decided that we had to abandon our insurance policy 
altogether. In Germany we have this rule that for new flood insurance policies, you have 
to report whether you have had flood damage in your house in the last 10 years. We had 
to disclose that we had had flood damages, and so we did not get any insurance. We 
heard someone say in the media that shortly after the floods in 2013 there was a political 
move to construct a new type of citizen flood insurance where the insurance companies 
would be brought to the table. But we have not heard anything since then. Right now, 
there is not any interest in disasters and floods from politicians. When the floods come 
back, the interest will probably be there again. And so it can start all over. I guess it is 
like that in Denmark as well? 
 
Kristoffer: Of course, although we do not have that much river flooding. Mostly storm 
surges. It is noticeable, that at the EU level, there is a discussion of whether all citizens 
 
 
193 
should be insured against floods. But in many places, that is not even an option, because 
the insurance policies are designed in a particular way. Isn’t that so? 
 
Ernst: Yes, and it is like that here in Germany. So why should all citizens have flood 
insurance, for instance, if they live on a high floor in Berlin? Why should they be insured? 
And that’s why those who really need flood insurance ought to be insured through a 
fund (Stiftung). Right now, you have to apply for reconstruction and rebuilding funds 
from the SAB, and that is like a fund where money is stored for when the next flood 
comes. But it is not a fund that focuses on the needs of citizens. 
 
In the next two ethnographic cases, the issues that Ernst mentions will be am-
plified in ways that make the question of living in a flood-prone area about 
more than merely applying technical fixes to one’s home. 
 
 
A Double Emergency 
 
The Krüger family lives in Meusslitz, at the far eastern end of the Dresden city 
boundary. The father, Andreas, works as an office clerk (Bürokaufmann), while 
the mother, Petra, works in child care (Kinderbetreuerin). They have lived in 
their house since 2001, and have two children between the ages of 10 and 15. 
They live near the Winkler family that I mentioned in Chapter Four. The two 
families know one another, although they are not close friends. In Chapter 
Four, we also met Erika Werner, who recommended that I talk to the Krügers. 
As I mentioned, Erika was an active organiser of the flood recovery activities 
after both the 2002 and 2013 floods. She had a keen sense of who in the area 
would talk to me. Erika informed me that people might not consider it polite of 
me to just walk up to their front door, knock, and ask of they would like to talk. 
It was better to go through people they know who could vouch for me. When I 
asked her why she recommended the Krüger family, she said, “You will know 
when you talk to them.” 
 As I knock on their door on a very warm summer day in July 2015, An-
dreas invites me in and leads me into their comfortable shady garden, complete 
with a garage, tool shed, and a trampoline for the kids. The garden is big, the 
house has three stories, and just behind the hedge that goes around the entire 
plot, you can catch a glimpse of the Old Elbe Arm, which is essentially a long 
strip of idle land. This was where the water that flooded their house in 2002 
and in 2013 came from.  
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 Both Andreas and Petra grew up in Dresden. Her family is from 
Meusslitz, while he comes from Klotzsche in the north, where the Dresden air-
port is located. They had always wanted to live in an old house, but they did 
not necessarily want a big plot of land. They searched for a house that suited 
them for about four years. When they bought the house they live in now in 
2001, it was a complete ruin, and they needed to do a whole lot of work to get 
it into shape. Growing up, Andreas’ father taught him how to use tools, and he 
became quite handy, so they took it upon themselves to restore the house and 
turn it into their dream home. With the help of friends, they spent a whole year 
restoring it, clearing it of asbestos, and taking care of other wear and tear that 
it had endured over the years. “We probably would not have bought the house 
if we had known just how bad a shape it was in,” Andreas reflects. They have 
been careful to keep the old parts of the house when they could, such as the 
original doors. They wanted the feeling of an old authentic Saxon house. Each 
time they have rebuilt after floods, they have tried to maintain this authentic 
feeling with mostly wooden building materials, but of course they have had to 
use more modern solutions in order to appease the insurance company and to 
protect their house more effectively against floods. In part because they have 
spent so much energy trying to design the house according to their visions of a 
good life, Andreas tells me, they really do not want to move away. 
 Like many of the other people I talked to in flood prone areas, Andreas 
and Petra bought their house just before the 2002 floods. Since there had not 
been a flood for many years, they thought it would be fine. “We did not really 
think about it,” Petra says, and explains their story from the beginning: 
 
Petra: We bought the house in 2001. Then the first flood came in 2002, and we did not 
know what would happen. We had no idea how high the water could get. No one had 
told us. There was nothing in the media about what to expect. We probably did not even 
know whether there would be floods here. A neighbour remembered a flood back in 
1941. So we thought, “No worries!” But then the water came. We took what we could, 
but we were not quite finished building the house at the time. We tried to protect it with 
sandbags. Everyone in the area did that. Everyone. Today we know that you cannot 
stack sandbags particularly high, so it really does not make that much of a difference, 
but back then we did it. The water level was above the ground floor of the house, almost 
to the first floor. Everything in the garden floated around. We had a beautiful floating 
terrace [laughs]. The chairs, table, and other things, floating around at the same level as 
the garden wall. It was fun to watch how the furniture could not get out, because the 
current forced it back into our plot whenever it seemed like it was swimming out into 
what used to be the street in front of the house. The water was so powerful. 
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 Their personal story of the flood emergency in 2002 is one of the more 
dramatic, and even became a national news story. Just before the Elbe rose and 
flooded their area of Dresden, Petra, pregnant with their first child, went into 
labour many weeks ahead of schedule. As a result of her early delivery, their 
newborn baby daughter had to be kept under observation at the university hos-
pital. But as the flood waters flowed into central Dresden, the hospital was 
evacuated, and all the premature infants were dramatically rushed to a hospital 
in Berlin. 
 In Berlin, the national media interest in the evacuated babies was intense, 
and Petra remembers how one of the doctors breathed a sigh of relief when 
Andreas and Petra volunteered to do an interview, so that the hospital staff 
would not be disturbed by the cameras and recorders that had converged on the 
hospital. After appearing in the media, they received an incredible amount of 
support and donations from the people of Berlin, and they made friends that 
they are still in close contact with to this day. An elderly couple who wanted to 
help approached Andreas and Petra and gave them a new washing machine 
out of the blue. Members of a local band in Berlin even “adopted” their prem-
ature daughter as substitute uncles, and arranged a benefit concert for Andreas 
and Petra. The money they raised was their main source of funding for the res-
toration and repair of their house after the 2002 floods.  
 Although people in Berlin showed them immense support, it was also a 
hard time for the couple: “You did not really know what to do with yourself,” 
Petra reflected. They had no idea what awaited them at home while they were 
with their daughter at the hospital in Berlin. When Andreas got the message 
that the water levels were beginning to recede, he left the hospital and went 
back to Dresden. But misfortunes rarely come alone, and in the meantime their 
car had broken down. Luckily, he was able to get a replacement car from the 
auto repair shop. When he returned to Dresden in a car with Berlin license 
plates, the neighbours thought he was a flood tourist. When he finally got back 
to the house, the water was already almost gone. But the worst thing about river 
floods is not the water itself, but what it leaves behind: 
 
Andreas: The worst thing about cleaning up, and repairing damages after the 2002 floods, 
was the dried mud and sludge (Schlamm). The sludge coated the house in a very thick 
layer, and it had even sealed the door so completely that we could not get inside. The 
water was gone, but the sludge remained. The house is old, and we had not quite finished 
the restoration work, so we spent the whole time during that first phase trying to get it 
clean once again after having bought it just one year earlier.  
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In the aftermath of the floods, while it was summer, they set up a kitchen 
and bathroom in the garden and slept upstairs on the first and second floors, 
which had not been as severely affected, while the process of drying the walls 
was underway. But as autumn and winter approached, they had to rent a house 
through some friends of theirs. They took whatever furniture they could along 
with whatever they needed to live a decent temporary life. They used foldout 
beds and camping equipment, and in the meantime, Petra had become pregnant 
with their second child. 
 When the 2006 floods came, they were on vacation and had to go home 
to remove their belongings from the ground floor. While on holiday, they had 
seen that friends and neighbours had tried to contact them and wanted to help 
them, so they had to go home. 
 But this time, they had more luck. When the water rose, it only reached 
the perimeter of their plot. But they still had trouble from the groundwater, 
which came later, after the water from the Elbe, and left a couple of centimetres 
of water on the ground floor. The family had to remove all their belongings 
from the living room and the kitchen once again. 
 
Andreas: In 2006, it was close and we thought it was another 100-year flood. But it did 
not turn out to be so bad after all. And in 2013, when all the rain and water started, I 
initially thought it would turn out like in 2006, but Petra saw it differently…I don’t 
know…I am the optimist and she is the pessimist. 
 
Petra: I am realist! (laughs) On Saturday, [June 1, 2013] we celebrated our son's birthday 
and it had been raining all the time, the whole week. And throughout the birthday, I had 
said that there would be floods, and everyone laughed at me. On Sunday, I said that we 
had to do something. On Monday, my son said that we should look at the news and see 
if there were any updates about the floods. And so we saw a message that said that the 
Elbe was expected to crest at 9 metres in Dresden. I called Andreas and we began to 
remove things from the house, but no one helped because everyone was at work at that 
time. But help soon came, just as it had before. 
 
Echoing what I described in Chapter Four, the 2002 flood had a major 
impact on the unity of their community. As newcomers to the area, the unity 
that they experienced during that event helped integrate them into the local 
community: 
 
Petra: There was only one kitchen in use in one of the houses in the neighbourhood, and 
we all went over there in the period after the floods as we cleaned up. There is no shop 
nearby. No bakery, for example. So every day, a car from a bakery in Plauen delivered  
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Figure 34. Locals in Laubegast sailing in the streets during the 2013 floods. Photo used with 
permission. 
 
 
Figure 35. Another local sailing in the streets during the 2013 floods. Photo used with permis-
sion. 
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bread to us. Free bread! Some of the people in the local community had some kind of 
contact with someone who knew the baker.  
 
I asked them whether they perceived the floods as a special time. 
 
Petra: It sounds silly, but on the one hand it was a wonderful time because everyone 
helped each other, and on the other hand, you are older, you have to start building up 
again for the third time and this time we had two children who also had to take care of 
their school and their life in general. 
 
 Andreas and Petra have no objection to living with family or friends when 
the first floor of their house is underwater, including during the extensive period 
after the floods when restoration and repair work is ongoing. But some of their 
neighbours are more stubborn and refuse to leave their homes, using small 
boats and auxiliary power generators to enable everyday life to continue despite 
the water masses. Some neighbours even fished from their balconies and ter-
races for food. This is something that Andreas and Petra laugh about now, of 
course, as it was not really a matter of survival, but about showing a kind of 
spirit of refusal to let the floods disrupt the neighbours’ ability to stay where 
they were. 
 
 
Until the Next One Comes 
 
People who live in areas that have experienced more than one flood event ex-
plained to me that it has taken more than one flood event for them to ascertain 
exactly what needs to be done to prepare for the many blows to one's home and 
one’s psyche: “One learns to make one’s house ready and stay updated through 
the media,” as Andreas phrased it. Andreas and Petra have obtained a great 
deal of knowledge in dealing with floods over the years, including how to be 
flexible, prepared, and not least, to have foresight about when and how fast the 
water rises:  
 
Andreas: We now estimate that it takes about 10 hours from the first official warning 
before the water starts to enter our house. We know exactly how much time we have 
when the water is at a certain level at the measuring station in Dresden. In 2013, this 
prediction fit pretty well. 
 
 Yet, even though they know what awaits them, they still feel troubled and 
insecure when there is a flood warning: 
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Andreas: In 2002, we had no idea what awaited us. And now here in 2013, we knew what 
was coming –and even though we knew that we had to wait, it was still stressful. 
 
They had no flood insurance in 2002, but they received many private do-
nations to help rebuild, and they also invested their own savings. Still, much of 
the financial support came from the SAB. In 2002, they did not know how 
much damage the house had sustained or what needed to be repaired. The SAB 
sent an appraiser that was also an architect, who helped them make plans for 
how to repair the damage to the house. At that time, the old 18th century house 
was categorised as a heritage site, which added to the complexity of the process. 
It was not clear to them how everything was decided upon, but over the next 
thirteen months, they repaired as much as they could with the help of the ar-
chitect from the SAB so that they would not have to do anything more for sev-
eral decades.  
I will not go into the more technical details about insurance here. What 
is interesting in this context, rather, is what Andreas and Petra think about their 
future: do they want to, or will they be forced to, move?  
 
Andreas: Petra has considered it, but it is not realistic. No one will buy the house. They 
know that the house has been completely under water at least twice, and almost a third 
time in 2006. We also have a mortgage to pay to the bank, and every time we consider 
moving, we feel this double burden hinders our plans. It is also very beautiful here and 
we do not really want to move. Maybe after the next flood. But selling the house right 
now makes little sense, because we cannot get enough for it to buy something that suits 
our needs. And I must be honest, I will not spend the rest of my life in a home where I 
am unhappy. When the next flood comes, maybe things will be different. 
 
Petra: One can only hope that it won’t come anytime soon. 
 
As is the case for many of the people in living in flood-prone areas in Dresden, 
the Krügers settled down here around the time when they were having their 
first child because it is both far from the noise and the pollution of the city, but 
still in proximity to the public infrastructure system of buses and trams. Andreas 
tells me as Petra slips into the house to fetch a couple of beers for the three us 
for while we sit on their garden terrace that they have talked about moving on 
several occasions, especially after the 2013 flood. But it was mostly Petra that 
wanted to move, and he that wants to stay. That is, he corrects himself, if an-
other major flood comes in the next few years, he might reconsider whether to 
move. But for the time being, he likes living here. There is easy transport to the 
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city centre, many green spaces, and a close-knit community feeling, both in 
relation to their surrounding neighbours and to the community association, 
which Erika and her husband help organise. Finally, as Petra says after having 
rejoined us, this part of Dresden is one of the safest.  
But what about structural flood protection? I mention the issue of flood-
walls. The city decided in 2005 that this part of Dresden is officially classified 
as a flood inundation zone, and there are no plans for protection. For Andreas 
and Petra, this means they have been left behind by the city: 
 
Petra: So, they let us consciously be flooded with water because then they can save other 
areas of the city. 
 
Andreas: We have heard that the city is considering building some of the major roads in 
this part of Dresden higher, which would make it easier to get to and from these areas 
that become islands when there is flooding. The city is also considering different bridge 
configurations, so the water can flow easily away and does not get pushed back to us. 
 
According to Jörg Lämmerhirt, district leader in Leuben, ideas and plans like 
these are the city’s best options to alleviate some of the flood impacts on the 
areas where people like the Krüger family live in the short and medium terms. 
The district of Leuben is responsible for local flood adaptation plans, including 
in places like Meusslitz and Laubegast; more precisely, it acts as a mediating 
political level between the citizens, the Dresden city government, the admin-
istration of the Free State of Saxony, and the various agencies under the state 
such as the Talsperrenvervaltung, the body that oversees dams and dikes in Sax-
ony. As we also saw in the previous chapter, many different interests compete 
against one another and among various political levels in questions of politics 
and governance connected to flood protection and water management.  
On the one hand, Andreas and Petra think it’s understandable that the 
city does not intend to safeguard them from floods. There are only a few houses 
here, and not many stores or significant industry. But on the other hand, says 
Petra, their very existence is at stake. Andreas is more analytical, asking rhetor-
ically if the city decided to protect this area against floods, how much would 
the water level rise in the rest of the city? “Maybe you cannot even measure it 
in centimetres. If that is the case, the only logical course is to build some form 
of protection here.” The question, of course, adds Andreas, echoing the debate 
in Laubegast, is that some of the locals will have to decide whether they would 
prefer to lose the beautiful view from their ground floor or be protected from 
flooding. Petra jumps in and adds, “The people who decide these things on the 
city council or the Saxony parliament do not live here themselves, and they 
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probably have never experienced any flooding. They have probably never been 
affected by water masses themselves.” 
 
 
Perpetual Repairs 
 
On the opposite end of the Dresden municipality, Cossebaude and Gohlis are 
like Meusslitz: areas that are partly used as retention spaces for flood manage-
ment.  
 Dieter Schneider opened his garden gate for me, leading out to the street. 
On the opposite side lay vast fields of barley. “Look!” Dieter exclaimed as he 
threw his arms wide, trying to grasp the wideness of the dark blue evening sky 
with the setting sun in the background. “Who wouldn’t want this? You have 
everything. The fields, the sunshine, the calmness, the trees, the fresh air, and 
the river not far away. But just remember, if you can't see the Elbe, then you're 
fine. Most of the time.” 
 Dieter lives with his wife Helma and their two children on a street that 
connects Cossebaude and Gohlis, on the western end of the Dresden munici-
pality. There are a number of similar houses in this small settlement, with 
mostly middle class families that moved out of the Dresden city area to raise 
children and have space and calm to pursue a comfortable life. All the houses 
were built between 2000 and 2001. Dieter and Helma are both from the Jo-
hannstadt, a neighbourhood close to the city centre. They moved to 
Cossebaude in 2000, because they had friends that lived in the area and that 
they wanted to live closer to.  
When I visited them, they offered me coffee in their backyard, which was 
meticulously well-kept with beds, shrubberies, water pools for fish and a finely 
carved-out terrace. As I complimented the garden, Dieter uttered a long sigh 
and explained how they have had to repair and rebuild parts of their house over 
and over again. For them, it seems like their life has been nothing but repair 
work since the time they moved here. 
 Their story of the 2002 emergency is strikingly similar to the Krüger fam-
ily’s, although they did not have to be relocated to a hospital in Berlin or any-
thing like that. But it was nonetheless quite tedious. Compared to the Krügers, 
however, they have experienced more frustration during the reconstruction 
phases. Interestingly, although the 2002 floods were a greater shock than those 
of 2013, the latter event caused a great deal more trouble. In 2002, they man-
aged the best they could: 
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Helma: My parents were on vacation, and we lived there for three weeks, and then we 
found a place to live. Our son had just been born, he was only 3 months old. And then 
we got a home with kitchen, and another one just beside it with a couple of rooms for 
sleeping. And for the two months it lasted, we camped out there. We got a couple of 
pieces of furniture from our damaged house. It was hard. Really hard, with two small 
children, the small one was three months and the old one was five years. The child care 
centre was also flooded, so we had to look after them. I was home, at that time I did not 
work. I had to constantly bring the baby to my parents’, go to the house to clean up, and 
then go breastfeed, and then go back again to clean the house. It was a very stressful 
period. 
 
As with the Krüger family, not long after Dieter and Helma bought the plot and 
built the house, it was designated a flood inundation zone by a 2000 city council  
decision. That means that the city allows a certain amount of inundation in that 
area, using the land as a retention space.  
 
Dieter: In the contract and in the law, it says that we had to build in distinct ways, higher 
than normal.  We have the highest house in the area, and we built on a concrete foun-
dation. We were among the first, a lot of the other houses in the area were built after us. 
 
They bought the plot of land, and then the building plans needed to be revised 
according to flood risk rules. But by then, they had already invested in the 
house. As Dieter explained to me, this is crucial for the insurance policies they 
have held and to the kind of compensation they are entitled to when their house 
is flooded. In 2002, they had flood insurance with Allianz; the insurance com-
pany had taken over their policy from a GDR public flood insurance scheme 
that many people in flood-prone areas across the former East Germany have 
had or still have. Although most of the damages that people sustained to their 
houses and belongings are fairly manageable compared to other disaster con-
texts, the costs sometimes took me by surprise: 
 
Dieter: The damage was around 100,000 euros in total. The most costly damages were 
to the walls, piping, electricity, and other basic services that a house needs to function. 
But everything was very well organised on the part of the insurance company. At that 
time, very few people here were insured; we were among the only ones. The insurance 
compensation came very quickly, it functioned very effectively, and they sent an con-
tractor to help us who was very effective. 
 
Helga: The floor tiles were like sheets of ice. You could just break off pieces of them. 
Then fungus started to form, and we had to prevent that somehow.  
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Kristoffer: And that was covered by the insurance? 
 
Dieter: Yes, apart from the 5,000 euro deductible that we had to pay ourselves. The pro-
cess lasted from August to November, and then it was over. In comparison with 2013, 
it was a very quick process.  
 
Kristoffer: Did you think after the 2002 floods that you would move? 
 
Helga: No, not at that time. We didn’t think it would come again so quickly, and never 
that it would be as high as it was in 2002. It was a hundred-year flood. So you thought 
that was it for the next hundred years…. 
 
Dieter and Helga were spared flooding during the minor 2006 event. But not 
long after came the 2013 floods. The aftermath of this event turned out to be 
more complicated for the Schneiders, as will be evident from the following di-
alogue: 
 
Kristoffer: How was 2013 different from 2002? 
 
Petra: It was even tougher. 
 
Dieter: You of course know what kind of work lies ahead of you, and what kind of sorrow 
and regret of not having prepared yourself even better. Our parents, who had helped out 
with taking care of the children in 2002, were now much older, but they helped as best 
as they could. 
 
Helga: Everything was brought upstairs and we did all we could to document everything 
with reports and photos. 
 
Dieter: What happened then was horrible. Before the 2013 floods, we had moved our 
insurance policy from Allianz to a company called Münchener. They sent a flood dam-
age expert and an insurance representative, and we signed the contract. And we agreed 
on what was going to happen with the repairs. But then it developed in a bizarre manner. 
A water sanitation company came with a group of cheap foreign workers. These workers 
caused more damage than repairs because they were not skilled enough to know what 
ought to be removed and what should not, and what had been affected by the water. 
They could have left the heating pipes and the power cables, but they decided to move 
them as well. Our preparation work had made sure that they were not affected. They 
removed the wallpaper from the ceiling, although there was no water there. They had 
not brought a crew toilet, and the first thing they did was to dismantle the toilet on the 
ground floor, which created all sorts of problems. 
 
Helga: Those were poor people… 
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Dieter: Yes… but they did a poor job, and the insurance company also had quarrels with 
the sanitation company that had hired the workers. The company estimated that they 
would have to spend 20,000 euros to dry the interior walls. And that is not normal. That 
is much too expensive. And then it continued. Many, many emails with photos and all 
the information we could possibly send, these tiles, this piece of furniture, and so on. 
They just did the same thing for all the houses in the area, although there are big differ-
ences between the houses in terms of building materials. 
 
Helga: It was bad. It lasted forever. The companies did not need the floods back in 2002. 
In 2013, the economy was riper for companies to do work on houses after the floods. In 
2013, they needed the contracts because suddenly there was an industry around it, so 
they tried to do it as cheaply as possible. 
 
Kristoffer: So the process in 2013 was much more problematic. To me, that seems odd.  
 
Dieter: But it makes sense for the companies that did the reconstruction. 
 
Kristoffer; But the 2002 was such a big surprise, and 2013 was not… 
 
Helga: Yes, but after 2002, the companies developed strategies to make a profit from 
floods…  
 
Dieter: The 2002 floods were not bad in terms of damage costs. The 2013 were worse. 
Much worse. Even after we came back six months later, there were still a whole lot of 
things to do. 
 
Helga: An incredible amount of work. The garden we did in the spring, it was completely 
trodden down because of the workers. The cellar window was used to throw things out, 
and everything went in and out of the house through the garden door. 
 
 As is clear from the cases of the Schneider family and the Krüger family 
above, one of the questions I asked most often was whether people had consid-
ered moving away. There are no official statistics that can shed definitive light 
on this question in any comprehensive manner. Official demographic statistics 
on the different districts of Dresden show no clear indicators of this (Landes-
hauptstadt Dresden 2016). Any attempt to conclude that people have moved 
for one reason or the other makes this question complex to answer in a quanti-
fiable way. In Gohlis, I was told that four to five families moved after the 2002 
floods, a very small proportion of the total population given that the entire vil-
lage was flooded. Locals even told me that there was a building boom after 
2002, because land and house prices fell. The floods thus not only made people 
leave, but also attracted newcomers. And, just as companies sought to profit 
from flood damages, so too did the falling home prices seem attractive to some. 
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Peripheries 
 
As is evident from the three cases I have described above, some areas of  Dres-
den are defined as areas where floods are allowed. That some areas are allowed 
to be flooded is not only due to a lack of  solutions or funds, it is sometimes also 
an integral and necessary part of  flood management. In this case, its purpose is 
to keep other parts of  Dresden that are of  higher value dry. A kind of  centre-
periphery problem thus occurs when most of  the flood protection and manage-
ment investments are made in the Altstadt, where few inhabited buildings are 
at risk, but where buildings of  great symbolic value and significance to the city 
are concentrated. It should be noted at this point that private companies and 
stores are also expected to bear the costs of  flood protection for their property, 
which is the case for instance for the Kongresszentrum, a convention centre in the 
Altstadt bordering the Elbe. 
Even if one looks only at the Dresden municipal area, the river catchment 
environment is continuous and connected, meaning that changes in one area 
affect how water behaves in another. Protecting one area thus means poten-
tially greater risk to others. This raises a number of difficult questions for the 
ethics of flood management, something scholars and policy makers discuss on 
a regular basis. Thaler and Hartmann, for instance, suggest that decisions to 
protect some areas while others are exposed raise basic questions of justice: 
 
What justifies the protection of a particular piece of land? Whose land should be pro-
tected? Should flood risk management protect the upstream and sacrifice the down-
stream, or vice versa? Who—or rather what—should be protected best? (Thaler and 
Hartmann 2016:129) 
 
 These questions and issues are not new in the context of  Dresden. In his 
attempt to understand how the Saxon state learned how to deal with floods in 
the 18th and 19th centuries, Poliwoda asks, “How does political power react, 
when society is repeatedly affected by natural disasters?” (Poliwoda 2007:170). 
In the period between the late 18th and the middle of the 19th century, as Poli-
woda shows, Dresden experienced frequent floods, both minor and more se-
vere. But with the recurrence of these events in the span of just a few decades, 
policies and plans for response, reconstruction, and in particular, preventive 
measures were altered and changed, whereby the state delegated some of the 
responsibility and costs of flood protection and management to members of the 
public: 
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The state was responsible for providing finance for the maintenance of dams and dikes 
on the navigable rivers. Increased spending was necessary here after 1784 and thus the 
state attempted to relieve itself of this responsibility in some districts. In 1781 a law 
was drafted which would include new maintenance obligations for the river controls. 
In 1787, 1793 and 1799 the state parliament demonstrated that the ruling elector and 
the finance committee had in principle agreed on the spirit of the new decree: the rising 
costs for the maintenance and construction of river controls should from now on be 
borne by those who would gain from the direct use of them. The privileged classes and 
in particular neighbours of the Elbe would be required to make greater contributions 
in the future. (Poliwoda 2007:178) 
 
During this period, the government’s position on flood prevention became one 
that required those with direct interests in the structural defences, or river con-
trols, and those living close to the Elbe, thus being in higher risk zones, to bear 
a larger proportion of the financial responsibility. 
Today, I would argue, the changing discourse that requires individual 
households to take greater charge of  their own flood protection and adaptation 
mirrors the change that Poliwoda identified in earlier centuries. It underlines 
the problem that if  complete and total flood protection in all areas of  a city like 
Dresden is impossible, then it is up to those living in flood risk zones to with-
stand future inundation by bearing more of  the financial burden themselves. 
The Free State of  Saxony tries to help and to compensate flood-affected citizens 
through the SAB, but as we have seen, the process of  receiving this financial aid 
is complicated and lengthy. Moreover, for property owners to receive full com-
pensation, they must carry private insurance as well, but for many, it is becom-
ing increasingly hard to keep these insurance policies. As the case of  the Krüger 
family shows, it is not necessarily possible for people to move because of  falling 
house prices; and in the case of  the Schneider family, we observe that things do 
not necessarily get handled more efficiently the second or third time around.  
 During my many interviews and conversations with flood-affected peo-
ple, I observed their interesting tendency to talk about the floods as one event. 
Collapsing such discrete events into one ontological category initially seemed 
to me to be an indication that people ascribe the existence of floods as being a 
more or less unavoidable matter of fact in the future. However, as the ethno-
graphic cases above illustrate, when prompted to expand on their experiences, 
the different flood events are easily singled out and analysed according to their 
similarities and differences. In other words, even though flood events are col-
lapsed into a single category, people do not necessarily take for granted that this 
means that floods of a similar severity will come in the near future, or that they 
are predetermined and unavoidable; but neither does it mean that floods will 
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not come. It means, rather, that people living in areas that are allowed to be 
flooded, are beginning, to a certain extent, to embrace contingency and uncer-
tainty as a condition of life. This should not be interpreted to mean that people 
sit back and do nothing about their houses being flooded, which ought to be 
clear from the cases I have described in this chapter. But it does mean that es-
pecially after the 2013 event, flood-affected citizens of Dresden do not take ex-
pert estimates of statistical return periods or predictions of the future at face 
value. Rather than using the past to know the present or predict the future, the 
past casts the future in uncertain terms. The future is to some degree unknow-
able, and living with floods is either a fact of life, or a period of their lives that 
is already over, if there are no more floods in the coming decades. If the latter, 
then there is a real possibility that yet another disaster memory gap (Pfister 
2011) will occur, if the next generation of Dresdners does not experience what 
it means when the Elbe River threatens them. 
  
 
Towards Which Climate? 
 
There is of course another aspect to the issue of future floods in places like 
Dresden that adds more complexity and uncertainty to the question whether or 
not major floods will recur so frequent: climate change. Climate change adap-
tation and disaster risk reduction are becoming increasingly entangled, as na-
tional and global policy concerns such as the Sendai Framework for Disaster 
Risk Reduction acknowledge that global warming is predicted to have wide-
spread and significant impact on the frequency and severity of disasters 
(UNISDR 2015). Elizabeth Marino’s ethnography (2015) Fierce Climate, Sacred 
Ground: An Ethnography of Climate Change in Shishmaref, portrays in great detail 
how it is becoming increasingly difficult to demarcate climate change from 
(usual) disaster events in the arctic region, with one exacerbating the effects of 
the other. Indeed, many recent anthropological publications on climate change 
show how environmental change and adaptation are being tied to environmen-
tal crisis and rupture, including disasters and catastrophes (Hastrup and Rubow 
2014). 
I have only briefly mentioned the issue of  climate change in this thesis. 
There is a reason why I have not dealt with this issue in a more comprehensive 
manner here: people in flood-prone areas of  Dresden almost never talk about 
climate change or link local floods with global warming. While conducting re-
search in Dresden, but especially while writing this thesis, I have had a hard 
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time deciding what to do about the climate change question, and for a long time 
I had resolved that I would not address it at all. However, I believe the issue 
does deserve to be mentioned here, towards the end. 
Before embarking on fieldwork, I had a firm belief  that climate change 
would be a core issue for people who had endured flood events, and that they 
would be anxious about global warming. But this turned out not to be the case. 
As I designed my research around a pragmatic approach that to some extent let 
the informants define and direct which issues warranted further examination, I 
allowed climate change to slide into the background because it rarely came up. 
When I did ask people about it, I got answers like the following from Stefan 
Schulz: 
 
Well, yes, it is not like we do not believe in climate change like some of  the Americans. 
It is just, what can we do about it here? Dresden has experienced flooding before in 
history, so it is not clear whether these recent floods are actually something extraordi-
nary. Whether we call it climate change or not, we would be doing the same things to 
protect ourselves from floods. I think it doesn’t not really matter what you call it.  
 
Indeed, given the history of  floods in Dresden, and the pattern of  event clusters 
in specific periods of  time as I mentioned in Chapter Two (Merz et al. 2016), it 
is not clear from a local perspective whether climate change has a role to play, 
or whether the recent major flooding is simply history repeating itself.  
Despite these local opinions, however, the city of Dresden and the Free 
State of Saxony are of course concerned with the issue of climate change, and 
existing flood management plans and schemes are folded into larger climate 
change adaptation strategies (Korndörfer et al. 2009). Left-wing parties in par-
ticular in Dresden and Saxony argue that flood management ought to be inte-
grated into large-scale climate change adaptation solutions, including sustaina-
ble land-use and green infrastructure, as I have indicated earlier. More gener-
ally, the 2002 floods prompted a general concern with climate change across 
Germany as the possible culprit for these historical and monumental events 
(Kachelmann 2002), and so to claim that climate change does not exist as a 
public matter of concern would be to oversimplify matters. Yet the question of 
whether each major flood event that occurs in Dresden is due to climate change 
is neither contested nor a primary matter of concern for flood-affected citizens 
or the city officials I have talked to.  
But what is the answer to that question?  Will the frequency and impact 
of floods in Europe become worse in the future due to climate change? And 
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what might be the consequences locally for a place like Dresden? Although cli-
mate scientists seem to be certain that weather patterns will change, bringing 
more uncertainty to weather prediction, it is not a given that more floods will 
be a direct result of climate change itself. Rather, it varies from region to region, 
and even from city to city. The UN Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC) makes the following observation in their most recent report 
from 2014: 
 
Recent major flood events in Europe include the 2007 floods in the UK and the 2013 
floods in Germany. The observed increase in river flood events and damages in Europe 
is well documented; however, the main cause is increased exposure of persons and prop-
erty in flood risk areas. (…) Some regions may see increasing risks, but others may see 
decreases or little to no change. In the EU15, river flooding could affect 250,000 to 
400,000 additional people by the 2080s more than doubling annual average damages, 
with Central and Northern Europe and the UK most affected. When economic growth 
is included, economic flood losses in Europe could increase 17-fold (…) (Kovats et al. 
2014:1280). 
 
What is clear from the IPCC statement – and backed up by the European En-
vironment Agency (2013) – is that some areas may see increased flood risk, 
while others may not. Moreover, the risks that river floods pose for Europe are 
predominantly a result of more people living in areas of risk, bringing increased 
economic value to those areas and regions; they cannot at this moment in time 
be attributed to climate changes. The IPCC does predict that Northern Europe, 
including Germany, will be especially exposed to increased economic damages 
from flooding, as high as 17-fold. It thus seems that regardless of whether future 
floods are caused by climate change or not, Europe, including Dresden, is 
headed for a future with more floods. 
 The IPCC report is also quite clear when it comes to identifying what has 
caused recent flood events in Europe: human activity. This resonates with what 
disaster scholars have been saying for decades: disasters do not come about as 
a result of precipitation and extreme weather events alone. Rather, they are a 
result of how societies set themselves up to become more vulnerable to such 
events, as proponents of the vulnerability approach (Blaikie et al. 1994) have 
argued for decades. 
 Climate change or no, citizens of Dresden still seem to subscribe to the 
view that floods will occur more regularly today than they did before. In effect, 
the question of how to make life tolerable for those living in areas of Dresden 
without protection is still unresolved in numerous ways. Insurance policies are 
not readily available for all, and as the case of the Schneider family shows, 
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damages to one’s house do not necessarily become easier or less expensive to 
manage with the second or third flood event, although this would make sense, 
as business interests have seen an opportunity for financial gain in restoration 
and repair work. It is of course important to put the severity of the floods into 
context. The type of floods that most people in the Dresden area face are not 
flash floods that wreak havoc. Rather, with time, they become both a nuisance 
and a financial burden, not to mention the general existential insecurity that 
they pose. While moving has been an option for some, others have actively 
chosen to stay because they cherish where they live. For still others, moving is 
not a viable option, as selling a house in a flood-prone area would not give them 
the means to buy a house of any comparable standard elsewhere.   
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Chapter 7 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
 
It is just an illusion we have here on Earth that one moment follows another one, like beads on a 
string, and that once a moment is gone it is gone forever. 
- Kurt Vonnegut (1969:27) 
 
When the floods are not on our minds anymore, what do we do then? 
- Alexander Lange, Fluthilfezentrum 
 
 
 
A few weeks after participating in the heritage conference hosted by the Tech-
nical University in June 2014, I was walking along the Elbe on top of Dresden's 
old fortifications, where, as noted earlier, over the last decade the city has up-
graded a kilometre-long sandstone wall to protect the Altstadt from flooding. I 
am accompanied by an official from the Dresden Environmental Office who 
has been kind enough to spend an afternoon with me, answering my many 
questions. 
 The official explains that their faith in meticulous German bureaucratic 
planning – as he puts it with an ironic wink toward national stereotypes – with-
stood its real test in June 2013, when many of the new technical systems in the 
Altstadt faced their first major flood. He recalls that the water rose so high that 
with a few centimetres more, it would have overtopped the walls. In some 
places, it would not have taken much extra water for the river to spill over into 
the city. However, the steel plates the city mounted on top of the sandstone 
walls prevailed.  
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 In the midst of our conversation, the official stops, glances out over the 
Elbe, and reflects: 
 
Flooding is obviously a terrible thing, and although we do everything we can to prevent 
it, it was also fascinating to feel the pressure from the river. Everything was shaking, and 
you could sense the sheer force of the water. Yet it was quiet. It was unbelievable to see 
the Elbe behave that way. You could feel its will. 
 
He then tells me that for the city, the 2013 event may have been an even bigger 
surprise than the 2002 floods, because it was the second one-hundred-year event 
in little more than a decade. After that event, they were instructed by public 
relations people at the city administration not to use the term “one-hundred-
year event”. “It can be too easily misconstrued and misunderstood,” the official 
says, hinting at the fact that many citizens of Dresden have criticised flood pro-
jections based on retrospective statistics.  
 I ask the official about his views on flood protection and risk management 
more generally. What are the goals from the Environmental Office’s point of 
view, what is it that they are trying to achieve? He looked at me suspiciously, 
as though there must be a hidden agenda behind a question with such an obvi-
ous answer. Again, he stopped and glanced at the Elbe. “For us, it is all about 
getting things to get back to normal as quickly as possible for people, so that 
they can get on with their lives.” 
 The official’s remark speaks to a central aspect of how floods have a so-
cial, political, and public afterlife in Dresden: namely, how does a society adapt 
to the newfound perception that what were once rare events now seem to be 
more frequent, but are still inherently uncertain? The notion of returning things 
“to normal” prompts the question of what normal is, and whether the floods 
themselves produced a redefined normal.  
 This thesis has revolved around two central questions, pursuing them 
from different angles with respect to aspects of social and public life before, 
during and after floods in Dresden. First, what is the relationship between the 
ordinary and the exceptional when events that were once thought to be rare and 
extraordinary suddenly seem to be more and more frequent? Moreover, how 
can we understand such recurring events as having political and public dimen-
sions that both shape and are shaped by society? 
 I have aimed to show how flood-affected people in Dresden are beginning 
to adjust their perspective on such events as normal: not necessarily occurring 
cyclically, on an annual basis, but at the same time not unusual. It is this process 
of usualisation, of flood events that the thesis has attempted to shed light on. 
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This does not imply, however, that I treat floods as a type of  risk that people in 
Dresden are preoccupied with on a daily basis. Rather, such usual disasters sit 
somewhere between everyday occurrences and rare events. What I have termed 
usual disasters should thus be understood as a kind of  event that sits conceptually 
between the kind of  disaster-as-culture that Bankoff  (2002) describes and those 
extraordinarily improbable events that Nassim Taleb (2007) has called Black 
Swans, that one could argue that the 2002 floods were when they happened. 
 Instead, after the memory gap leading up to the 2002 event, the floods are 
in the process of  becoming an inherent part of  the production of  culture and 
society. Floods in Dresden are both catalysed and catalytic in relation to society, 
and precisely because they are both, they are intertwined with other issues that 
are of  equal importance to Dresdners, such as civil mobilisation, solidarity, 
house prices, urban development, memorialisation, and relations between the 
central and peripheral areas of  the Dresden municipality.  
 Many of the arguments made in this thesis echo what social scientists 
studying disasters have contended for decades (Blaikie et al. 1994; Oliver-Smith 
1999a), while others find their parallel in more recent works (Simpson 2013; 
Guggenheim 2013). This study not only seeks to contribute to the field of  dis-
aster studies more generally by adding to the growing literature on how disas-
ters prompt social transformations, but also to environmental and political an-
thropology, by attempting to theorise how we can understand environmental 
change and the afterlife of  environmental disasters ethnographically. Moreover, 
although climate change, as I mentioned in Chapter Six, has not been a direct 
focus of the thesis, I would argue that the current situation in Dresden mirrors 
many of the predicaments that people face in light of environmental crisis and 
change in different contexts.  
 I have tried via the various themes in my chapters to present an outline of  
how adjusting and adapting to floods is not solely a private matter for individ-
uals, families and households. Coming to terms with a new perception of  reality 
that is based more on an uncertainty about the future than the certainty that 
more floods will come is also a social, and indeed public, matter. 
 When a flood emergency provides the rare opportunity for members of  
the public to act collectively across social divides and political sympathies to 
safeguard public spaces, then the idea of  a society in tune with itself  suddenly 
takes on a more concrete form. Thus, when the authorities criticised public par-
ticipation in the flood response, they forgot one crucial aspect, namely that such 
forms of  participation are about more than just who is in control of  the state of  
emergency; they are also about citizens feeling part of  something bigger than 
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themselves. When the question of  solidarity between citizens and refugees more 
generally is linked to ideas about solidarity during the times of  floods, then 
ideas about what holds society together become a matter of  public concern, 
catalysed by the floods as critical events. When questions of  what one must give 
up in order to become fully protected from floods spark protests from civil so-
ciety, then the very idea of  what it means to live by a river becomes a central 
collective concern and prompts a new configuration between citizens and their 
local government. And when protection is forfeited, then the question of  
whether and how to adapt to the circumstances or to move away prompts a 
fundamental interrogation of  how to make life tolerable, and how to lean on 
neighbours, friends, and even strangers to continue life in proximity to the wa-
ter. 
 In the rest of this conclusion, I will offer a few final reflections on two 
themes: temporality and change. 
 Disasters are intense events, and the concentration of human activity they 
provoke can prompt various social, cultural and political changes. However, 
any discussion around changes brought about by disasters must also address 
continuity, or to what extent these changes are merely intensifications of cur-
rent trends (Bankoff 2004:27). As Susanna Hoffman argues, whether disasters 
instigate change, continuity, or both, and to what extent, is not only one of the 
central questions in the field of disaster research, but also one that will “rouse 
seemingly endless discourse” (Hoffman 1999:302). Moreover, Hoffman re-
minds us that in order to talk about change or continuity, we must also qualify 
what we mean by change: that is, whether such changes are minor or major, 
shallow or deep, lasting or temporary (Hoffman 1999:303). As I have attempted 
to show, in Dresden, questions such as those posed by Hoffman are not easily 
answered when comparing the recent history of floods with that of earlier his-
torical periods (Fügner 2002; Poliwoda 2007). In some ways, the circumstances 
surrounding recent flood events seem almost like history repeating itself, espe-
cially with respect to questions of structural flood protection; in others, more 
profound changes are under way, exemplified by how people engage with flood 
response through new digital technologies. 
 Yet, while disaster transforms things, the political, social, cultural and 
economic processes that have accumulated over the years to produce the disas-
ter also give it shape. It is in this sense that disasters are not only sequential 
events, but also processes. Disasters are shaped by specific configurations of  
where people live, how they live, and what means they have at their disposal to 
withstand destructive events like river floods. At the same time, however, such 
 
 
215 
events shape how these communities of  people come to be, because of  antici-
patory actions to manage future flood events. When an area is classified as a 
flood inundation zone, for example, then those living in that area will come to 
relate to their environment, their immediate community, and to the state in very 
specific ways. In other cases, flood management schemes that anticipate disas-
ter very concretely can define the borders of  communities, as is the case in 
Übigau and Mickten in the northwest part of  Dresden; they are separated by a 
flood retention canal that in no small measure defines the boundaries of  where 
one area and community of  the city ends and another one begins. 
 As the Dresden case shows, then, separating how floods have shaped so-
ciety from how society has shaped floods becomes a challenge, because the two 
modes have become entangled and intertwined over the centuries; indeed, this 
is what I argue is happening once again in Dresden since the great shock of  
2002. This perspective resonates with historical accounts of  disasters that retro-
spectively account for the dual relationship between disasters and culture/soci-
ety, in which the kind of  change that disasters instigate takes no predetermined, 
teleological direction. As Mauelshagen (2009:45) argues, it is “(…) a change 
emerging from the interaction between nature and culture that is irreversible 
and yet is neither predetermined nor arbitrary in its course.” Greg Bankoff goes 
even further, arguing not only that disasters and culture influence each other 
over time, but that what counts as a disaster is also predicated on cultural defi-
nitions: 
 
The key question here seems to me to be the historical relationship between disasters and 
culture. How has culture affected disasters and disasters influenced culture over time? 
Culture not only determines how a disaster comes about but even what constitutes a 
disaster in the first place. (For example, the fact that twelve million people will be injured 
or killed in traffic accidents in the coming year apparently is not considered as a disaster.) 
Moreover, what are the processes that respectively ‘de-’ and ‘re-disasterize’ events: that 
is how are things that are now considered to be disasters cease [sic] to be one and how 
are ones that are not become one? These types of questions can only be understood by 
consideration of what constitutes ‘time’ or the ‘past’. (Bankoff 2004:29) 
 
 With respect to Bankoff ’s last point, most parts of this thesis have con-
cerned the past and the present: how people in Dresden experienced the shock 
of the 2002 floods, and how that event and the subsequent floods in 2006 and 
2013 confronted them with the notion that floods might be more common than 
they had once thought. Obviously, as was most apparent in Chapter Six, the 
future also plays an integral part in how people come to terms with floods as a 
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condition. And precisely for this reason, this thesis has indeed concerned the 
future as much as it has the past and the present.  
 One manner of understanding how people remember and rationalise their 
actions in intense moments or periods such as flood events is as temporal punc-
tuations that stand out in one way or another from the collective understanding 
of “the normal”, in which different temporal dynamics are at play simultane-
ously. That is, both the future of the past and the future of the present combine 
to form the prospective horizons that people use to make sense of their aspira-
tions for the future, including how strategies and tactics of prevention and risk 
reduction are contingent on such horizons.  
 This ethnographic research itself  can also be said to rest on a contingent 
‘razor’s edge’. I arrived and studied the aftereffects of  the three major flood 
events at a moment in time when people perceived them as usual disasters. Had 
this fieldwork been undertaken just after the 2002 floods, that event might well 
have been understood as a radical exception to the rule, and the stories that 
people would have told me about the floods would undoubtedly have been 
different. The temporal context thus plays a significant role in understanding 
the predicaments of  flood-affected citizens. If  I were to return in ten to twenty 
years, additional research would in turn be contingent upon whether there had 
been another major flood in the meantime. If  another flood arrives in the near 
future, then one can only observe whether a new army of  citizens will form; 
whether solidarity will be as effervescent as before; whether the issue of  pro-
tecting Laubegast still fuels accusations and deflections of  blame; and whether 
people living on the periphery of  Dresden will decide to move, regardless of  the 
costs of  such a decision, or stay, continuing to defy the force of  the Elbe. 
 As a regional capital and a city of cultural landmarks, Dresden retains a 
strong sense of identity and self-awareness. The floods have been part of that 
history, alongside the bombing of the city in 1945, the communist era, 
UNESCO heritage conflicts, and recent political polarizations. A central part 
of the argument I have made in this thesis is that issues regarding flooding in 
Dresden should always be seen in relation to current and historical political 
developments. The relationship is not necessarily causal, whereby one issue af-
fects the other directly. Rather, in keeping with the notions of intertwinement 
and Tsing’s (2004) idea of friction (the constant encounters between competing 
interests and actors over time that produce culture and society), issues including 
those related to flooding affect each other because they play out in the same 
cultural and political context. Moreover, these issues relate to each other be-
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cause of their public nature. People who are not necessarily affected by the dis-
aster congregate around the floods, thereby turning them into matters of public 
concern and making them about more than merely “some Germans getting 
their basements flooded”, as friends and colleagues wondered before I em-
barked on fieldwork. Rather, the floods prompt questions and conflicts that 
concern fundamental questions of how citizens relate to the state, how one 
should behave toward strangers, and what it means to live under conditions of 
insecurity. 
 From this point of view, floods are not necessarily political in and of them-
selves, but are so in relation to other political, cultural and social issues. This is 
the approach I have taken in this thesis, examining how disasters have a public 
afterlife that shapes how citizens and the government come to expect the next 
flood. It is, of course, not a question of if it will come, but when. 
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English Abstract 
 
 
 
In this thesis, I explore how citizens and public institutions have adjusted to 
recent recurring floods in Dresden. As a riverine city, Dresden regularly expe-
rienced damaging floods throughout its history, right up until the start of the 
Second World War. Then something strange happened. Although water levels 
in the Elbe still reached threatening heights on an annual basis, the next sixty 
years did not produce any flood event that overran the city's flood defences. In 
hindsight, Dresden experienced what historians of disaster call a disaster 
memory gap, whereby the collective memory of what floods entail gradually 
faded as a result of a long period without a major event.  
 Then, in August 2002, heavy rain for weeks on end caused the biggest 
flood on record in Dresden and across Central Europe. Thousands of homes 
were flooded, and damages in the city amounted to over 1 billion euros. It was 
quickly classified as a hundred-year event: a statistical outlier that was not likely 
to recur anytime soon. However, in June 2013, the third-largest flood on record 
broke the dikes that protect the city. Yet again, Dresden experienced an event 
that was only supposed to occur once every hundred years. The recent spate of 
floods in Dresden prompts us to investigate the nature of the relationship be-
tween the ordinary and the exceptional, since events that were once thought to 
be rare and extraordinary suddenly seem to be more and more frequent. 
 In the thesis, I explore how the citizens of Dresden are adjusting to a new 
understanding of the future in which recurring floods may prove to be the rule 
rather than the exception. In other words, floods have become what I term usual 
disasters. The ethnographic research that I conducted in 2014-2015 explores how 
locals, at this specific moment in time, perceive the future as being fraught with 
uncertainty. This has implications both for how people understand themselves 
as members of society as well as for the relationship between the state and civil 
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society. In other words, floods in Dresden have a social, political and public 
life.  
 Rather than seeing disasters solely as either catalysed by patterns of vul-
nerability in society, or as catalytic events that shape the configuration of soci-
ety, the thesis approaches floods in Dresden through what I call intertwine-
ment. Floods are an integral and intertwined part of the history of Dresden, and 
are thus located within, rather than outside, society. As recurring events, the 
floods become intertwined with other political issues, such as the urban devel-
opment of the city’s riverscape; the ability of citizens to participate in emer-
gency response efforts; local opposition to government plans to build floodwalls 
and dikes; and finally, how solidarity toward flood victims enflamed a discus-
sion of the meaning of solidarity between citizens. The thesis thus explores how 
floods perceived as recurring events are tied together with these and other po-
litical issues in Dresden, and argues that disaster politics should not only be 
conceived as a politics of the exceptional, but also as a politics of the usual. 
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Dansk Resumé 
 
 
 
I denne afhandling undersøger jeg, hvordan borgere og offentlige institutioner 
har tilpasset sig de seneste oversvømmelser i Dresden. Ligesom de fleste byer, 
der er beliggende ved en flod, har Dresden igennem hele sin historie regelmæs-
sigt oplevet massive og ødelæggende oversvømmelser, helt frem til starten af 
Anden Verdenskrig.  
 Derefter skete der noget besynderligt: Selvom vandstanden i Elben hvert 
år nåede truende højder, oplevede man i de næste tres år ingen oversvømmelse, 
der for alvor truede byens borgere eller dens bygninger. Retrospektivt set ople-
vede Dresden, hvad katastrofehistorikere kalder et katastrofe-hukommelsestab, 
hvorved den kollektive erindring om, hvad oversvømmelser medfører, lang-
somt forsvandt som følge af en lang periode uden en sådan stor begivenhed.  
 Men i august 2002 forårsagede massiv regn i ugevis den største oversvøm-
melse nogensinde i Dresden og i hele Centraleuropa. Tusinder af hjem blev 
oversvømmet, og skader i byen løb op i over en milliard euro. Oversvømmelsen 
blev hurtigt klassificeret som en hundrede års-begivenhed, som med al sandsyn-
lighed ikke ville forekomme i nær fremtid. Imidlertid oplevede byen i juni 2013 
endnu en voldsom oversvømmelse. Endnu engang kom Dresden dermed ud for 
en begivenhed, der kun skulle ske en gang hvert hundrede år.  
 De nylige oversvømmelser i Dresden kan hjælpe os til at forstå, hvad for-
holdet mellem det sædvanlige og det usædvanlige er, når begivenheder, der en-
gang blev anset for at være sjældne og ekstraordinære, pludselig synes at være 
normale. 
 I afhandlingen undersøger jeg, hvordan borgerne i Dresden har tilpasset 
sig en ny opfattelse af fremtiden, hvor oversvømmelser er reglen snarere end 
undtagelsen. De opfattes som det, jeg kalder sædvanlige katastrofer. Den etnogra-
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fiske forskning, som jeg gennemførte fra 2014-2015, undersøger, hvordan lokal-
befolkningen opfatter fremtiden som noget, der er omgærdet med usikkerhed. 
Dette har betydning for, hvordan mennesker forstår sig selv som medlemmer 
af samfundet, og hvordan forholdet mellem stat og civilsamfund er konfigure-
ret. Afhandlingen undersøger med andre ord, hvordan oversvømmelser i Dres-
den har et socialt, politisk og offentligt liv. 
 Snarere end at se katastrofer udelukkende som hændelser, der er kataly-
seret af sårbarhedsmønstre i samfundet, eller som katalytiske begivenheder, der 
former samfundet, undersøger afhandlingen oversvømmelser i Dresden som 
værende sammenflettet med samfundet. Oversvømmelser er en integreret del af 
Dresdens historie og er således placeret inden for samfundet snarere end at være 
eksterne begivenheder. Som tilbagevendende begivenheder flettes oversvøm-
melserne sammen med andre politiske problemer og kontroverser, såsom by-
udvikling af byens flodlandskab; mulighed for borgerne for at deltage i nød-
hjælpsarbejde; lokal modstand mod den lokale regerings planer om at bygge 
mure og diger, der skal forebygge oversvømmelser; og hvordan solidaritet mel-
lem ofrene for oversvømmelserne har ført til en offentlig diskussion om, hvad 
solidaritet og fællesskab blandt borgere betyder generelt set. Afhandlingen ud-
forsker dermed, hvordan oversvømmelser er bundet sammen med andre politi-
ske spørgsmål i Dresden, og hævder, at katastrofepolitik ikke kun behøver at 
blive opfattet som noget ekstraordinært, men i lige så høj grad som noget, der 
er sædvanligt. 
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